Opinion
15-P-670
03-16-2016
JOHN FINLAYSON v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BILLERICA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
John Finlayson owns a parcel of real estate located on Seminole Road in the town of Billerica. He appeals from the decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) affirming the defendant board of assessors' (assessors) denial of an application for abatement of real property taxes assessed on the parcel for fiscal year 2014. Finlayson contends that in affirming the denial of abatement, the board made multiple procedural errors, and that the board's decision was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
General Laws c. 58A, § 7. Finlayson contends that the board made four errors under G. L. c. 58A, § 7, and the board's rules prescribed thereunder, 831 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.00 et seq. (2007), which govern appeals taken to the board. Finlayson argues that the board erred by (1) permitting the assessors to introduce "last minute" evidence not produced in discovery prior to the hearing; (2) not entering a default judgment in his favor after the assessors failed to file an answer to his appeal to the board; (3) allowing the assessors to challenge Finlayson's characterization of his dwelling as a "bungalow" and to contest anything else in his appeal, because of their failure to file an answer; and (4) failing to deem the dwelling a bungalow as a sanction for the assessors' failure to respond to Finlayson's request for admissions under Mass.R.Civ.P. 36, 365 Mass. 795 (1974). None of these contentions has merit.
Under G. L. c. 58A, § 7, as appearing in St. 1998, c. 485, § 2, appellees in appeals to the board are not required to file an answer "if the appellee desires to raise no issue other than the question whether there has been an overvaluation or improper classification of the property on which the tax appealed from was assessed" (emphasis supplied). Here, Finlayson's appeal was based entirely on a claim of overvaluation, in part because the assessors characterized the dwelling on the property as a "ranch" rather than a bungalow. As the only issue before the board was valuation, the assessors were not required to file an answer. Accordingly, the assessors did not default, and they were not precluded from contesting Finlayson's claim of overvaluation.
Finlayson's claim regarding the admission of "last minute" evidence over his objection is governed by 831 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37 (2007), the regulation concerning practice and procedure before the board. Under § 1.37(1), the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, and the board "reserves the right to make hearings and proceedings as informal as possible, to the end that substance and not form shall govern, and that a final determination of all matters before it may be promptly reached." In addition, § 1.37(2) states that "all formal rules of pleadings, practice and evidence will be eliminated to the extent that the Board member or members holding the hearing may consider practicable."
Accordingly, rule 36 does not apply, and the assessors had no obligation to respond to Finlayson's request for admissions.
Under its informal rules, the board did not err in admitting in evidence a sales comparison analysis that the assessors did not provide to Finlayson until the date of the hearing. When Finlayson objected to the evidence, the hearing commissioner granted a twenty-minute recess for Finlayson to review the analysis. In addition, the commissioner agreed to hold the evidence open for three weeks after the hearing to permit Finlayson to file a response, which he did, and which the board considered in reaching its decision. The hearing commissioner's actions in this regard were consonant with the regulations and did not deprive Finlayson of a fair hearing.
Weight of the evidence. On review, we determine whether the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. See New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 465 (1981); First Marblehead Corp. v. Commissioner of Rev., 470 Mass. 497, 501 (2015). "[S]ubstantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, supra at 466 (quotation and citation omitted). "Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a possible but a necessary inference from the findings." Olympia & York State St. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 428 Mass. 236, 240 (1998) (quotation and citation omitted).
Finlayson had the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that his property was overvalued. General Elec. Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984). "The taxpayer may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation." Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983). The board gave due consideration to the evidence Finlayson submitted and the arguments he made, including his assertion that the Concord River, which abuts the assessors' comparable bungalow properties, is a more desirable setting than the Shawsheen River near his home. "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the board." Cummington Sch. of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977), citing Fisher Sch. v. Assessors of Boston, 325 Mass. 529, 534 (1950). Giving "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge" of the board, Peterson v. Assessors of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 432 (2004), quoting from G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), and the evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that the board did not err in its determination.
Decision of the Appellate Tax Board affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Grainger & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: March 16, 2016.