Opinion
No. 20-2550
04-23-2021
H. FRANK FIFE and JOHN G. AND ELIZABETH STEELMAN FOUNDATION, Appellants v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; COMMISSIONER UNITED STATES CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION; DIRECTOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; JUDSON W. MURDOCK, II, in his official capacity as Houston CBP Director of Field Operations, individually, jointly, separately and in the alternative
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 1-19-cv-13912)
District Court Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
March 9, 2021 Before: Chief Judge, SMITH, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges OPINION McKee, Circuit Judge.
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
H. Frank Fife and the John G. and Elizabeth Steelman Foundation appeal the District Court decision dismissing their Complaint for lack of standing. We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its well-reasoned and thorough opinion. We will only briefly elaborate.
The District Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review "dismissals for lack of standing de novo." Common Cause of Pa. v. Pa., 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 294 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Appellants contend that the Government inflicted concrete and particularized harm on them by barring a third party (Erika Contreras) from reentry to the United States. That third party is not a party to this litigation. They nevertheless argue that Contreras' expedited removal represents both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss, multiple notice and due process violations, and a deprivation of their liberty and property interests.
Appellant Br. at 14-15.
Id.
Appellants erroneously characterize the Sponsorship Agreement and related documents as a "contract" between them, Contreras, the school she attended, and the Government. Despite their creative arguments to the contrary, the District Court recognized that Appellants' assistance to Contreras was purely gratuitous. They previously conceded that they were "to receive nothing in return" for financing Contreras' education. Accordingly, Appellants have not met their burden of establishing Article III standing, and we need not reach their claims of prudential standing.
Appellant Br. at 19-20, 26-29.
App. 92 at ¶ 138.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) ("The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.").
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.