Opinion
Hearing Granted April 20, 1960.
Opinion vacated 7 Cal.Rptr. 377.
Overton, Lyman & Prince, George W. Prince, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellant.
Betts, Ely & Loomis, Richard F. Runkle, Los Angeles, for respondents.
FOX, Presiding Justice.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover the cost of essential medical care and treatment provided by it for George A. Ross, deceased, pursuant to a 'life care contract' with said Ross, which treatment was necessitated by injuries inflicted on Ross by the defendants. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained without leave to amend and judgment of dismissal was entered thereon. Plaintiff appeals.
The essential allegations of the complaint, which for purposes of this appeal must be considered as true (Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 300 P.2d 119), are as follows: That plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation organized and existing under the laws of California; that the defendant Sidney Finston, on or about December 19, 1956, so negligently, recklessly and carelessly operated his automobile that said car struck George A. Ross, causing grievous injury; that Ross died on February 3, 1957; that 'on or about July 1, 1952, the plaintiff corporation entered into a life-care contract with George A. Ross whereby said corporation expressly agreed to provide to George A. Ross all essential medical care'; that as a proximate result of said accident plaintiff was required to and did furnish Ross with essential medical care 'including treatment by doctors, nursing care, medication and hospitalization, at a total cost to the plaintiff of $6,259.48'; that plaintiff was injured and damaged in said amount as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants; and, that the said contract between plaintiff and Ross expressly assigned to the plaintiff a right of subrogation for all expenses incurred by the plaintiff as the result of any injuries inflicted upon Ross by reason of the negligence of any third party.
The 'life care contract' between plaintiff and Ross was authorized by Division 3, Chapter 3, of the Welfare and Institutions Code. By section 2353 of that code, such 'life care contract' may specify 'the services which are to be provided by the * * * organization' which may include medical care. The services to be furnished by the organization are purchased by or for the recipient, by the transfer of property to the organization. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 2350.)
It is the plaintiff's position that it has stated a cause of action directly and in its own right, to recover the damage it suffered in providing medical care for Ross which was necessitated by defendants' wrongful act in injuring him. We have concluded that its position is sound.
The life care contract between plaintiff and Ross created the relationship that existed between them. By that contract it was plaintiff's duty to furnish Ross essential medical treatment, nursing care and hospitalization. Ross in turn had a right to these services when necessary. It is thus apparent that certain rights and duties were created in favor of each of the parties to the contract. By their negligent act in injuring Ross and thus necessitating his medical care and hospitalization defendants have wrongfully invaded plaintiff's rights and its duties to Ross and have damaged plaintiff to the extent of the expenditures that their wrongful act made necessary. In other words, defendants' negligence in injuring Ross was the proximate cause of plaintiff's having to spend more than $6,000 in providing Ross with medical and hospital care in order to perform its duty under the life care contract. This plaintiff suffered a detriment by the wrongful act of defendants for which it should have a right of recovery (Civ.Code, §§ 3520 and 3523) by a direct action against the wrongdoers whose negligence was responsible for the damage sustained by it (see Civ.Code, Follansbee v. Benzenberg,
In holding that section 377, Code of Civil Procedure, was not applicable the court pointed out that that section 'given a right of action for wrongful death to the heirs or personal representatives of the decedent. At the time Civil Code section 956, was enacted, section 377 was amended to provide that the damages recoverable thereunder 'shall not include damages recoverable under Section 956 of the Civil Code.' An action for wrongful death is for damages caused to the heirs. (Citation.) The damages recoverable are the pecuniary loss sustained by the heirs by reason of the decedent's death. (Citations.) Expenditures made for an injured person because of the injury are not, in an action brought by his heirs, elements of their damage. (Citations.) The medical expenses paid by plaintiff are not recoverable in the action insofar as damages are sought for the wrongful death of the decedent.' In harmony with these principles the medical expenses incurred by Fifield Manor would not be recoverable in an action brought under section 377, Code of Civil Procedure.
Although there is no statutory authority granting a wife the right to sue a tortfeasor who injures her husband, for necessary Furthermore, defendants are not prejudiced, under the circumstances of this case, by allowing plaintiff to sue them directly. Ross is dead. No cause of action for the medical expenses incident to his injury resides in his estate, heirs or personal representative. Ross incurred no medical expenses recoverable by his estate under section 956, Civil Code, nor do such expenses constitute damages recoverable by his heirs in a wrongful death action under section 377, Code of Civil Procedure. Follansbee v. Benzenberg, supra. Defendants cannot be prejudiced by being required to pay damages caused by their wrongful act, particularly since the damages prayed for in this action are not recoverable by any other party. Any defenses which defendants might have had against Ross, such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or statute of limitations, are similarly available against plaintiff. Milsevich v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal.App. 662, 668, 230 P. 15. See also Brooks v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal.App.2d 410, 329 P.2d 575. Thus defendants are in no worse position in this suit than if sued for the same damages by Ross in the event he had lived, or by a representative of his estate had he personally incurred the medical expenses necessitated by his injuries.
Finally, in approaching a solution to the question herein posed we are not unmindful of the public policy considerations that are involved. The ever increasing number of senior citizens in this state present a social and economic problem of major importance. In order to provide for their welfare and security, the legislature enacted Division 3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The provision for 'life care contracts' between elderly persons and organizations which will provide decent, well supervised homes for them, is a vital part of this division. The purpose of the legislature in enacting the Welfare and Institutions Code, as stated in section 19 thereof, was in part '* * * to provide for protection, care, and assistance to the people of the State in need thereof. * * *' The courts should be slow to deny to an organization devoted to the furtherance of such a socially beneficial policy, the right to protect itself from damage by the tortious act of another, simply because there is no express statutory authority for the maintenance of such action. To do so would be to endanger the entire system which the legislature has provided for the care of the elderly. Such an institution should not be required to gamble that the beneficiary of a life care contract who is injured by the negligence of another, will survive to bring an action for the damages suffered by both parties to Plaintiff states a cause of action directly and in its own right for the recovery of the damage it has sustained. It was therefore error to sustain the demurrer.
It is unnecessary to pass upon plaintiff's contention that it is entitled to maintain this action on the theory of subrogation.
The judgment is reversed.
HERNDON, J., concurs.
ASHBURN, J., concurs in the judgment.