The cases were later consolidated, and the homeowners filed an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court reversed and remanded, relying in part on its prior decision in Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1991). 348 Ill. App. 3d 856.

In these cases, the parties stipulated that the loans at issue: (1) were made after March 1, 1980; (2) satisfy the terms of section 527(b) of the National Housing Act; and (3) are not purchase-money first liens on defendants' residential real estate. In Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App. 3d 398, 405-06, 574 N.E.2d 15, 20-21 (1991), this court considered this very issue, concluding that the loan at issue was not within the scope of DIDMCA because it was unclear that the trust deed securing the loan was a "first lien" and that the "first lien on residential real property" language in section 501 of the DIDMCA applied only to purchase-money mortgages. In addition, the Hicks court held that when section 4 of the Interest Act, which permits any rate or amount of interest or compensation with respect to loans secured by a mortgage on real estate, was enacted in 1979, the three-point limit found in section 4.1a was not implicitly repealed.

Congress responded by enacting the Deregulation Act, which eliminated interest rate limits set by state usury laws with respect to first mortgage real estate financing. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App.3d 398, 404 (1991). Given the legislative intent of this Act and its interrelationship with state statutes, it is appropriate to apply its prohibitions only to those transactions clearly provided within its scope.

Plaintiff argues that Illinois opted out of DIDMCA when it reenacted its points limitation in 1992. Plaintiff argues that the legislature was specifically adopting the interpretation of the statute made by court in Fidelity Financial Services Services, Inc v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App.3d 398, 574 N.E.2d 15 (First Dist. 1991) and sought to remove all doubt as to the statute's validity. We reach the opposite conclusion.

Weather-Seal-Nu-Sash, Inc. 596 N.E.2d at 782; see Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks 574 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. 1991). While multiple violations are not necessary under Section 2F, a plaintiff must cite to the prior single MVRISA conviction and/or violation in its pleading when it is filing its ICFA cause of action.

Four years after Currie, an Illinois appellate court weighed in on the issue, holding contrary to Currie, that section 4.1a was not repealed by implication.Fidelity Financial Services v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1st Dist. 1992). The court essentially harmonized the two contradictory sections, finding that they operated in conjunction with each other to "[limit] ancillary charges in connection with loans, [in order to assure] that costs passed to borrowers accurately reflected the cost of money, assuring a more competitive market while limiting the potential for abuse."

Curie, 859 F.2d at 1542-43. However, any confusion over whether Section 4.1a was repealed was resolved by the opinion in Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 574 N.E.2d 15 (1st Distr. Ill. App. 1991), which explained that Section 4 dealt with the general cost of money whereas Section 4.1a limits the fees that can be charged on top of the principal. Jackson v. Resolution GGF OY, 136 F.3d 1130, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998).

The judge wrote that he found two decisions by the state's five intermediate appellate courts more persuasive than Currie and elected to follow them instead. See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Clark, 807 N.E.2d 1109 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 2004); Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App.3d 398, 574 N.E.2d 15 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1991). Recognizing that other district judges in this circuit continue to enforce Currie, and that many suits similar to this one are pending elsewhere, the district judge sensibly concluded that a prompt decision under § 1292(b) could accelerate the disposition of many pieces of litigation. We agree with that conclusion and therefore grant the petition for permission to appeal.

Extra risk is worthwhile only in exchange for extra compensation, and Harbor predictably charges high interest rates, both directly through a stated annual rate of interest and indirectly by deducting "points" from the amount advanced to the borrower. Between 1989 and 1991 Harbor charged more than 3 points in Illinois for loans secured by junior mortgages on real estate, believing that 815 ILCS 205/4.1a, which limits a lender to 3 points if it charges interest at an annual rate exceeding 8%, had been repealed by an amendment to a related section of the same statute, the Illinois Interest Act. So Currie v. Diamond Mortgage Corp., 859 F.2d 1538 (7th Cir. 1988), holds, and it was Currie that emboldened Harbor to charge more than 3 points until Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 214 Ill. App.3d 398, 574 N.E.2d 15 (1st Dist. 1991), held that Currie misunderstood state law and that the points limitation remains in force. Illinois law specifies a penalty of double the total interest (including points) when a lender charges excessive interest.

In the instant case, Haymer alleges that Countrywide and Valor deliberately excluded Haymer's income from the application process, concealed from her the fact the she could not afford to repay the loan, and finally approved the loan that they knew Haymer could not afford. The Court finds that Haymer has sufficiently pleaded allegations that could demonstrate concealment or omission of a material fact because concealing from a borrower the fact that she cannot afford repayments can constitute information upon which it can be expected that she would rely on in deciding to apply for a loan. See Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Hicks, 574 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently stated deceptive practices in violation of ICFA when she alleged that mortgagee knowingly structured the loan to create payments and charges mortgagor could not afford). Because the Court has concluded that Haymer has sufficiently alleged deceptive practices under ICFA, it is unnecessary to address the parties' argument relating to "unfair" conduct.