Opinion
22A-CR-2268
02-27-2023
Karen Fielder, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT James D. Crum Carmel, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable David J. Najjar, Judge The Honorable Barbara Crawford, Senior Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-2110-CM-6235
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT James D. Crum Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Karen Ellen Fielder (Fielder), appeals her convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(4), and criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a).
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶3] Fielder presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain her convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and criminal mischief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] In October 2021, Fielder and Brittany Edwards (Edwards) lived on the same residential cul-de-sac street in Westfield, Indiana. Their residences were on the same side of the street, four to five houses down from each other, with Fielder's residence further towards the end of the cul-de-sac. The street was a two-lane street, with room for street parking. On October 17, 2021, Edwards' two young children were playing outside with a neighbor's children. They were playing with "power wheels, little cars that they can drive" and were riding into the street. (Transcript p. 9). To keep the children safe, Edwards put out three signs: "[t]wo of them were green and they're shaped like little people and they held a flag out that's red, and on the little green person it says "Slow Children at Play," and then the other one is almost exactly like that but it is orange." (Tr. p. 10). She placed two signs "in the gutter right next to [her] mailbox as well as [a third one by her] neighbor across the street, next to their mailbox in the gutter." (Tr. p. 11). The gutter is "maybe a foot wide or so." (Tr. p. 11).
[¶5] Around lunchtime the children parked their toy cars in the driveway at Edwards' home while waiting for a lunch delivery. At that point, Edwards noticed Fielder driving into the cul-de-sac and running "over the two signs" by Edwards' mailbox. (Tr. p. 14). Edwards recorded Fielder's actions on her phone because of a prior similar incident. The video recording shows the signs on both sides of the road, with Fielder driving to the edge of the road to hit the signs near Edwards' mailbox and then swerving back into the road. Fielder did not stop. Although the signs were cracked due to the impact, they were still functional. Edwards reported the incident to the non-emergency number for the Westfield Police Department and an officer came to her house to take a statement and collect the video. The officer noticed the signs and observed that they were not in the travel portion of the road.
[¶6] After the officer left, Edwards put the signs back up. Ten to fifteen minutes later, Fielder drove by again, and this time she struck the sign Edwards had placed on the opposite side of the street, near her neighbor's mailbox. Fielder was "driving fast" and had to "actually veer in to hit" the sign. (Tr. p. 19). Again, after hitting the sign, Fielder did not stop. The second incident was also reported to the police, who responded to Edwards' home.
[¶7] While the original officer and an additional officer were still at Edwards' home, Fielder drove by a third time and hit the two signs on Edwards' side of the road. The officer observed Fielder's vehicle "veer[] into the plastic signs" and noted that the signs would have been "easy to avoid." (Tr. pp. 52, 67). Fielder made no effort to stop. After the third incident, the signs were no longer usable. Upon observing Fielder drive into the signs, the officers performed a traffic stop. Fielder "expressed frustration that her neighbors were putting signs in her road" and repeatedly referred to the street as "her road." (Tr. p. 55).
[¶8] On October 18, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Fielder with leaving the scene of an accident and criminal mischief. On August 23, 2022, the trial court conducted a bench trial. At the trial, Fielder testified that she hit the signs twice because "[i]t would have been unsafe for [her] to travel in the middle lane." (Tr. pp. 73-74). She explained that she did not stop "[b]ecause [the sign] was in the middle of a public right-of-way. It's [a] road obstruction," and she did not believe that she had been involved in an accident. (Tr. p. 74). Fielder informed the court that she assumed the signs had been put out by a neighbor. At the close of the proceeding, the trial court found Fielder guilty as charged and sentenced her to ten days in the county jail, with four days credit, for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and to ten days in the county jail, with four days credit, for Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. The trial court ordered both sentences to run concurrently.
[¶9] Fielder now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[¶10] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind. 2014). We neither assess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence, and we will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶11] Fielder contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support either of her misdemeanor charges.
