Opinion
NUMBER 2015 CA 0888
12-23-2015
JOHN FILS & DEMITRIA FILS INDIVIDUALLY & ON BEHALF OF GENEVA FILS v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, CHARLES T. GUIDRY, JENNIFER R. HAYES, MAYOLA CALAIS, STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND/OR DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS AND/OR OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SERVICES & USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Patrick Daniel Rachel Martin-Deckelman Houston, TX and David L. Bateman Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Calvernia Reed, individually and on behalf of the minor child, Geneva Marie Fils James L. Hilburn Beth Everett E. Wade Shows Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana through the Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services, now known as the Department of Children and Family Services Donald R. Smith Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant, Mayola Calais J. Elliott Baker Irving H. Koch Covington, LA Counsel for Intervenor, State of Louisiana through James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, Attorney General
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Docket Number C553321
Honorable Donald Johnson, Judge Presiding
Patrick Daniel
Rachel Martin-Deckelman
Houston, TX
and
David L. Bateman
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee,
Calvernia Reed, individually and
on behalf of the minor child, Geneva
Marie Fils James L. Hilburn
Beth Everett
E. Wade Shows
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
State of Louisiana through the Department
of Social Services, Office of Community
Services, now known as the Department
of Children and Family Services Donald R. Smith
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant,
Mayola Calais J. Elliott Baker
Irving H. Koch
Covington, LA Counsel for Intervenor,
State of Louisiana through James D.
"Buddy" Caldwell, Attorney General BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH AND DRAKE, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
In this appeal, defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services, now known as the Department of Children and Family Services, ("the Department") challenges the trial court's ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment, declaring that the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B) do not apply to plaintiff's claims against defendants, Mayola Calais and the Department. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal as it is taken from a partial judgment that is not immediately appealable under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on March 22, 2006, involving Geneva Marie Fils, who was an infant at the time. Following Geneva's birth on January 2, 2006, the Department instituted legal proceedings, resulting in the Department being granted the legal custody of Geneva. The Department then placed Geneva in the foster care of Calais.
Thereafter, on March 22, 2006, Jennifer R. Hayes, with Calais's permission, was operating Calais's vehicle westbound on Louisiana Highway 724, with Calais and Geneva as passengers in the vehicle, when a vehicle driven by Charles T. Guidry travelling eastbound on Louisiana Highway 724 allegedly crossed the centerline and struck the Calais vehicle head on. As a result of the collision, Geneva, who was improperly restrained in her car seat at the time, sustained serious personal injuries, including a fractured skull and a traumatic brain injury.
Geneva was placed in the back seat of the car in a front-facing position, in a car seat without the component car seat base and with the shoulder strap of the seat belt positioned across the carrier. Following the accident, Calais was issued a citation for a child restraint violation. See LSA-R.S. 32:295.
On March 16, 2007, John Fils and Demitria Fils, Geneva's biological parents, filed suit, individually and on behalf of Geneva, seeking damages and naming as defendants: Guidry and his alleged insurer, USAgencies Casualty Insurance Company; Hayes; Calais and her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company; and the Department. Although not named in the caption of the petition, Calvernia Reed, Geneva's maternal aunt, was named as a plaintiff in the body of the petition, in her capacity as "the current guardian of Geneva." In the petition, plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of Geneva and also for their own loss of consortium. Later, in February 2011, following the death of Demitria Fils and upon being granted legal and physical custody and judicially appointed as tutor of Geneva, Reed was substituted as the proper party plaintiff in these proceedings.
Thereafter, by order dated July 3, 2012, the trial court approved the creation of the "Geneva Marie Fils Trust" and made the Trust a plaintiff herein.
During the pendency of these proceedings, the parties filed various motions for partial summary judgment, and, the trial court rendered various judgments and rulings, which were designated as final for purposes of immediate appeal, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Various appeals followed. At issue in the present appeal is the trial court's February 13, 2015 judgment, which granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the applicability of the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B) herein.
Specifically, in response to plaintiffs' claims against it, which were based both on the Department's alleged independent acts of negligence, as well as on its alleged vicarious liability for the negligence of Calais and Hayes, the Department affirmatively pled that, in the event it is held liable for damages, its maximum liability for general damages should be limited to $500,000.00 pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1), which provides that the "total liability of the state and political subdivision for all damages for personal injury to any one person, including all claims and derivative claims, exclusive of property damages, medical care and related benefits..., shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars...." (Emphasis added).
