Opinion
C.A. No. PC-2020-00508
02-01-2021
BLAKE A. FILIPPI Plaintiff, v. NICHOLAS MATTIELLO, ET AL. Defendants.
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Nicholas Gorham, Esq. For Defendant: Cassandra A. DeAngelis, Esq.; Joseph Avanzato, Esq.; Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.; John Tarantino, Esq.; Rajaram Suryanarayan, Esq.; Lauren E. Jones, Esq.; Marc Desisto, Esq.
DECISION SILVERSTEIN , J. (Ret.) This matter is before the Court for decision with respect to several motions to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief. Plaintiff is a duly elected Rhode Island State Representative and serves as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives (the House).
Defendants include, among others, the Speaker of the House, the President of the Rhode Island Senate, the Majority Leader of the House, and the Minority Leader of the Senate (each of the aforementioned Defendants are sued in their designated capacities—each of said Defendants, together with Plaintiff, in their said capacities, by statute constitute the Joint Committee on Legislative Services) (the JCLS) created pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 22-11-1. By statute (22-11-2) the Speaker is Chairman and the Senate President is the Vice Chairman of the JCLS. . Also named as Defendants are the Executive Director of the JCLS, the General Treasurer of the State, and the State Controller, all of whom also are sued in their said capacities.
The Minority Leader of the Senate has filed a timely answer to the Complaint. All of the other Defendants have filed motions to dismiss or joined in motions to dismiss. The motions to dismiss invoke the provisions of Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, lack of jurisdiction over subject matter and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively.
The Complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, G.L. 1956 §§ 9-30-1, et seq. and Rule 57 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure as to (a) the violation by the Speaker and the Executive Director of provisions of the statutes with respect to the JCLS by making decisions on behalf of the JCLS without meetings of the JCLS and without JCLS approval; (b) the violation by the Speaker and the Executive Director of the General Laws by directing the Auditor General to cause an audit of the Rhode Island Convention Center Authority without approval of the majority of the JCLS members; (c) a determination that the JCLS acts through a majority of its members, and that the JCLS has not delegated its statutory authority to the Speaker; and (d) the Executive Director is unlawfully serving as Executive Director of the JCLS and that the position of Executive Director is vacant.
Before turning to a discussion of the specific 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions pending before the Court, a word as to the role of the JCLS—Section 22-11-3(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws grants to the JCLS "exclusively the responsibility . . . to act upon all administrative matters affecting the operation of the general assembly, including, but not limited to" a list of specific administrative tasks. See § 22-11-3(a)(1)-(6). Further, the JCLS is vested with "exclusive authority on office space allocations and maintenance and repair in this state capitol building for all agencies of government, except the offices of the governor and the offices of the secretary of state." Section 22-11-3(b).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, in addition to the declaratory relief sought, asks the Court to grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief "restraining and enjoining [the Speaker, the Executive Director, the General Treasurer, and the State Controller] from taking any action which would usurp, or serve to usurp, the statutory responsibilities of JCLS . . ."
I
Standard of Review
As set forth supra, all of the Defendants, save only the Senate Minority Leader, have responded to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by filing motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of Rules 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
The role of such motions is to determine whether the complaint is sufficient so that the proceedings as a matter of law can continue—oftentimes courts refer to that as "testing the sufficiency of the complaint." In dealing with such motions, the Court limits its "review . . . to the four corners of that pleading" (here, the Amended Complaint). Woonsocket School Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Court, for the purpose of deciding such motions, "assumes the allegations contained in the (amended) complaint to be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to (the Plaintiff)." Id. (internal quotation omitted). It is well settled that "[a] motion to dismiss is properly granted when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim." Id. (internal quotation omitted). The moving Legislative Defendants, that is to say the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, the Majority Leader of the House (hereinafter, collectively the Legislative Defendants), joined by the Executive Director base their motions to dismiss on what they tell the Court are bedrock constitutional precepts as do the General Treasurer and the State Controller. Specifically, these Defendants (hereinafter the Moving Defendants) invoke (1) the separation of powers doctrine; (2) the political question doctrine; and (3) the provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article VI, Section 5, the so-called speech in debate clause.
