Opinion
35770.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1955.
Workmen's compensation. Before Judge Vaughn. Clayton Superior Court. March 21, 1955.
R. Beverly Irwin, Osgood O. Williams, for plaintiff in error.
Marshall, Greene Neely, contra.
1. An award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation will not be set aside if there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to sustain it.
2. Awards of the Board of Workmen's Compensation, like verdicts, "shall have a reasonable intendment, and shall receive a reasonable construction, and shall not be avoided unless from necessity."
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1955.
Mrs. Florence Field filed her claim with the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, seeking to recover of Griffin Construction Company, employer, and the employer's insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, compensation for the death of her husband, John P. Field, which she alleges was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The deputy director who heard the case entered up an award in the claimant's favor. The full board reversed that decision and entered an award denying compensation. Upon appeal the judge of the superior court affirmed the latter award, and the claimant excepted.
The uncontradicted evidence showed that the deceased, while engaged with other workmen building a cement beach wall, accidently bumped his head against a rafter, fell head foremost from a scaffold about four feet upon a concrete floor, his side striking a cement block, and from the impact of the fall he was knocked unconscious; that, after he regained consciousness, he tried to resume work but was unable to do so, and went to a doctor. The doctor testified that the deceased came to his office on Monday, the day he was injured, and related that he had fallen from the scaffold and injured his right side. The doctor further testified that, while he found no abrasions, he found the deceased's right side bruised, and by use of an X-ray determined that the deceased's ribs were not broken. The doctor offered to bandage the deceased's chest, but testified that the deceased declined and said "it didn't bother him that much."
There was evidence that, while the deceased returned to the place of his employment on the following day and evidently undertook to do some work, a fellow employee testified that "he didn't do much work, he could not, he was sore and couldn't hardly move." The witness later stated that the deceased didn't do any work, but was "out there on the job."
Again the next day the deceased went to his employment, but it was raining and no work was done; according to the same witness he was still sore and complained of pain in his chest. On both occasions he drove his automobile. On the following day, Saturday, he attended a meeting of his Union, again driving his automobile, walked up a flight of steps, and while engaged in routine discussions of matters which had been submitted to a committee of which he was a member and which involved no excitement, he suffered a heart attack, was carried to the hospital, and later died. A witness testified that he was still sore from the fall, moved in an awkward manner, and held his hand over his chest.
The record contains evidence that, between the time of the injury and his death, the deceased suffered considerable pain in his chest, was depressed, and experienced loss of appetite and sleep.
The medical testimony was in sharp conflict. Physicians testifying on behalf of the claimant were of the opinion that the accident sustained by the deceased was the natural, unavoidable, and proximate cause of his death. Doctors produced by the employer and its insurance carrier were of a contrary opinion, testifying that they could see no connection between the accident and the deceased's death. The medical witnesses for both sides gave scientific reasons for their conclusions. One of the employer's expert medical witnesses performed an autopsy on the deceased and made a written report of his findings. The report, never introduced in evidence, was referred to on the hearing by the deputy director, counsel, and some of the witnesses as the autopsy. The witness who made the autopsy discussed his finding in considerable detail, and was examined in reference to the report. He was of the positive opinion, from the information gained by him from this post mortem examination, that the accident did not cause or aggravate the condition from which he determined the deceased died.
Other physicians, in their testimony, referred to the written report of the autopsy, and stated their opinions as to the correctness of the conclusions of its author contained in the document.
In this opinion the plaintiff in error, for the sake of convenience, will be referred to as the claimant, the defendants in error respectively as the employer and the insurance carrier.
1. While the evidence amply authorized a finding in favor of the claimant, there was sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the award denying compensation.
2. The finding of fact in the award appealed from contained the statement: "It is the opinion of the majority of the board that the autopsy is the highest and best evidence in the record of the case, which, together with other evidence in the record, shows no connection or proximate cause of the death as a result of the accident and injury complained of."
The claimant contends that the quoted statement clearly reveals that the compensation board considered the written report of the autopsy, and based its award in part upon the report, though it was never introduced in evidence.
It is elementary that a fact-finding body can predicate its finding only upon evidence admitted on the trial of the case.
There are certain rules fixed by our statutes and others adopted by our courts in reference to the construction of verdicts, which we think apply to findings of fact by the compensation board. Code § 110-105 provides that "Verdicts shall have a reasonable intendment, and shall receive a reasonable construction, and shall not be avoided unless from necessity."
It was held in Dunson v. Harris, 45 Ga. App. 450 (2) ( 164 S.E. 910): "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity. Civil Code (1910), § 5927. A verdict, though not explicit in its terms, the intent of which is apparent from the pleadings and the evidence, must be construed with reference thereto. Nottingham v. Nicholson, 42 Ga. App. 628 ( 157 S.E. 118)."
In Swain v. Georgia Power c. Co., 46 Ga. App. 794 ( 169 S.E. 249), this court pronounced the rule: "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity. Civil Code (1910), § 5927. The presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict of a jury, and if possible a construction will be given that will uphold it. Southern R. Co. v. Oliver, 1 Ga. App. 734 ( 58 S.E. 244); David v. Marbut-Williams Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 157, 159 ( 122 S.E. 906); Atlantic Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Brown, 129 Ga. 622 ( 59 S.E. 278)."
Since it appears from the record in the instant case that the medical witness who performed the autopsy and was the author of the written report, minutely and in detail described his findings from the autopsy, and explained his conclusions based upon those findings, as did other medical witnesses, it is reasonable to interpret the statement of the board, that the autopsy was the highest and best evidence, as referring to the evidence of the witnesses in reference to the autopsy, rather than to the written report of the autopsy. So we cannot hold that the expression of the board, that the autopsy was the highest and best evidence, revealed that the award appealed from was predicated upon private information of the members of that body. The statement that the autopsy is the highest and best evidence is obviously inaccurate, since it was the evident intent of the board to refer to the weight rather than to the quality of the evidence. However, mere inaccuracy of expression does not affect the validity of the award, its meaning being apparent.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.