Summary
In Fielding v. Rachlin Management Corp., 309 AD2d 894 (2nd Dept. 2003), the court held that plaintiff had established notice of the puddle which caused plaintiff's fall when plaintiff established that the puddle was the result of rain water emanating from an open window and that defendants had actual notice of the same condition on prior occasions.
Summary of this case from Allen v. Turyali Fast Food, Inc.Opinion
2002-06726
Argued September 5, 2003.
October 27, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), entered June 6, 2002, which, upon granting the defendants' motions pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law, made at the close of the plaintiff's case, which was reserved for decision, and made at the close of the evidence, dismissed the complaint.
Hill, Langsam Moin, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Cheryl Eisberg Moin of counsel), for appellants.
Thomas D. Hughes, New York, N.Y. (Richard Rubinstein of counsel), for respondents.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the motions are denied, the complaint is reinstated, and a new trial is granted, with costs to abide the event.
At trial, the injured plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell in a puddle of rainwater located in the basement of the apartment building where she resided. After her fall, she observed rainwater entering the basement passageway through a window, which was open despite a building policy that the defendants' employees were obligated to close all windows during a heavy rainstorm.
It is well settled that to prove a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the defendants either created the defective condition or had actual or constructive notice of it ( see Russo v. Eveco Dev. Corp., 256 A.D.2d 566; Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836). A defendant who has actual knowledge of a recurring dangerous condition can be charged with constructive notice of each specific reoccurrence of that condition ( see Freund v. Ross-Rodney Hous. Corp., 292 A.D.2d 341; Garcia v. U-Haul Co., 303 A.D.2d 453).
The trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs made out a prima facie case by presenting evidence which raised an issue of fact as to whether the defendants had constructive notice of such condition and thus could be held liable. The trier of fact could rationally conclude that the defendants had actual notice of a recurring condition based on the intensity and duration of the storm prior to the accident, the plaintiffs' testimony concerning the condition of the passageway floor, the building superintendent's testimony about previous accumulations of rainwater resulting from open windows, and the failure of the doorman to comply with the building rule requiring the closure of basement windows during the rainstorm ( see Friedman v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 302 A.D.2d 491; Coletta v. City of New York, 291 A.D.2d 527; Garcia v. U-Haul Co., supra).
SANTUCCI, J.P., KRAUSMAN, SCHMIDT and RIVERA, JJ., concur.