Opinion
24-3197-JWL
11-12-2024
HUGO FIGUEROA, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Hugo Figueroa is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein.
1. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced to twelve months of incarceration and did not receive all of his jail credit toward his sentence. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that he filed a motion while incarcerated, which was granted by the judge. Plaintiff attaches the April 15, 2015 Order Nunc Pro Tunc to his Complaint. (Doc. 1-1, at 1.) The order awards Plaintiff jail credit in Case No. 2013-CR-000495 from 6/27/2014 to 7/29/2014. Id. The order reflects that Plaintiff's defense counsel approved the order. Id.
Plaintiff seeks compensation for the 33 days that he was held wrongfully. (Doc. 1, at 23.) Plaintiff states that he was sentenced in Case No. 2013-CR-000495 on June 3, 2014, and his motion was granted on April 16, 2015. Id. at 3. Plaintiff names the Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) as the sole defendant and seeks $66,000 in damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis in this matter, the Court is required to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-. . . (B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is determined from looking at the appropriate state statute of limitations and tolling principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). “The forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983....In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).” Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch., 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983 action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1059 (2006). A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute oflimitations. Id. at 1258-59; see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Hawkins v. Lemons, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009).
It plainly appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on November 8, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that he overserved his sentence in 2016 when he did not receive his 33 days of jail credit. The KDOC's Kansas Adult Supervised Population Electronic Repository (“KASPER”) shows that Plaintiff was released from custody on August 12, 2016. It thus appears that any events or acts of Defendant taken in connection with Plaintiff's claims took place more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and are time-barred. See Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1995) (district court may consider affirmative defenses sua sponte when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed). Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that he would be entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Plaintiff should show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
See https://kdocrepository.doc.ks.gov/kasper/ (last accessed Nov. 8, 2024).
The Court also notes that even if Plaintiff's claims were not untimely, he names an improper defendant. Plaintiff names the KDOC as the sole defendant. “A party's capacity to sue or be sued in federal court is determined by state law.” Sims v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 2019 WL 4450671, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2019) (citation omitted). “Under Kansas law, absent express statutory authority, legislatively-created government agencies lack the capacity to sue or be sued.” Id. (citation omitted). “The KDOC is a legislatively-created government agency, and Kansas law does not permit it to sue or be sued.” Id. (citing K.S.A. § 75-5203). Furthermore, as an agency of the State, the KDOC has absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to a suit for money damages. See McGee v. Corizon, 831 Fed.Appx. 381, (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020) (unpublished) (“As to the Kansas Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Amendment bars McGee's claim. It is well-recognized that an action cannot be brought in federal court against a state or its agencies.”) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983”). IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of this action without further notice for failure to state a claim.
A dismissal as time-barred is for failure to state a claim. Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 2011).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until December 12, 2024, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.