The Department further pled that any award of future medical care and related expenses must be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n any suit for personal injury against the state or a state agency wherein the court pursuant to judgment determines that the claimant is entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment, the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund...." (Emphasis added).
Thereafter, on July 7, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling that "[t]he limitation of liability identified in LSA-R.S. 13:5106 is inapplicable to any party in this matter." Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the limitation of liability in LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) applies only to the State of Louisiana and its political subdivisions, and not to a "state agency." Plaintiffs contended that because the Department is a "state agency," the Department is not entitled to the limitation of liability provided in LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1). Additionally, plaintiffs argued that Calais and Hayes likewise did not fall within the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) and, thus, that any limitation of liability set forth therein likewise would not apply to any liability for damages caused by their actions.
Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that the requirements of LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c), which provides that the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund, as provided in LSA-R.S. 39:1533.2, "[i]n any suit for personal injury against the state or a state agency wherein the court pursuant to judgment determines that the claimant is entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment," are also inapplicable herein. (Emphasis added). Specifically, they averred that because this matter is to be tried by a jury, the question of entitlement to future medical care will not be determined by "the court." Further, with regard to Calais and Hayes, plaintiffs argued that the provision requiring a reversionary trust for future medical care and expenses does not apply because Calais and Hayes do not meet the definition of "state agency."
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5106(B)(3)(a) similarly provides that the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid pursuant to a reversionary trust established for the benefit of the claimant "[i]n any suit for personal injury against a political subdivision wherein the court, pursuant to judgment, determines that the claimant is entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment...." (Emphasis added).
A hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment was conducted on February 9, 2015, and two days later, on February 11, 2015, the trial court issued a written "Ruling," providing as follows:
After reviewing the Motion for Summary Judgment, ... the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiffs regarding the limitation of liability and applicability of the Future Medical Care Fund section, identified in [LSA-]R.S. 13:5106, is hereby GRANTED.
The Court hereby finds that the limitation of liability identified in [LSA-]R.S. 13:5106(B) is inapplicable to any party in this matter. The Court further finds that the Future Medical Care Fund identified in [LSA-]R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) is inapplicable to any party in this matter. This Judgment shall
be deemed a final, appealable judgment pursuant to [LSA-] C.C.P. Art. 1915.(Emphasis added). Thus, while the "Ruling" provided that "[t]his judgment shall be deemed a final, appealable judgment pursuant to [LSA-]C.C.P. Art. 1915," it then instructed "counsel for plaintiffs to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling, circulate it in accordance with Rule 9.5, and submit to the Court for signature within 15 days," thus clearly contemplating a subsequent formal written judgment.
I am instructing counsel for plaintiffs to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling, circulate it in accordance with Rule 9.5, and submit to the Court for signature within 15 days. Judgment to be signed accordingly.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Baton Rouge, Louisiana this 11th day of February, 2015.
Two days later, on February 13, 2015, the trial court signed a form judgment, providing as follows: "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B) does not apply to Mayola Calais or The Department of Social Services through the Office of Community Service, now known as the Department of Children and Family Services." Notably, the February 13, 2015 judgment does not contain any designation by the trial court that the judgment is final for purposes of immediate appeal in accordance with the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B).
The judgment appears to be a form used by the trial court with boxes provided for the following information: the date of hearing, the motion or pleading involved, the filing party, the names of counsel for the parties, the evidence considered, and the court's ruling. Additionally, the form contains boxes to be filled in with the name of the judge presiding, the judge's signature, and the date of the judgment. The boxes on the form judgment were all completed with the relevant information, and the judgment was signed by the trial judge.
The Department now appeals the February 13, 2015 judgment, contending that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and in determining that the limitations of liability set forth in LSA-R.S. 13:5106 do not apply to the claims asserted against the Department.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, we must resolve whether the judgment before us is a partial judgment that is immediately appealable under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915. Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Henderson, 2009-2212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 39 So. 3d 739, 741. This court's appellate jurisdiction extends to "final judgments." LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083; Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 2000-0206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So. 2d 478, 483. A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. A declaratory judgment has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1871 and 1877. However, a judgment that only partially determines the merits of an action is a partial final judgment and, as such, is appealable only if authorized by LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915. Rhodes v. Lewis, 2001-1989 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 64, 66.