A. Leaving the Scene of an Accident
[¶12] Fielder was charged with leaving the scene of an accident when failing to stop after driving into Edwards' signs. Fielder's duties following a collision with property damage are specified in Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1.1, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall do the following:
(1) [] [T]he operator shall immediately stop the operator's motor vehicle:
(A) at the scene of the accident; or
(B) as close to the accident as possible; in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
(2) Remain at the scene of the accident until the operator does the following:
(A) Gives the operator's name and address and the registration number of the motor vehicle the operator was driving to any person involved in the accident.
(B) Exhibits the operator's driver's license to any person involved in the accident or occupant of or any person attending to any vehicle involved in the accident.
(4) If the accident involves . . . damage to property other than a vehicle, the operator shall, in addition to the requirements of subdivisions (1) and (2):
(A) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle or property of the damage; and
(B) if after reasonable inquiry the operator cannot find the owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle or property, the operator must contact a law enforcement officer or agency and provide the information required by this section.
(b) An operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with subsection (a) commits leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor.
[¶13] Fielder now contends that "running over the signs placed in the road did not constitute an accident which triggered her" statutory obligations. (Appellant's Br. p. 7). While she did acknowledge that the signs "were property of another and had value," she claims that "an accident" should have some minimal damage value because "we wouldn't expect someone who ran over [a] toy car to believe they were involved in an accident." (Appellant's Br. p. 7).
[¶14] In Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ind. 2006), our supreme court observed:
The phrase "involved in an accident" and the word "accident" are not specifically defined in the statute. Undefined words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. "Accident" is broadly defined as "an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance" and "an unfortunate event resulting especially from carelessness or ignorance." "Accident" is also defined as an "unexpected and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm" and as "[a]n unforeseen incident." . . . [N]othing inherent in the term "accident" suggests that it encompasses only incidents where someone or something is struck. Upon closer examination, we believe the term "accident" is the bellwether for all of the duties imposed by Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1. . . . We therefore hold that all of the duties imposed by the statute apply to a "driver of a vehicle involved in an accident."
Thus, the duties the statute imposes upon a driver are triggered regardless of whether the driver's vehicle struck anyone or anything. Id. Accordingly, there is no merit in Fielder's argument that her collisions with the signs were not an accident for the purpose of Indiana Code § 9-26-1-1.1. The statute is clear that once the operator of a vehicle causes damage to property, an accident has occurred and the statutory requirements are triggered, regardless of the monetary amount of damage caused. As nothing in the statute limits the purview of the statute to property damage of a certain value, we decline Fielder's request to read such a requirement into I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1. Therefore, we affirm her conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.
B. Criminal Mischief
[¶15] To convict Fielder of criminal mischief, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced the property of Edwards without Edwards' consent. See I.C. § 35-43-1-2. Fielder's sole argument revolves around her belief that "the signs being in the public street signified to her that they were abandoned property. And if they are abandoned property, then they are not the 'property of another person,' as contemplated by I.C. 35-43-1-2." (Appellant's Br. p. 8).
[¶16] However, Fielder's argument is contradicted by her testimony during the bench trial. While testifying, Fielder admitted that she assumed that the signs had been placed there by a neighbor. Moreover, the signs were standing at the side of the road, in an area where children were playing. They were placed vertically at the edge of both sides of the road, near homeowners' mailboxes, and visible to traffic as a warning sign. These were not signs that were discarded in the trash or just tossed in the road. Accordingly, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Fielder knew the signs were not abandoned property. See Baxter v. State, 891 N.E.2d 110, 121 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (the State may establish the required mens rea by circumstantial evidence, and it may be inferred from the fact and circumstances of each case). Therefore, we affirm Fielder's conviction for criminal mischief.
CONCLUSION
[¶17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to affirm Fielder's convictions.
[¶18] Affirmed.
[¶19] Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur