Where the communication is not fair and honest, the qualified privilege does not exist. Finish Allatoona's InterstateRight, Inc. v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572, 575(1) ( 206 S.E.2d 679) (1974); see also Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 273-274(4) ( 165 S.E. 443) (1932). In this case, the inquiry focuses on the element of good faith, alone.

By its terms, if the requirements of the code section are met, matters contained in such pleadings are privileged "[h]owever false and malicious [the allegedly libelous statements] may be...." OCGA § 51-5-8; Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691 ( 25 S.E.2d 414). The case of Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572 ( 206 S.E.2d 679), relied upon by appellant does not stand for the proposition he asserts. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on these claims.

That statute is construed in pari materia with OCGA § 51-5-7, which affords a conditional privilege to, among other publications, fair and honest reports of court proceedings and comments upon the acts of public persons with reference to their public capacities. See Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406 ( 61 S.E.2d 221) (1950); Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572 ( 206 S.E.2d 679) (1974). However, the conditional privilege which protects newspaper reports such as the one currently under consideration "disappears in the face of `actual malice.'"