II
Separation of Powers
The constitution of our state provides in Article V, Of the Distribution of Powers, as follows: "The powers of the government shall be distributed into three separate and distinct departments: the legislative, executive and judicial." The constitution further provides that "[t]he organization of the two houses may be regulated by law, subject to the limitations contained in this Constitution." Article VI, § 6 (second sentence). And in Article VI, Section 7, it is provided that "[e]ach house may determine its rules of proceeding . . ."
Relying on our Supreme Court's opinion in Woonsocket School Committee, supra, the Moving Defendants advance their separation of powers argument by stating that the doctrine is violated when one branch (here, the Judicial branch) attempts or is asked impermissibly to interfere with another's performance of its constitutionally assigned function or where one branch seeks to assume a function more properly entrusted to another (here, the Court being asked essentially to fill in allegedly missing gaps in the statute creating and governing the JCLS). Of course, there can be no question but that our State Constitution grants to the Houses of the Legislative Department the power (and perhaps the duty) to determine the organization as well as the rules of proceeding in the House and the Senate. Indeed, it would seem that much of Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon the direct or indirect failure to provide express rules of proceeding in connection with quorum, notices of meetings and voting as well as to fully explicate the powers of the Chairman and the Executive Director of the JCLS, a joint committee of both houses of the Legislative Department.
III
Political Question Doctrine
Closely aligned to the separation of powers arguments advanced by Defendants is a separate argument also relied upon by Defendants, the so-called "political question doctrine." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The United States Supreme Court there further identified "political question" cases as involving "(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government[.]" Id. As indicated above, here, there is no question but that Article VI, Sections 2, 6, 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution commits the issue of the organization as well as the rules of proceeding to a coordinate branch of state government; to wit, the Legislative department. There can be no question but that the adoption of the constitutional amendment dealing with the distribution of powers in 2004 recognized the coordinate status of the three departments of government—not only were the departments co-equal, but no department was to interfere (except as otherwise provided by law) with the performance by either of the other departments in a function entrusted to such other department by the constitution. For example, the Legislature does not try civil or criminal cases. A further example is that neither the Executive nor the Judicial department enact legislation.
IV
Speech in Debate
Defendants also rely as aforesaid upon the "speech in debate" clause of Article VI, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution. This provision "is to ensure the Legislature freedom in carrying out its duties," Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 982 (R.I. 1984), and further adds additional support for the concept of "separation of powers among the coordinate branches of government." Id.
Our Supreme Court has held that the speech in debate clause grants legislators with absolute immunity from questioning "by any other branch of government for their acts in carrying out their legislative duties relative to the legislative process." Irons v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 973 A.2d 1124, 1131 (R.I. 2009).
Our Constitution designates the legislative department (the General Assembly) as the holder of legislative power which includes how to organize and the power to determine the rules of proceeding. Accordingly, by reason of the speech in debate clause, the judicial branch is precluded from questioning the manner in which the General Assembly (and each of its two Houses) conducts its business. It generally is held that the speech in debate concept applies to everything which is "legislative in character." For example, "proposing . . . or voting upon a particular piece of legislation [clearly] are core legislative acts." Irons at 1131. The concept however goes further, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, the clause protects "how appellee spoke, how he debated, how he voted, or anything he did in the chamber or in committee." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (emphasis added).
In Holmes, 475 A.2d at 981, our Supreme Court found there to be no relevant difference between the federal provision (speech or debate) and the Rhode Island provision (speech in debate).
Plaintiff, through an Amended Complaint, asserts that Defendants the Speaker and the Executive Director have taken upon themselves the powers of the JCLS without meetings of or the approval of the JCLS. Plaintiff further claims that as a member of that body he should be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be involved in decisions of the JCLS. Plaintiff asserts that the JCLS has not adopted rules which authorized the actions of the Speaker or of the Executive Director (indeed Plaintiff complains that the Speaker, without a meeting of or the approval of the JCLS, appointed the Executive Director as the Executive Director).
