Defendants submit that, "The acid test to be applied in determining whether an obligation incurred by the husband is a community debt is whether or not the transaction was intended to be for the benefit of the community." Fies vs. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, [ 221 P.2d 1031 (1950)], or as stated in Beyers vs. Moore, 45 Wn.2d 68, [ 272 P.2d 626 (1954)], "If there was any expectation of benefit to the community . . . at the time the note was signed . . . it was a community obligation."
[1] Appellant's position is anchored to the axiomatic rule that when the husband, as manager of the community property, incurs a debt, it is presumptively a community obligation. Oregon Imp. Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wn. 710, 30 P. 1058; Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wn. 158, 31 P.2d 515; Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn.2d 68, 272 P.2d 626.
In such case it is to be construed as an agreement to pay a reasonable sum therefor. Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031. Plaintiff alleged, and defendants denied, that $300 was a reasonable fee. No proof was offered on the issue raised, nor was it submitted for determination by the court without proof. The judgment denying plaintiff's attorney's fees was proper.
[3] As argued by the plaintiff, Corby is presumed, as managing agent of the community, to have acted for the benefit of the community at the time of the reaffirmation endorsement. Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Outler, 172 Wn. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). However, this presumption may be overcome by evidence showing the transaction was not carried on for the community and in the community interest.
This, however, is a rebuttable presumption.Whitehead v. Satran, 37 Wn.2d 724, 225 P.2d 888; Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031; Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn.2d 632, 214 P.2d 654.Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 41 Wn.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383; In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273; Jones v. Davis, 15 Wn.2d 567, 131 P.2d 433; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wn. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531.
The witness is bound by the judgment to the same extent as a party. Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wn.2d 299, 229 P.2d 523; Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031; Briggs v. Madison, 195 Wn. 612, 82 P.2d 113; Howard v. Mortensen, 144 Wn. 661, 258 P. 853; Curtis Studio v. Lennes, 121 Wn. 32, 208 P. 79; Wise v. Reed, 79 Wn. 134, 139 P. 753; American Bonding Co. v. Loeb, 47 Wn. 447, 92 P. 282; Shoemake v. Finlayson, 22 Wn. 12, 60 P. 50.[4] A judgment creditor purchasing at his own execution sale stands in the shoes of the judgment debtor and takes only his interest.
[2] If there was any expectation of benefit to the community from the tractor transaction at the time the note was signed by respondent Eberli, it was a community obligation. Spinning v. Allen, 10 Wn. 570, 39 P. 151; Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Wiley, 89 Wn. 301, 154 P. 437; Zarbell v. Mantas, 32 Wn.2d 920, 204 P.2d 203; and Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031. [3, 4] This court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial court, unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them, but we think it does in this case because of respondent Eberli's admission during the trial.
As no findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered with respect to the dismissal of the community, the court in effect ruled as a matter of law that Mr. Hovde's signing of the contract "as a separate estate" and Mr. Brubaker's being a licensed real estate broker established that the purchaser's promises in the earnest money agreement were the separate obligations of Mr. Hovde. [1] As was said in Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 110, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950): The acid test to be applied in determining whether an obligation incurred by the husband is a community debt, is whether or not the transaction was intended to be for the benefit of the community.
We hold that the trial court's characterization of the debt was erroneous and reverse. [1, 2] A debt incurred by either spouse during marriage is presumed to be a community debt. E.g., Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wn. 710, 30 P. 1058 (1892); National Bank of Commerce v. Green, 1 Wn. App. 713, 463 P.2d 187 (1969). See also RCW 26.16.030 extending management authority to both spouses. It is well settled that this presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.
This rule presented no due process problems because the husband, as manager of the community, was deemed to represent the community's interest. Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Capital Nat'l Bank v. Johns, 170 Wn. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932). In fact, as the statutory agent of the marital community, the husband had not only the right, but the duty, to defend actions against the marital community.