Opinion
No. C-04-1404 SC.
December 6, 2005
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the death of their daughter, Angela Davenport Ramirez ("Decedent"), Lisa Fidler and Rito H. Ramirez ("Plaintiffs") brought this action against the San Mateo County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Don Horsley in his capacity as Sheriff, the San Mateo County Women's Correctional Facility, and county employees Lillian Johnson, Nomalee Tilman, Rosemary Taylor, Daren Schofield, and Mahesh Mohan Khilnani ("Defendants"). In the motion at hand, Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion.
II. BACKGROUND
Decedent was booked into the San Mateo Correctional Facility on March 6, 2003. Complaint at 4. On April 6, 2003, Decedent committed suicide, allegedly owing to severe psychological withdrawal symptoms resulting from a lack of access to doctor-prescribed medicine. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew of Decedent's medical needs but failed to adequately respond. Id. at 7.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying Decedent medical assistance and by failing to monitor Decedent's activities while in custody. Id. at 4-8. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim under Section 1983. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 24 ("Defs.' Mem.").
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-256 (1986).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants make three contentions in their motion for summary judgment. First, Defendants assert that they did not act with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" to amount to deliberate indifference and therefore did not violate Section 1983 by depriving Decedent of her Eighth Amendment and due process rights. Defs.' Mem. at 13-18. Second, Defendants contend that qualified immunity protects the individual Defendants from liability for the alleged violation of Decedent's civil rights. Id. at 18-22. Finally, Defendants contend that the County of San Mateo is not liable for the alleged civil rights violation because it had no unconstitutional policy or custom that led to Decedent's death.Id. at 22-24.
A. Deliberate Indifference
i. Eighth Amendment
"To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of a two-part test." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks removed). First, "there must be a demonstration that the prison official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. Second, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so." Id.
It is deliberate indifference when a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety."Id. (citation and quotation mark removed). "[T]he prison official must not only be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, but that person must also draw that inference." Id. (citation and quotation marks removed). If a prison official "should have been aware of the risk, but was not," then there has been no violation of the Eighth Amendment "no matter how severe the risk." Id. (citation and quotation marks removed).
It is a question of fact whether Defendants' knew of Decedent's allegedly fragile psychological state, or whether they could infer from their knowledge Decedent's alleged condition that that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Whether Defendants actually drew such an inference and failed to act accordingly is also a question of fact.
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim.
ii. Due Process
The state's interference with a parent's "fundamental liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child" is "remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060 (citation and quotation marks removed).
As with the previous claim, whether Defendants' alleged acts and omissions constitute state interference with Decedent's liberty interest is a question of fact. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment as to the due process claim.
B. Qualified Immunity
The threshold question is whether the "facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
The Court finds that it is unable to rule on this question until the complicated factual issue of whether correctional officers and medical staff has culpable states of mind are resolved at trial.
C. Liability of San Mateo County for the Alleged Civil Rights Violation
Defendants contend that the County of San Mateo cannot be held liable for the alleged civil rights violation because it has no unconstitutional custom or policy that led to the alleged violation. Defs.' Mem. at 22-23. Specifically, Defendants assert that their policies and procedures "have passed regulatory muster." Id. at 23. Decedent, Defendants contend, was properly admitted and treated according to their policies which afford inmates ample opportunity to express their needs and have them addressed. Id. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs have not proven that Plaintiffs acted with a culpable state of mind. Id. at 22-24.
Plaintiffs contend that an unconstitutional policy existed and its implementation led to the violation of Decedent's rights. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that "Defendant San Mateo maintained a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the serious needs of Ms. Ramirez and their official custom or policy was the moving force behind a deprivation of Ms. Ramirez's rights." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 10 ("Pls.' Mem."). Plaintiffs contend that the correction officers "failed to comply with the required state regulations and accepted correctional practices" and thereby caused Decedent's death. Id. at 18.
The U.S. Supreme Court requires a "plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the plaintiff's injury." Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1994). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the "municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability." Id.
The Court finds that there is a dispute as to the material fact whether there was an unconstitutional policy or custom and whether the action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the questions of whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and whether the County of San Mateo is liable for a constitutional violation cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment because they involve disputes over material facts.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES in its entirety the motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.