Filter v. Mohr

10 Citing cases

  1. Continental Cas. of Ill. v. Westinghouse Elec.

    327 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Mich. 1970)   Cited 1 times
    In Continental Casualty, the defect was deemed to have been "undiscoverable" by the assembler-manufacturer who was granted indemnity.

    The findings of the court are sufficiently definite as to each issue raised in the complaint to substantiate the general conclusions of the court as to negligence and breach of warranty. See generally, NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1952) on demeanor evidence, and Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, 266 N.W. 341 (1936) on the weight to be given to physical facts. The basic principle of the right to indemnity was also stated in the Fidelity Casualty of New York v. Federal Express case, supra:

  2. McDaniel v. Hancock

    43 N.W.2d 68 (Mich. 1950)   Cited 7 times

    " That an assault or an assault and battery may be committed in the manner asserted by plaintiff in the instant case was adjudicated in People v. Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375. Nor, in view of conflicting details in the pertinent testimony, can we agree with appellant's contention that "it [was] a physical impossibility for second accident to have occurred as plaintiff claims." Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230; Vukich v. City of Detroit, 325 Mich. 644, 647. Appellant contends that prejudicial error resulted during the closing argument to the jury by appellee's counsel, who said: "I do not know whatever happened to it on the criminal end of it. I did not look into that. It is not of any concern here.

  3. Holman v. Brady

    3 So. 2d 30 (Ala. 1941)   Cited 46 times

    Byram Co. v. Livingston, 225 Ala. 442, 143 So. 461; Daniel v. Motes, 228 Ala. 454, 153 So. 727; Buffalo Rock Co. v. Davis, 228 Ala. 603, 154 So. 556. Where evidence shows plaintiff started to pass truck of defendant 150 to 160 feet from intersection and point of collision was 50 feet from intersection, statute prohibiting passage at intersection is not applicable, and questions of negligence and contributory negligence are properly submitted to jury. Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, 266 N.W. 341; Cent. of Ga. R. Co. v. Chambers, 183 Ala. 155, 62 So. 724; Newman v. Lee, 222 Ala. 499, 133 So. 10. A witness may testify as to his impression from collective facts. Porter v. Louisville N. R. Co., 202 Ala. 139, 79 So. 605; Ala. G. S. R. Co. v. Yarbrough, 83 Ala. 238, 3 So. 447, 3 Am.St.Rep. 715; Ala. Min. R. Co. v. Jones, 114 Ala. 519, 21 So. 507, 62 Am.St.Rep. 121; St. L. S. F. R. Co. v. Brantley, 168 Ala. 579, 53 So. 305; Louisville N. R. Co. v. Williams, 183 Ala. 138, 62 So. 679, Ann.Cas.1915D, 483; Standard Coop. Co. v. Dearman, 204 Ala. 553, 86 So. 537; Sloss-S. S. I. Co. v. Jones, 207 Ala. 7, 91 So. 808; Werner S. M. Co. v. Vinson, 220 Ala. 210, 124 So. 420; Rowe v. Ala. Power Co. 232 Ala. 257, 167 So. 324; Birmingham R. L. P. Co. v. Long, 5 Ala. App. 510, 59 So. 382; McPherson v. Martin, 234 Ala. 244, 174 So. 791; Pittman v. Calhoun, 233 Ala. 450, 172 So. 263. Estimates of distance and speed are inconclusive factors, and the value of same is for the jury.

  4. Grudzien v. Ziolkowski

    293 N.W. 714 (Mich. 1940)   Cited 1 times

    As trier of the facts, he had the advantage of observing the witnesses, and, therefore, we are ever reluctant to disturb a finding based on credibility. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 280 Mich. 24; Rubsam Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 281 Mich. 691; Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230. The decree is affirmed.

  5. Fors v. LaFreniere

    284 Mich. 5 (Mich. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    Defendants' theory is refuted by the physical facts recited above, which show that plaintiff's decedent was struck by the front of the car. See Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230. Nor can it be said, as a matter of law, that one who walks or stumbles into the side of a car is necessarily guilty of contributory negligence. It is negligence only if it happened because of failure to exercise due care. See Patterson v. Wagner, 204 Mich. 593. This necessary qualification was not included in the language proposed by defendants. The court, therefore, properly refused to charge in the exact language of defendants' request.

  6. Rubsam Corp. v. General Motors Corp

    275 N.W. 735 (Mich. 1937)   Cited 4 times
    In Rubsam Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 281 Mich. 691, it was decided that there had been no use by defendant of patent 1. The case was thereafter remanded to circuit court for determination of whether patents 2, 3, and 4 had been used by defendant.

    The question of use by defendant of Rubsam's invention was sharply and strenuously disputed with strong testimony on both sides. As was said in Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, 234: " 'We are reluctant to disturb findings which involve the adoption of one of two conflicting versions in testimony.

  7. Potter v. Felician Sisters Home

    281 Mich. 101 (Mich. 1937)   Cited 6 times

    The issue of fact thus presented, makes the matter of decedent's contributory negligence a question for the jury. Detroit Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, supra, Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, and Marciniak v. Sundeen, 278 Mich. 407. See, also, Thompson v. Michigan Cab Co., 279 Mich. 370 ."

  8. Pulford v. Mouw

    272 N.W. 713 (Mich. 1937)   Cited 19 times

    The issue of fact thus presented makes the matter of decedent's contributory negligence a question for the jury. Detroit Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, supra; Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, and Marciniak v. Sundeen, 278 Mich. 407. See, also, Thompson v. Michigan Cab Co., ante. Appellants say that the court erred in failing to charge the jury, in the language of their requests to charge, regarding the condition of the brakes on decedent's car and with respect to defendant Mouw's negligence. The matter of the adequacy of brakes was fully and completely covered by the charge of the court.

  9. Marciniak v. Sundeen

    270 N.W. 729 (Mich. 1936)   Cited 6 times
    In Marciniak, the presumption was not involved because eyewitnesses were present to testify and their testimony disclosed that plaintiff's decedent driver did nothing to avert the accident.

    There was enough evidence relative to the place and character of the collision to present as an issue of fact defendant's negligence and decedent's contributory negligence. Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230. The conclusion reached by the trial judge is supported by testimony ( Bugbee v. Fowle, 277 Mich. 485, 490), and the judgment is affirmed, with costs to appellee.

  10. Purdy v. Moore

    224 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 9 times
    In Purdy v. Moore, Mo.App., 224 S.W.2d 838, the St. Louis Court of Appeals had under consideration a set of facts bringing in issue this section, and held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in undertaking to pass a truck at a certain intersection.

    We do not find that the question has been directly ruled by either of the Appellate Courts or the Supreme Court of our state. However, we do find that the Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of Filter v. Mohr, 275 Mich. 230, 266 N.W. 341, 343, had before it a very similar statute of that state. In that case the trial court said, "May a collision happening 37 feet from an intersecting highway line be classified as an intersection collision? I am firmly impressed with the belief that the answer should be in the affirmative.