Finkel Products v. Bell

24 Citing cases

  1. United States v. 0.28 Acres of Land

    347 F. Supp. 2d 273 (W.D. Va. 2004)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that party claiming laches bears the burden of proof

    The Supreme Court of Virginia has described laches "as an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party." Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 140 S.E.2d 695, 699 (Va. 1965), abrogated on other grounds, Heyward Lee Constr. Co., Inc. v. Sands, Anderson, Marks Miller, 453 S.E.2d 270 (Va. 1995). No set amount of time automatically makes a delay unreasonable; it depends on the circumstances of each case.

  2. Heyward Lee Constr. v. Sands, Anderson

    249 Va. 54 (Va. 1995)   Cited 14 times

    ' " Id. at 125, 68 S.E. at 281 (quoting De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Montgomery Brewing Co., 57 F. 111 (5th Cir. 1893)). We reaffirmed the Monk decision in Finkel Products v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695 (1965). In so doing, we stated the following:

  3. Forrer v. Brown

    221 Va. 1098 (Va. 1981)   Cited 9 times

    The regularity of the first suit, as the result of which Brown acquired ownership of the property, is not challenged. Thus, unless the court in the second suit had jurisdiction over Brown and he was brought before the court in the manner authorized by law, the decree in that suit as to his ownership interest was utterly void. Elementary is the proposition that no person may be deprived of his property without due process of law and one of the essentials of due process is notice. Finkel Outdoor Products, Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 931, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965). [2-3] Forrer argues "the County actually joined [Brown], by order of publication, as a party unknown" in the second suit.

  4. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. Levin Prof'l Servs.

    348 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Va. 2004)   Cited 1 times

    The affirmative defense of Laches is defined as "an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable time and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party." Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1965). In order to prevail on laches, Levin must show two things: (1) Wells Fargo's neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time, and (2) that the delay has prejudiced Levin.

  5. In re Shegog

    Case No. 05-52434-FJS (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sep. 9, 2008)   Cited 1 times

    The affirmative defense of laches to the motion to reopen requires a showing that Ms. Terry failed to assert her rights "for an unreasonable time and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party." Wells Fargo Bank v. Levin Prof'l Servs., 348 F. Supp. 2d 638, 646 (E.D. Va. 2004) (quoting Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695, 699 (Va. 1965)). The court in Wells Fargo Bank goes on to say:

  6. McCulley v. Brooks & Co. General Contractors, Inc.

    295 Va. 583 (Va. 2018)   Cited 9 times
    Observing that "a party making a general appearance prior to the entry of a final judgment waives any objection to the service of process by voluntarily submitting to the court's jurisdiction over him"

    "The consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Id. Consequently, "a judgment against a party not before the court in any way will be as utterly void as though the court had undertaken to act when the subject-matter was not within its cognizance," Blanton v. Carroll , 86 Va. 539, 541, 10 S.E. 329, 329 (1889), "and may be so treated in any proceeding, direct or collateral," Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell , 205 Va. 927, 931, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965) (quoting Martin P. Burks, Common Law and Statutory Pleading and Practice § 353, at 667-68 (T. Munford Boyd ed., 4th ed. 1952) ).

  7. Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc. v. Harvard

    291 Va. 42 (Va. 2016)   Cited 15 times
    Declining to reach parties' claim based on putative violation of Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States where the case could be resolved without reaching the constitutional issues, because the Court "strive to decide cases on the ‘best and narrowest grounds available’ "

    The rule also prevents parties from using private contract disputes to attack the validity of a law when, as here, the government is not a party and cannot be enjoined from enforcing the allegedly invalid law. See Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 929, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965) (“The defendant must be properly brought before the court, else there will be no jurisdiction over him and a judgment against him will be void.”).

  8. Glumina Bank v. D.C. Diamond Corporation

    259 Va. 312 (Va. 2000)   Cited 9 times
    Finding subsection satisfied because foreign company contracted to transfer funds into a bank account in Virginia

    These contentions are meritless. Of course, any money judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. Finkel Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 931, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965). But as we already have said, Code § 8.01-328.

  9. James T. Bush Construction Co. v. Patel

    243 Va. 84 (Va. 1992)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Surveying cases and observing that "principles of due process" bear on necessity of trustee

    We specifically reject any construction of Monk that would lead to the conclusion that the holder of an interest arising subsequent to a mechanic's lien is, by definition, a proper but not a necessary party, and that an analysis regarding the nature and rights of such interest is unnecessary in making that determination. Due process rights and the relevance of such rights to property subject to a mechanic's lien were discussed in Finkel Products v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695 (1965). [6-7] In this case, Bush seeks to compel the sale of the subject property to satisfy the mechanic's lien. Dominion's status as beneficiary of a deed of trust was a matter of record prior to Bush's filing the original bill of complaint. Indeed, Bush named the deed of trust trustees as defendants.

  10. Race Fork Coal Co. v. Turner

    237 Va. 639 (Va. 1989)   Cited 11 times
    In Race Fork Coal, an injured employee filed a worker's compensation suit initially against what he thought was his employer, an uninsured independent contractor, and then refiled it against his statutory employer, a fully insured general contractor.

    We are faced with an adjudication of which the defendant had no notice and, therefore, no opportunity to defend. Ordinarily, due process would require that Race Fork receive notice of the accident and of the hearing on October 29, 1985. Finkel Productsv. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 931, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965). Recognizing the constitutional necessity for such notice, the Fund argues that it was not required in this case because the Workers' Compensation Act put Race Fork in privity with Travis.