Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue if (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action. See Figueroa v. Campbell Indus., 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995); Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992); Hernandez, 572 F.2d at 220-21 ("The collateral estoppel analysis involves a three-step process: (1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide whether the issue was "litigated" in the first case; and (3) an examination of the record of the prior proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily decided in the first case."). Under federal law, while the availability of issue preclusion in a particular case is a question of law, the decision of whether to apply the doctrine is vested in the trial court's discretion.

¶25 Following Gizoni , the Ninth Circuit, in Figueroa v. Campbell Industries , held that a LHWCA settlement order which did not resolve the maritime worker's status under the LHWCA did not preclude Jones Act claims. Figueroa v. Campbell Indus., 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995). The court held that

CNA equates the settlement of the Jones Act claim with receipt of compensation pursuant to the Jones Act. Two cases, Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp. (5th Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 423, and Figueroa v. Campbell Industries (9th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 311, have reached contrary conclusions whether an award in one jurisdiction precludes further recovery in another. Both courts analyzed case law stemming from litigation that originated in California.

In the wake of Gizoni, some federal courts, in particular the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have indicated that an employee who receives compensation under the LHWCA is not precluded from asserting a Jones Act claim against his employer for damages arising out of the same injury where “the jurisdictional issue was not previously litigated, and no finding in that regard was made at the administrative level.” Figueroa v. Campbell Indus., 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir.1995). Cf. Anders v. Ormet Corp., 874 F.Supp. 738, 741 (M.D.La.1994) (holding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from litigating his status as a seaman under the Jones Act where the parties “fully litigated the issue of seaman status” before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”)).

When the LHWCA applies, its remedy is "exclusive and in place of all other liability of [the] employer to the employee." Id. § 905(a); see Figueroa v. Campbell Indus. , 45 F.3d 311, 314–15 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the LHWCA’s one-recovery rule). The Supreme Court described the LHWCA’s compensation scheme as a quid pro quo: "In return for the guarantee of compensation, the employees surrender common-law remedies against their employers for work-related injuries."

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. , provides a federal remedy for a non-seaman maritime employee to recover against an employer for personal injuries. See Figueroa v. Campbell Indus. , 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995). The OCSLA extends the LHWCA to the OCS, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b), but defendants in Rodrigue were not the workers' employers.

[4] Recognizing that a bar to relitigation would not serve the purpose for which it is usually employed since the parties are forced to take inconsistent positions under the Jones Act and the LHWCA and extending the reasoning of the Gizoni Court to the next logical step, we hold that plaintiff's litigation of his LHWCA claim does not bar his subsequent Jones Act claim.Figueroa v. Campbell Industries, Nos. 93-55936, 93-55945 (9th Cir. January 13, 1995), which involved a maritime worker whose LHWCA claim was compromised and settled before a Jones Act action was filed, reached the same result for different reasons. IV. CONCLUSION

That is, a claim for maintenance and cure requires that the individual qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. See Scheuring v. Traylor Bros. Inc., 476 F.3d 781, 784 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Figueroa v. Campbell Indus., 45 F.3d 311, 313 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The Jones Act and the LHWCA both provide a remedy to injured maritime workers. However, each statute specifies different maritime workers to be within its reach."). "

However, it is possible for employees to qualify as both Jones Act seamen and LHWCA workers. Figueroa v. Campbell Indus., 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A]lthough the [Jones Act and LHWCA] are 'mutually exclusive', some maritime workers may be Jones Act seamen who are injured while also performing a job specifically enumerated under the LHWCA, and, therefore, are entitled to recovery under both statutes, although double recovery of any damage element is precluded."). While recovery under both the Jones Act and LHWCA is not allowed, an employee who receives voluntary LHWCA payments without a formal award is not precluded from seeking relief under the Jones Act.

Further, it appears that Plaintiff is not excluded from the state workers' compensation scheme. See CNA Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 58 Cal. App. 4th 211, 217-18 (1997) (noting that unlike other states, the California Labor Code does not exclude persons covered under federal statutes and general maritime law); see also Figueroa v. Campbell Industries, 45 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "some maritime workers may be Jones Act seamen who are injured while also performing a job specifically enumerated under the LHWCA, and therefore, are entitled to recovery under both statutes, although double recovery of any damage element is precluded."). While other states exclude persons covered under the Jones Act from recovering under state workers' compensation benefits, the California Labor Code does not. Id.