The principal claims in these proceedings are claims for damages in tort stemming from the personal injuries suffered by Geneva. The judgment at issue does not address the merits of those damages claims, but, instead, is limited to a declaration that the statutory limitations of LSA-R.S. 13:5106 are inapplicable herein. The judgment on review herein does not determine the merits of all of the claims pending in the case and, therefore, constitutes a partial judgment that is appealable only if authorized by Article 1915. See Succession of Brantley, 96-1307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/20/97), 697 So. 2d 16, 18; and Boutte v. Meadows, 2013-1189, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/14) (unpublished).
Whether a partial judgment is immediately appealable is determined by examining the requirements set forth in LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915. Henderson, 39 So. 3d at 741. Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A), a partial judgment is a final judgment if it:
(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors.A partial judgment that fits within one of these enumerated categories is a final judgment subject to immediate appeal without the necessity of any designation of finality by the court. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1911(B).
(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided by Articles 965, 968, and 969.
(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).
(4) Signs a judgment on either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have been tried separately, as provided by Article 1038.
(5) Signs a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue has been tried separately by the court, or when, in a jury trial, the issue of liability has been tried before a jury and the issue of damages is to be tried before a different jury.
(6) Imposes sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to Article 191, 863, or 864 or Code of Evidence Article 510(G).
However, a partial judgment that is not included in one of these enumerated categories is not a final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal unless it is properly designated as "final" by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1911(B) and 1915(B)(1). Code of Civil Procedure article 1915 attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1113, 1122.
The February 13, 2015 judgment at issue herein, declaring that the limitations of liability provided in LSA-R.S. 13:5106, i.e., the $500,000.00 "cap" and the "Future Medical Care Fund," do not apply to the Department or Calais, does not fall within any of the categories identified in LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A). The judgment does not dismiss the suit as to any party, nor does it grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings; it also does not pertain to an incidental demand that was tried separately. The judgment likewise does not adjudicate the issue of liability and does not impose sanctions or disciplinary action. Moreover, while the judgment does grant a motion for partial summary judgment, it is a summary judgment under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E), which authorizes the grant of a summary judgment "dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case as to that party or parties." Summary judgments granted pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E) are specifically excluded from the type of partial summary judgment that is immediately appealable under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A) without the need for a designation of finality. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(3).
Thus, because the February 13, 2015 judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A), this court's jurisdiction depends upon whether the judgment was properly designated as a final judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1911(B) and 2083; Boutte, 2013-1189 at p. 7 (unpublished) (Trial court's judgment that declared that only one "cap" applied to plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the Patient Compensation Fund did not fall within any of the categories of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A)). However, the February 13, 2015 judgment before us contains no designation as to finality. As such, the partial summary judgment is not appealable, and this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review it. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2) ; Hayward v. Hayward, 2012-0720, 2012-0721, 2012-0722, 2012-0723, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/18/13), ___ So. 3d ___, ___; Richardson v. Tessier, 2007-0374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/07), 977 So. 2d 55, 56.
Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(B)(1) provides as follows:
When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(B)(2) provides that in the absence of a determination and designation of finality, "any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added).
Moreover, even if we were to consider the trial court's February 11, 2015 "Ruling" to be the judgment of the court, rather than the February 13, 2015 "Judgment," we would be constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in designating the "Ruling" as final pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). Although the "Ruling" provides that the judgment (which, in the "Ruling" the trial court ordered counsel for plaintiffs to prepare) shall be deemed a final, appealable judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915, the trial court gave no explicit reasons for its determination that no just reason for delay existed. Accordingly, this court would review that determination on a de novo basis. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 1122. In conducting this review, we consider the "overriding inquiry" of "whether there is no just reason for delay," as well as the other non-exclusive criteria trial courts should use in making the determination of whether certification is appropriate, which include: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court, might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and (4) miscellaneous facts such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 1122..
