Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates

27 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers

    442 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)   Cited 3 times
    Discussing Fidelity Dep. Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 167 (8th Cir. 1935)

    ' That language was quoted with approval by Judge Sanborn, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 167 (1935), which was a case involving alleged dishonest acts of a bank employee named Sloan. Judge Sanborn also said in that opinion:

  2. Central National Life Insurance v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

    626 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1980)   Cited 53 times
    Reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of fidelity insurer because the issue of when the loss resulting from dishonest or fraudulent acts was discovered constituted a "disputed issue" for the trier of fact

    Salley v. Globe Indem. Co., 133 S.C. 342, 131 S.E. 616, 43 A.L.R. 971. In Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1935), an opinion by Circuit Judge Sanborn, the evidence disclosed that the insured bank knew of the losses long prior to notifying the bonding company, but the court said: So far as the giving of notice and proofs of loss by the bank to the defendant is concerned, we think the trial court was not required to hold as a matter of law that the provisions of the bond had not been complied with or that the compliance had not been waived.

  3. Eglin Nat. Bank v. Home Indem. Co.

    583 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1978)   Cited 16 times
    Interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees

    The court said that whether this was dishonesty was a jury question, and quoted from London Lancashire. The Eighth Circuit in Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 171 (8th Cir. 1935), approved this jury instruction: The word "dishonesty" is to be given a broad significance and includes any acts done in breach of the officer's duty to the bank and any wilful omissions to discharge the duties of his office.

  4. First Nat. Bank of Sikeston v. Transamerica

    514 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1975)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that the bank was aware of its executive's elaborate check-kiting scheme

    We have long and consistently held that conduct may be fraudulent and dishonest within the meaning of a fidelity bond even though it falls short of a criminal offense. Boston Securities, Inc. v. United Bonding Insurance Co., 441 F.2d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1971); General Finance Corp. v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 439 F.2d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 1971); Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 166-167 (8th Cir. 1935); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Egg Shippers' Strawboard Filler Co., 148 F. 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1906). We have held that where an employee creates a conflict of interest and acts in his own interest, or acts in disregard of his employer's interest, subjecting it to a likelihood of loss, that is fraudulent and dishonest conduct within the meaning of a fidelity bond. Boston Securities, Inc. v. United Bonding Insurance Co., supra; General Finance Corp. v. Fidelity Casualty Co., supra. And we have held that the practice of kiting checks constituted obtaining money under "false pretenses" as that term was used in a bond.

  5. Bryant v. United States

    462 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1972)   Cited 16 times

    His attempt to do so should not be a basis of error unless done in a biased manner. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 8 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 532, 539; Kramer v. United States, 8 Cir., 1969, 408 F.2d 837, 841; Ray v. United States, 8 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 258, 261, cert. denied, 1967, 386 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 863, 17 L.Ed.2d 785; Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 8 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 160, 170. No such bias has been demonstrated in the instant case. It is appellant's final contention that the Assistant United States Attorney committed prejudicial error in his final argument to the jury.

  6. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord

    456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972)   Cited 45 times
    Holding mandamus is an appropriate avenue to review recusal decision but denying the writ on the facts presented

    He has the authority to interrogate witnesses, and to express his opinion upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 170 (8th Cir. 1935). We see no reason why such power need be restricted to the actual trial.

  7. General Finance v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of N.Y

    439 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1971)   Cited 31 times
    In General Finance, the parties added a clause to the bonding agreement clearly indicating that the Insurer did not intend to cover losses that resulted from the dishonest acts of the majority shareholder.

    The words "fraudulent or dishonest" are to be given a broad meaning in the context here. Irvin Jacobs Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 202 F.2d 794 (C.A.7, 1953). Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (C.A.8, 1935). Although it is not necessary that the employee benefit personally, here the proof traced some funds directly to Mr. Leach, and monies of GFC were diverted again and again to unauthorized purposes in disregard of the interest of the corporation and palpably subjecting it to a likelihood of loss.

  8. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murnion

    439 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1971)   Cited 13 times
    Interpreting Montana law

    It was correct under this view of Montana law for the district court to submit the question to the jury since timeliness of notice and excuse for delay are traditionally questions of fact. See American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 552, 42 L.Ed. 977 (1898); Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1935). Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the jury's determination was without support in the record.

  9. United States v. Stirone

    311 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962)   Cited 28 times
    Observing that "[i]t is the right and duty of the judge to act in the interrogation of witnesses to the end that the truth emerge," therefore, "if the issues are obscured or the testimony misunderstood, [the judge] is entitled to and should interrogate witnesses to help render understandable such matters"

    Thus, if the issues are obscured or the testimony misunderstood, he is entitled to and should interrogate witnesses to help render understandable such matters. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1941); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1932); United States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 600 (3 Cir. 1948); Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6 Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 131, 1 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1956); United States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1951); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941); Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 170 (8 Cir. 1935); United States v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522, 529 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659, 60 S.Ct. 513, 84 L.Ed. 1008 (1939); Kettenback v. United States, 202 F. 377, 385 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613, 33 S.Ct. 772, 57 L.Ed. 1352 (1913). There are instances where the bounds of judicial propriety have been overstepped, e.g., United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (2 Cir. 1961); United States v. Quercia, supra; Knapp v. Kinsey, supra, however, in each question on review the paramount consideration is whether the judge has seen to it that all admissible evidence helpful to an intelligent understanding of the issues is before the jury to aid it in its deliberations.

  10. Wegman v. United States

    272 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1959)   Cited 12 times

    A long established and quite strictly enforced rule in federal courts has been that cross-examination of a witness is limited to the scope of direct examination. Wills v. Russell, 1879, 100 U.S. 621, 25 L.Ed. 607; Smith v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 260, 263; Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 8 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 160, 168; Union Electric Light Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 8 Cir., 1933, 65 F.2d 297, 302; Rose v. United States, 8 Cir., 1930, 45 F.2d 459, 465; Hill v. Wabash R. Co., 8 Cir., 1924, 1 F.2d 626, 630; Minnesota Ontario Paper Co. v. Swenson Evaporator Co., 8 Cir., 1922, 281 F. 622. The trial court properly limited the cross-examination of Treece and Hudnall to the scope of their direct examination, and if the testimony sought by appellants was deemed important, the witnesses could have been called subsequently as their own, Kincade v. Mikles, 8 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 784, 787, or the trial judge could have upon request, in his discretion, allowed appellants to make the witnesses their own during cross-examination and by so doing go into other matters. In such case, however, the appellants would be bound by the witnesses' answers.