As indicated above, Defendants seek dismissal based on the doctrines referred to above, that is to say, separation of powers, political question and/or speech in debate and argue that Plaintiff's route to rectifying what he deems to be problems is action within the branch of government which they say is the only branch which under our Constitution and case law has the authority and jurisdiction to deal with Plaintiff's complaints, to wit, the Legislature. There cannot be any question but that the Legislature, either through enactment of appropriate legislation or by the adoption of appropriate rules, could address the issues complained of by Plaintiff, as could the JCLS itself through its rulemaking authority (22-11-3.1(a)). While the Legislature may, the judiciary may not.
Plaintiff responds essentially by referring to two diverse bodies of authority presently existing which he argues support his contentions. Plaintiff seeks to invoke (1) Masons' Manual of Legislative Procedure ("Masons") and/or (2) the Common Law of Parliamentary Procedure.
Masons is not a document created by our Legislature. It is a guide offered by the National Conference of State Legislatures, an organization in which our Legislature holds membership. Indeed, the rules both of our House and our Senate refer to Masons. It should however be noted that neither the Senate rule nor the House rule or any rule, statute or constitutional provision called to the Court's attention or found by the Court provides for the utilization of Masons in connection with joint committees of both legislative Houses. As noted, the House rule authorizes (but does not mandate) Masons' use for "guidance" and the Senate rules provide Masons' Rules of Order (likely a misnomer for Masons' Manual of Legislative Procedure) shall govern on the "Senate floor" and in the committees of the Senate (neither of which are the subject of this proceeding).
House Rule 37A (the presiding officer may refer to (Masons) . . . for guidance as to procedure on the floor of the House . . ." Senate Rule 10.8 "Masons . . . shall govern procedure on the Senate floor and in the committees of the Senate in all cases in which they are not inconsistent with those rules or with any joint rules of the Senate and House."
As to the suggestion that the common law of parliamentary procedure fills the legislative gaps suggested herein—it would indeed be strange for this Court to find, and the Court declines to so hold, that judicial findings by other courts and other judges (the basis for common law) would control our legislature where the Court here already has found that the judicial branch is precluded by the trinity of precepts—separation of powers, political question and speech in debate from interfering in this matter.
The Defendants throughout these proceedings have reminded the Court that although the Court may believe that it could devise an appropriate scheme to rectify the "problems" perceived by Plaintiff, it is not appropriate for the Court to interfere with affairs of the legislative branch of government. In 1937, our Supreme Court had occasion to proclaim "[w]e have neither the right nor the inclination to seek to control the action of a co-ordinate branch of the government. No one of the three co-ordinate branches of the government should interfere with the other branches in the exercise of their rightful prerogatives. This Court has consistently and with great care declined to encroach upon the powers granted by the Constitution to the Legislature, which alone is responsible under that Constitution to the people for any failure to perform its duty." To Certain Members of the House of Representatives in the General Assembly, 58 R.I. 51, 191 A. 269, 272 (1937). In To Certain Members, our Court quoted from the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, '"[b]ut we have no power to compel either of the other departments of the government to perform any duty which the constitution or the law may impose upon them, no matter how palpable such duty may be, any more than either of those departments may compel us to perform our duties."' 191 A. at 272 (quoting People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 232 (1857)).
Immediately following its quotation of the above, our Court again stated: "[t]his statement of the proper functions of the judicial department of a state government fully applies to us . . ." Id.
V
Conclusion
Assuming that the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint are true (as the Court must when dealing with 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss), this Court cannot but personally conclude that Plaintiff should be entitled to some form of relief; however, this Court is constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis (and by the statement on page 5 that the Court does not legislate) to apply existing law—that law as shown above under the circumstances here mandates that the Court grant the referred to motions to dismiss leaving Plaintiff if he chooses to seek relief, to seek it from (1) the Legislature; or (2) the people through constitutional amendment; or (3) from both.
An order consistent with the provisions set forth above may enter.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff:
Nicholas Gorham, Esq.
For Defendant:
Cassandra A. DeAngelis, Esq.; Joseph Avanzato, Esq.; Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.; John Tarantino, Esq.; Rajaram Suryanarayan, Esq.; Lauren E. Jones, Esq.; Marc Desisto, Esq.