As noted above, by its very language, the "Ruling" clearly contemplated that a formal judgment on the motion for partial summary judgment would be confected, and such a judgment was indeed signed two days later. Thus, it appears that the trial court's "Ruling" was more akin to reasons for judgment, rather than a formal judgment on the motion. See generally Taylor v. Dowling Gosslee & Associates, Inc., 44,654 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 10/7/09), 22 So. 3d 246, 251-252, writ denied, 2009-2420 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So. 3d 299 (Trial court's "clarification" was not a judgment and not appealable), and Boykins v. Bovkins, 2004-0999 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/24/07), 958 So. 2d 70, writ denied; 2007-1302 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 369, cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1018, 128 S. Ct. 2082, 170 L. Ed. 2d 816 (2008) (Even though the trial court improperly included language normally used in judgments in portions of the reasons for judgment, nothing in the reasons for judgment constituted the judgment of the court, and the parties were only bound by the terms of the judgment).
The adjudicated claim is limited to a determination regarding the applicability of the damages cap and the Future Medical Care Fund provided in LSA-R.S. 13:5106 to plaintiffs' claims herein. However, plaintiffs' claims for damages against the Department, or any other defendants, were not adjudicated by the judgment. A determination as to the applicability and effect of the damages cap would be relevant only if plaintiffs obtain a judgment on the merits against the Department in excess of five hundred thousand dollars plus interest and costs, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits. See LSA-R.S. 5106(B)(1). If plaintiffs fail to obtain such a judgment, the applicability of the damages cap set forth in LSA-R.S. 5106(B)(1) will be a moot issue, and any opinion from this court in that regard would be advisory in nature. Furthermore, a review of the judgment by this court at the present time would not shorten the time of the trial on the merits of the damage claim nor reduce the expense of the trial. Regardless of the outcome of the instant appeal, plaintiffs would still be required to prove the amount of damages for which the Department is liable. Moreover, such a limitation of liability by the imposition of a damages cap is applied only after a judgment on the merits has been rendered. See generally Boutte, 2013-1189 at pp. 8-9, citing Batson v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 99-0232 (La. 11/19/99), 750 So. 2d 949, 953; Turner v. Massiah, 94-2548 (La. 6/16/95), 656 So. 2d 636, 638; Singer v. Jarrott, 2008-1562 - 2008-1571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/29/09) (unpublished), writ denied, 2009-2230, 2009-2233 (La. 1/8/10), 24 So. 3d 873, 874. Similarly, the requirement that future medical care and related benefits be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) becomes relevant only after a determination that Geneva is entitled to future medical care and that the Department is liable for such benefits.
Thus, even if we were to consider the February 11, 2015 "Ruling" to be the judgment of the trial court, based upon our de novo review, we would hold that the trial court erred in certifying the "Ruling" as a final judgment pursuant to Article 1915(B)(1). Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1911 and 2083; Henderson, 39 So. 3d at 742.
Moreover, we decline to convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writs. This court has the discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs and rule on the writ application. Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005-0074 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So. 2d 34, 39. However, there are limitations on this authority. In Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So. 2d 878 (La. 1981)(per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court directed that appellate courts should consider an application for supervisory writs under their supervisory jurisdiction, even though relief may be ultimately available to the applicant on appeal, when the trial court judgment was arguably incorrect, a reversal would terminate the litigation (in whole or in part), and there was no dispute of fact to be resolved.
In the instant case, the criteria set forth in Herlitz are not met. Here, a reversal of the trial court's judgment would not terminate the litigation, in whole or in part, because the trial court has not determined what amount of damages, if any, plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the Department (or from any other defendants). Therefore, the granting of a writ application will not terminate the litigation at this time, and the parties have an adequate remedy by review on appeal after a final judgment is rendered. See Boutte, 2013-1189 at pp. 9-10 (unpublished) and Davis, 808 So. 2d at 485. Accordingly, we decline to convert this matter to an application for supervisory writs.
Additionally, we note that because the partial judgment is not a final one, it may be revised by the trial court at any time prior to rendition of judgment on the merits. See Davis, 808 So. 2d at 485.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, we find that the February 13, 2015 partial summary judgment is non-appealable. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed ex proprio motu, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs in the amount of $2,981.00 are assessed against defendant, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services, now known as the Department of Children and Family Services.
APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED.