Opinion
No. 1D18-3993
07-06-2020
Anthony Deonta FINCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Victor Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris E. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Victor Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris E. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
Appellant, Anthony Deonta Finch, appeals his conviction for second-degree murder and raises three issues. We affirm as to all issues and write only to address his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove that he acted with hatred, spite, ill will, or evil intent when he shot the victim in the back after losing to him all of his girlfriend's money and his gun during a dice game.
We review the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to determine whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. Holmes v. State , 278 So. 3d 301, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). If the State presented competent evidence to establish every element of the crime, judgment of acquittal is improper. Id.
Appellant's conviction for second-degree murder required proof that the killing was perpetrated by an act done from ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. See § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (making "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual" second-degree murder); see also Holmes , 278 So. 3d at 304 (explaining that an act is imminently dangerous to another and evinces a depraved mind when a person of ordinary judgment would know that it is reasonably certain to kill or cause serious bodily injury, it is done from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil intent, and it is of such nature that it indicates an indifference to human life). The requisite intent must generally be inferred from the circumstances and may be demonstrated by the defendant's conduct before and after his use of deadly force. Holmes , 278 So. 3d at 304.
As Appellant contends, "[a]n impulsive overreaction to an attack or injury is insufficient to prove ill will, hatred, or spite." Sandhaus v. State , 200 So. 3d 112, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (reversing the appellant's second-degree murder conviction upon finding that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the evidence proved that he stabbed the victim with ill will, malice, hatred, spite, or evil intent and the evidence established only that he impulsively overreacted to seeing the victim hitting his younger brother as others joined the fight); see also Dorsey v. State , 74 So. 3d 521, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (concluding that the evidence established only an impulsive overreaction to an attack—not ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent—where the appellant was confronted by the victims and others while he had his back to his vehicle, he and one of the victims exchanged words, that victim punched him in the face with the other victim's encouragement, causing him to fall back against his car, and he quickly pulled out a gun and shot each victim once before driving away).
However, Appellant's reliance on Sandhaus in moving for a judgment of acquittal was misplaced because he was not reacting to an attack or injury when he shot the victim. The evidence at trial established that Appellant became angry and shot the victim in the back after losing money and a gun to him during a dice game. As Appellant recounted to his cellmate, the money and gun were not going anywhere because he needed the money and refused to lose guns, so he "hit that mother-f[*****]," "popped his a[**]." We find that Appellant's act of pointing a loaded gun at the victim and shooting him in the back demonstrated that he acted with the requisite intent to commit second-degree murder. Additionally, after shooting the victim, Appellant did not stay to render aid or call 911. When Appellant was finally arrested, his focus was on intimidating the witnesses and trying to ensure they did not show up for depositions and court. We find that Appellant's actions after the shooting further evinced that he acted with a depraved mind.
Because a reasonable jury could find that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant shot the victim with ill will, malice, hatred, spite, or evil intent, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. See Holmes , 278 So. 3d at 303–05 (rejecting the appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove that he acted with ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent when he shot his girlfriend in the back seat of the car he was driving upon finding that his act of pulling a loaded pistol and pointing it at the victim's head alone was competent evidence that he possessed the requisite intent and his actions after the shooting, whereby he did not stop the car and seek aid for the victim and instead disposed of the gun and provided false reports about the shooting, also reflected the requisite intent); see also Jacobson v. State , 248 So. 3d 286, 288–89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting that pointing a loaded gun at the victim's head and then firing has been held to be an act imminently dangerous and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life and finding in part that the appellant's conduct after the shooting also demonstrated that he had ill will towards the victim and the shooting was not an accident where he did not call 911 or seek medical aid and instead rummaged through the victim's house, stole his possessions, and confessed to another person, whom he subsequently tried to intimidate by threatening to kill her, too).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction.
AFFIRMED .
Lewis, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.