"The correct method for challenging the decision of a state disciplinary board is by petitioning the appropriate circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala. 1982). Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in this case.
`The correct method for challenging the decision of a state disciplinary board is by petitioning the appropriate circuit court for writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala. 1982). Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in this case.'
Even prior to Helveston, we indicated that loss of good time was not the sole occurrence which would trigger the requirements of Wolff. In Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), we noted that, even if the withdrawal of petitioner's good time were ignored, the minimum requirements of due process would apply to his disciplinary, because his custody classification was changed from minimum to maximum. 409 So.2d at 965.
The correct method for challenging the decision of a state disciplinary board is by petitioning the appropriate circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala. 1982). Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in this case.
"The correct method for challenging the decision of a state disciplinary board is by petitioning the appropriate circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala. 1982). Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in this case.
"The correct method for challenging the decision of a state disciplinary board is by petitioning the appropriate circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala. 1982). Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in this case.
In Barker v. State, 437 So.2d 1375 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983), the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that a report of a prison disciplinary board, in order to meet the due process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), must contain a "written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Indeed, in Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), the court held that a disciplinary board report with such deficiencies could not support the State's motion to dismiss a petition for habeas corpus. Such a result follows from the Wolff decision that the constitutional mandate of due process is absent when the disciplinary board report does not contain those requirements.
In summarily dismissing Benjamin's petition on the state's motion, the circuit court made no specific finding. We consider that the record before us does not contain sufficient facts to uphold the circuit court's ruling or to even clearly determine on what basis the court dismissed Benjamin's petition. Based upon the pleadings, especially the very general pleadings submitted by the state and attached documents that do not contradict all of the petition's allegations, and upon the nonspecific order of the court, we cannot reconcile or distinguish the court's ruling, if finding that no liberty interest was affected, with the following cases: Moulds v. State, 502 So.2d 384 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (wherein the court appeared to consider that the due process procedures of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), apply to transfers from general population to administrative segregation); Richie v. State, 481 So.2d 454 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985) (same); Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court intimated that Wolff v. McDonnell requirements are applicable to a change in custody classification from minimum to maximum). See generally Summerford v. State, 466 So.2d 182 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985).
This is an appeal from the denial of a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the action of a prison disciplinary board. The record contains no disciplinary report affirmatively showing that the due process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), were satisfied. Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), cited by the district attorney in his motion to dismiss, supports the granting of the petition. Ex parte Bland, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala. 1983), and Barker v. State, 437 So.2d 1375 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), also support the appellant's arguments.
That traditional rule has been eroded by the expansion of the constitutional guarantees of the convicted and imprisoned. Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1980), held that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper method by which an inmate can challenge a disciplinary hearing depriving him of good time credit even if the inmate would not be entitled to immediate release upon restoration of his good time. Fielding v. State, 409 So.2d 964, 965 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). An accused's right to speedy trial remains undiminished even when he is already serving a prison sentence.