Opinion
11940-20S
01-06-2022
Melissa Mottesheard Fike f.k.a. Melissa Mottesheard Mills, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Maurice B. Foley Chief Judge
On November 19, 2020, respondent filed in the above-docketed case a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, on the ground that the petition herein was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6015(e) or 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). The motion was further supplemented by a response filed January 21, 2021. Respondent attached to the motion and/or response copies of a certified mail receipt, a postmarked document transmittal, and U.S. Postal Service (USPS) tracking information, as evidence of the fact a notice of final determination concerning relief from joint and several liability for the taxable year 2015, dated June 25, 2020, was sent to petitioner by certified mail on June 25, 2020.
The petition was filed with the Court on September 29, 2020, which date is 96 days after the date of the notice of final determination for tax year 2015 mailed to petitioner. The petition was received by the Court in an envelope that bears a USPS postmark dated September 24, 2020, which date is 91 days after the date of the notice. The petition had been sent via certified mail, and USPS tracking information is consistent in reflecting September 24, 2020, as the first entry, labeled "USPS in possession of item".
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case based upon a notice of determination that disallows a request for relief from joint and several liability on a joint return, the jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Sec. 6015(e), I.R.C.; Rule 320(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. In this regard, section 6015(e)(1), I.R.C., specifically provides that the petition must be filed with the Tax Court within 90 days of the determination. The Court has no authority to extend this 90-day period. However, if the conditions of section 7502, I.R.C., are satisfied, a petition which is timely mailed may be treated as having been timely filed.
In the present case, the time for filing a petition with this Court expired on September 23, 2020. However, the petition was not filed within that period.
Petitioner was served with a copy of respondent's motion to dismiss and, on January 20, 2021, filed an objection. Therein, petitioner did not deny the jurisdictional allegations set forth in respondent's motion and in fact conceded that petitioner had not filed before the statutory deadline, explaining as follows concerning timeliness:
Petitioner does acknowledge that the intend [sic] to Petition the United States Tax Court was mailed a day late via certified mail from Chester, Virginia. Petitioner respectfully requests that the court consider the fact that the process of fighting this injustice was guided by the IRS not advising a path forward with consistent information but rather varying information. In addition, the Petitioner has been involved in battling this erroneous 2015 return since the end of 2017. That is an extensive amount of time and when the Corona Virus hit in early 2020 everything spiraled out of control.
The balance of the objection chronicled in greater detail petitioner's extensive efforts to resolve administratively Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the matter of an allegedly unauthorized joint 2015 return filed by petitioner's late husband, whereas petitioner had filed her own separate return. Highlighted were the frustrations and confusion of her attempts to deal with the agency, including seeking to involve a preparer who, per petitioner, apologized for the erroneous return.
Given the foregoing, the objection shows that, before and potentially after issuance of the final determination, petitioner continued to communicate with the IRS. This scenario therefore parallels the well-settled law in the notice of deficiency context that once such a notice has been issued, further administrative contact or consideration does not alter or suspend the running of the 90-day period. Even confusing IRS responses or correspondence during the administrative process cannot override the clearly stated deadline in the statutory notice. Such confusion is not uncommon given that the IRS frequently treats as separate processes or proceedings what taxpayers view as a single dispute. Taxpayers not infrequently have also conflated this Court with an IRS unit, but the IRS is a completely separate and independent entity from the Tax Court. Petitioner has suggested no relevant distinction in the context of a final determination under section 6015, I.R.C., and the Court sees none.
Although section 7502, I.R.C., allows a timely mailed petition to be treated as timely filed, that section mandates that the envelope bearing the petition be "properly addressed to the agency, officer, or office with which the document is required to be filed.". Sec. 7502(a)(2)(B), I.R.C. A petition seeking judicial review of a final determination must be filed with this Court and not the IRS. Sec. 6015(e), I.R.C. Hence, the mailing of a petition, or other documentation, to the IRS is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256 (1972). The statute is clear, and this Court must follow it. See Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 896 (1980). The Court would also note that a final determination issued to a taxpayer provides expressly that the period within which to petition the Tax Court (not the IRS) extends 90 days from the date of the letter and that: "The time you have to file a petition with the Tax Court is set by law, and we can't extend it. Contacting the IRS for more information or receiving additional correspondence from the IRS or the Tax Court won't change the timeframe for filing a petition with the Tax Court." The notice is likewise explicit in providing that petitions must be filed with the United States Tax Court and in giving the Court's address as "400 Second Street, NW, Washington, DC 20217". With these definite rules regarding the inefficacy of written correspondence to the IRS, it is clear that efforts to contact the IRS by phone can offer no greater protection.
Furthermore, it is equally well settled that where the Commissioner's representatives provide erroneous advice based upon a mistaken interpretation of the law, courts and the Commissioner are not bound by the agent's statements and must follow the applicable statutes, regulations, and caselaw. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Neri v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 767, 771-772 (1970). Consequently, the same result must obtain regardless of whether the jurisdictional question is later raised by the Commissioner or by the Court sua sponte. Moreover, despite its superficial appeal, it has long been the rule that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is unavailable in these circumstances. As this Court has stated, an "estoppel argument must fail for the simple reason that the doctrine of estoppel cannot create jurisdiction where none otherwise exists." Energy Res., Ltd. v, Commissioner, 91 T.C. 913, 917 (1988). Equally inapplicable is equitable tolling of the nature addressed in United States v. Wong, 135 S.Ct. 1625 (2015), insofar as the 90-day filing period has long explicitly been held to be jurisdictional.
Thus, while the Court is sympathetic to petitioner's situation and understands the unintentional character of the inadvertence here, as well as the challenges of the circumstances faced and the good faith efforts made, the fundamental nature of the filing deadline precludes the case from going forward. As a Court of limited jurisdiction, the Court is unable to offer any remedy or assistance when a petition is filed late. Rather, the Court is barred from considering in any way petitioner's case or the correctness of her claims. Unfortunately, governing law recognizes no reasonable cause or other applicable exception to the statutory deadline, and the allegation that the petition was sent one day late remains unrebutted.
The Court has no authority to extend that period provided by law for filing a petition "whatever the equities of a particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within the required period." Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256, 259 (1972). Accordingly, since petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was mailed to or filed with this Court within the required statutory period, this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The premises considered, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.