The jury could have inferred that Larocque's conduct constituted a threat against the victim and was an admission of guilt. See Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 ( 393 S.E.2d 252) (1990) (admission of threatening phone call to witness without evidence connecting calls to the defendant resulted in reversible error). In Riden and similar cases cited supra, it is the evidence of an actual threat communicated to the witness or victim that allows the jury to find an admission by conduct.
State v. Williams, 181 Ga.App. 204, 206, 351 S.E.2d 727 (1986). The State relies upon Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333(3), 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990), for the proposition that, in the second proceeding, “the grand jury was entitled to rely on the evidence it had previously considered in returning the original indictment.” However, Fields is inapposite; there was no question of the illegality of the grand jury itself in that case.
Because there was no other legitimate reason for introducing this evidence, compare Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 486 (3) ( 604 SE2d 151) (2004) (evidence of anonymous threat admissible to explain evasive answers by witness), we hold that the trial court erred by allowing the State to adduce it. See Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331 (4) ( 393 SE2d 252) (1990). (c) The admission of irrelevant evidence will not be deemed reversible error where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence had any influence over the jury's decision.
Nealy v. State, 239 Ga. App. 651, 655 ( 522 SE2d 34) (1999). Compare Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 ( 393 SE2d 252) (1990). SEARS, Presiding Justice.
See Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 657 (1) (a) ( 261 S.E.2d 409) (1979). Compare Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 (4) ( 393 S.E.2d 252) (1990). 6. Detective Fagler testified that during the investigation, witness Searcy told him that McCoy came to her home once on the night of the shooting, and later told him that McCoy came twice that night; she did not mention a rifle.
After the trial court overruled Forehand's relevancy objection, counsel for the State inquired as to whether the defense witness was a "drug dealer." The court then sustained Forehand's objection and he sought no further relief. Compare Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 (6) ( 393 S.E.2d 252) (1990) (meritorious hearsay objection erroneously overruled); Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17 ( 435 S.E.2d 60) (1993) (meritorious relevancy objection erroneously overruled). Since the transcript shows that the only objection to the characterization of the defense witness as a "drug dealer" was sustained below, we need not consider any possible prejudicial effect upon Forehand's own character.
" (citations and punctuation omitted)). See supra note 27; see also Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 (4) (393 SE2d 252) (1990) (holding that it was reversible error to permit witness to testify as to threat he received by phone, for the stated purpose of showing that "a threat had been made against" the witness, when the State was unable to link the threat to the defendant, preventing the testimony from being relevant to any material issue). Suffice it to say, the State's use of the evidence cannot be saved under this same theory if the evidence was improperly admitted for purposes of rehabilitation.
" (citations and punctuation omitted) ).See supra note 27; see also Fields v. State , 260 Ga. 331, 333 (4), 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990) (holding that it was reversible error to permit witness to testify as to threat he received by phone, for the stated purpose of showing that "a threat had been made against" the witness, when the State was unable to link the threat to the defendant, preventing the testimony from being relevant to any material issue). Suffice it to say, the State's use of the evidence cannot be saved under this same theory if the evidence was improperly admitted for purposes of rehabilitation.
We therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sustain the objection, particularly in light of the fact that it told the prosecutor to "move on" and reiterated that the jury had been instructed that statements of counsel were not evidence. Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 (4) ( 393 SE2d 252) (1990). Scott further claims that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the eyewitnesses regarding the alleged threats against them.
The hearsay rule that a witness must testify from his own first-hand knowledge to establish a fact clearly applies to law enforcement officers. Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 334(5), 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990). Because the sheriff lacked personal knowledge concerning the existence of the search warrant, the state failed to produce any competent evidence to prove that the search of the hotel room was lawful because it was conducted pursuant to such a warrant.