(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Field v. Kearns , 43 Conn. App. 265, 275–76, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). General Statutes § 52-196a provides in relevant part: "(b) In any civil action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against an opposing party that is based on the opposing party's exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.

Other jurisdictions have considered what the term "quasi-judicial act" means. See also Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999) (a commission that conducts hearings with many of the traditional safeguards of courts and then issues orders is performing a quasi-judicial act), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 816, 120 S.Ct. 55, 145 L.Ed.2d 48 (1999); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993) (an administrative determination is quasi-judicial when the agency is required to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases); Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 682 A.2d 148, 151 (1996) (a proceeding is quasi-judicial when the agency has the power to exercise judgment and discretion, hear and determine or ascertain facts, make binding orders and judgments affecting personal or property rights, examine witnesses, and enforce decisions or impose penalties), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). [¶ 10] There is no dispute that Lembke, in her capacity as the Director of the Driver's License Division of the NDDOT, is an administrative official responsible for the decision to grant, to refuse to grant, to revoke or to suspend driver's licenses in the State of North Dakota.

. In the present case, in its memorandum of decision, the court stated that "[t]he legislative history [of § 52-196a ] and [this court's discussion of SLAPP lawsuits in Field v. Kearns , 43 Conn. App. 265, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996) ] reflect a desire to prevent those who use litigation strategically to quell conduct consistent with a party's constitutional rights from doing so with impunity. A frequent example of the wrong sought to be addressed is the hypothetical developer with substantial resources trying to discourage average citizens from contesting a proposal before a local or state governmental entity.

This court previously has held that "a grievance proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature"; Cohen v. King , 189 Conn. App. 85, 90, 206 A.3d 188 (2019), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 925, 246 A.3d 986 (2021) ; and that "statements made in a grievance proceeding [are] shielded by absolute immunity ...." Id., at 92, 206 A.3d 188 ; see also Field v. Kearns , 43 Conn. App. 265, 273, 682 A.2d 148 ("we conclude that bar grievance proceedings are quasi-judicial"), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996) ; Grant v. Quinn , Docket No. CV-10-5035130, 2011 WL 925441, *4 (Conn. Super.

In a grievance proceeding, the committee performs a number of judicial functions, such as assigning the case to a reviewing committee, compelling testimony and the production of evidence via subpoena power, holding hearings at which both parties have the right to be heard, and, ultimately, recommending dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of sanctions. Field v. Kearns , 43 Conn. App. 265, 272–73, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Rioux v. Barry , 283 Conn. 338, 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (overruling grant of absolute privilege in vexatious litigation claim). Accordingly, a grievance proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature.

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 270, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996); see also McColl v. Pataky, 160 Conn. 457, 459, 280 A.2d 146 (1971). III

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn. App. 265, 270, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). I

The position taken by the majority is a paradox in the face of absolute immunity afforded in other contexts where the courts of this state continue to recognize the protection it affords in quasi-judicial proceedings. See Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 247-48, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (information supplied by employer on fact-finding supplement form of employment security division of state labor department entitled to absolute immunity); Preston v. O'Rourke, 74 Conn. App. 301, 309-15, 811 A.2d 753 (2002) (arbitration is quasi-judicial proceeding and testimony entitled to absolute immunity); Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn. App. 265, 273, 682 A.2d 148 ("bar grievants are absolutely immune from liability for the content of any relevant statements made during a bar grievance proceeding"), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). Since Petyan, our Supreme Court and this court have held that witnesses, complainants and grievants enjoy absolute immunity in labor arbitrations and grievances filed against members of the bar.

SLAPP is an acronym for "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation," and is a form of vexatious litigation "to punish and intimidate citizens who petition state agencies and have the ultimate effect of ‘chilling’ any such action." Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 276, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). As a result, legislatures enact anti-SLAPP statutes, such as § 52-196a, to allow courts to dismiss frivolous and vexatious actions.

Defendant Gale also claims that absolute immunity should apply to a complaint filed with the SEEC. He cites the decision in Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 277, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). There the Appellate Court held that " the public policy of protecting the courts and the public from unethical and unprofessional attorneys is so strong that there is absolute immunity for the complainant in filing or otherwise causing the institution of attorney disciplinary proceedings."