Opinion
FSTCV175020546S
10-16-2019
Lisa FIELDING v. Daniel MCLEOD
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
KRUMEICH, J.
Defendant Daniel McLeod has moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff, Lisa Fielding, his former tenant, lacks standing to assert that he violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, C.G.S. § 42-110a et seq. ("CUTPA"). For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Standards for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ..." Weiner v. Clinton, 100 Conn.App. 753, 756-57 (2007), quoting Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
"In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court ‘must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations ...’ A trial court considering a motion to dismiss may, however, ‘encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ...’ [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint, ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... Conversely, ‘where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ... Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ... An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties ... The trial court ‘may [also] in its discretion choose to postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question until the parties complete further discovery or, if necessary, a full trial on the merits has occurred.’" Giannoni v. Commissioner of Transportation, 322 Conn. 344, 349-50 (2016) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff Has Standing to Assert CUTPA Claims Against Defendant.
"It is well established that [a] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim ... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear ... Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause ..." Warren v. Cuseo Family, LLC, 165 Conn.App. 230, 235 (2016) (citations omitted). "The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss ... [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Tanasi, 176 Conn.App. 829, 837 (2017) (citations omitted).
" ‘[S]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’ ...‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory ... Classical ‘aggrievement requires a two part-showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share ... Second, the party must also show that the [party’s] decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest ... Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest ... Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’" Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 556 (2012) (citations omitted). See also Jackson v. Drury, 191 Conn.App. 587, 598 (2019).
As a tenant plaintiff is classically aggrieved to raise the claim against her former landlord of direct injury against her personal interests alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. See generally McKay v. Longman, 332 Conn. 394, 410 (2019). Plaintiff has demonstrated the possibility that she has "a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter" of the claim and the alleged conduct "has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest ..." Canty, 304 Conn. at 556. "Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes ... standing by allegations of injury." Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 411 (2012). "We emphasize that the question of standing is not an inquiry into the merits. A plaintiff may have standing and nevertheless lose his suit. Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a plaintiff ordinarily establishes his standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists so that a party may attempt to vindicate ‘arguably’ protected interests." Connecticut Ass’n of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd, 197 Conn. 554, 557 n.1 (1985).
Entering a rental unit without a tenant’s consent may violate CUTPA under certain circumstances and raises the question of whether the landlord’s conduct is reasonable, even in the face of a perceived emergency, and thus concerns adjudication of the merits which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss. See e.g., Haslam-James v. Lawrence, 133 Conn.App. 321, 330-32 (2012). "[W]hether a defendant’s acts constitute ... deceptive or unfair trade practices under CUTPA, is a question of fact for the trier, to which, on appellate review, we accord our customary deference ..." Id. at 330. Here, the parties have disputed the circumstances of defendants’ alleged entry into her apartment and his conduct upon entry. Although defendant has marshaled evidence casting doubt on the credibility of plaintiff’s claims and, if proven, may ultimately prevail on the merits on summary judgment or trial, that is not the test for standing; it suffices if the allegations in the complaint taken as true raise a colorable claim. Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of demonstrating a colorable CUTPA claim and has standing to litigate the claims alleged in her Second Amended Complaint.
This case is unlike Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 353-54 (2001), where the undisputed facts precluded the claim brought by plaintiff.