Thus, the speech at issue falls squarely within the scope of Glicksman's official duties as an administrative law judge — deciding cases. Relying on Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), Glicksman argues that Garcetti is inapplicable when an employee is terminated for speech that constitutes a refusal to undertake wrongful conduct. See Fierro, 591 F.Supp.2d at 442 ("The question of whether speech stemming from a supervisor's instruction to a subordinate to commit a wrongful — perhaps even criminal — act falls under Garcetti is one that has not yet been addressed by the Second Circuit."); see also Fierro v. City of New York, 341 Fed. Appx. 696, 698 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Without addressing the substantive question of whether a public employee's refusal to abide by an instruction to engage in misconduct is protected speech under the First Amendment, such protection was certainly not clearly established at the time Bleadon engaged in her allegedly retaliatory conduct.").
Since these provisions apply to actions “for any cause whatever,” they necessarily apply to discrimination claims. See Bucalo v. East Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. 351 F.Supp.2d 33, 35–36 (E.D.N.Y.2005); Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 431, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y.2008), rev'd on other grounds,341 Fed.Appx. 696 (2d Cir.2009)..Section 3813 applies to claims against “any officer of a school district [or] board of education.” N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(1).
Mem.”) at 12. In support of this proposition, plaintiff cites Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y.2008), rev'd in part, 341 Fed.Appx. 696 (2d Cir.2009), a case in which plaintiff alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action for “refusing to participate in or facilitate [defendant's] campaigns to ruin the careers of two very good teachers whom [defendant] did not like.” Id. at 441.
Plaintiff's NYCHRL claims are likewise governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Plaintiff's [NY] CHRL claims against the DOE — an entity listed in section 3813(1) — are dismissed as time-barred pursuant to section 3813(2-b) to the extent they accrued prior to [one year before plaintiff's filing suit]."), rev'd on other grounds, 341 Fed. Appx. 696 (2d. Cir 2009).
Superintendents are "officers" within the scope of § 3813. See Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd on other grounds by 2009 WL 2223067 (2d Cir. July 27, 2009) (finding that school district superintendents were "officers" within the meaning of § 3813(1)); DeRise v. Kreinik, 10 A.D.3d 381, 381, 780 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (2d Dep't 2004) (finding that § 3813's notice of claim provision applies to a suit against a superintendent).Fierro, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (holding that a principal of a non-"special school" is not an officer because "[§ 1983(1)'s] requirements apply to `any officer . . . [of a] school provided for in article eighty-five of this chapter or chapter ten hundred sixty of the laws of nineteen hundred seventy-four.' `Article 85 schools are statutorily designated special schools, including schools for the instruction of the deaf and blind, as are schools governed by Chapter 1060 under the 1974 laws.'") (emphasis added); see also Richards v. Calvet, No. 99 Civ. 12172 (RJH) (MHD), 2005 WL 743251, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding that § 3813(1) does not apply to cl
and superintendents such as Yazurlo are "officers" that fall within the scope of Section 3813. See Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd on other grounds by 2009 WL 2223067 (2d Cir. July 27, 2009) (finding that school district superintendents were "officers" within the meaning of § 3813(1)); DeRise v. Kreinik, 10 A.D.3d 381, 381, 780 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (2d Dep't 2004) (finding that § 3813's notice of claim provision applies to a suit against a superintendent). Here, Smith's cause of action accrued on January 7, 2002 — the day the School District told Smith that it was terminating his employment.
However, actions against individually named defendants such as principals-with the exception of certain statutory special schools-must be brought within the more general three-year statute of limitations. Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 431, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (plaintiff's claims against the school principal are not barred by one-year statute of limitations because the principal “is not an officer within the meaning of section 3813”), rev'd on other grounds, 341 Fed.Appx. 696 (2d Cir. 2009).
"Serious misconduct on the part of the head of a public [facility]" - like Warden Glenn at West Facility - is a matter of public concern. Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 431, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd in part, 341 F. App'x 696 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversed on qualified immunity grounds). Plaintiff plausibly alleges a causal connection between this speech and an adverse action via direct evidence of a retaliatory animus.
"Temporal proximity is strong circumstantial evidence of improper intent." Fierro v. City of N.Y., 591 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd in part on other grounds, 341 F. App'x 696 (2d Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs correctly argue that they have a protected First Amendment interest in filing the police report regarding L.C.'s bullying and the District's failure to protect W.C. (Ps' Dist. Opp. at 12-13.)
Eyshinskiy's ratings and his statements in defense of those ratings were made pursuant to his official duties and cannot form the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff relies on the district court's decision in Fierro v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 341 F. App'x 696 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). In Fierro, the court found that an assistant principal's refusal to engage in "campaigns to ruin the careers of two very good teachers whom [his principal] did not like," id. at 441, was not speech made pursuant to his professional duties.