' That language was quoted with approval by Judge Sanborn, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 167 (1935), which was a case involving alleged dishonest acts of a bank employee named Sloan. Judge Sanborn also said in that opinion:
Salley v. Globe Indem. Co., 133 S.C. 342, 131 S.E. 616, 43 A.L.R. 971. In Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1935), an opinion by Circuit Judge Sanborn, the evidence disclosed that the insured bank knew of the losses long prior to notifying the bonding company, but the court said: So far as the giving of notice and proofs of loss by the bank to the defendant is concerned, we think the trial court was not required to hold as a matter of law that the provisions of the bond had not been complied with or that the compliance had not been waived.
The court said that whether this was dishonesty was a jury question, and quoted from London Lancashire. The Eighth Circuit in Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 171 (8th Cir. 1935), approved this jury instruction: The word "dishonesty" is to be given a broad significance and includes any acts done in breach of the officer's duty to the bank and any wilful omissions to discharge the duties of his office.
We have long and consistently held that conduct may be fraudulent and dishonest within the meaning of a fidelity bond even though it falls short of a criminal offense. Boston Securities, Inc. v. United Bonding Insurance Co., 441 F.2d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1971); General Finance Corp. v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 439 F.2d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 1971); Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 166-167 (8th Cir. 1935); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Egg Shippers' Strawboard Filler Co., 148 F. 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1906). We have held that where an employee creates a conflict of interest and acts in his own interest, or acts in disregard of his employer's interest, subjecting it to a likelihood of loss, that is fraudulent and dishonest conduct within the meaning of a fidelity bond. Boston Securities, Inc. v. United Bonding Insurance Co., supra; General Finance Corp. v. Fidelity Casualty Co., supra. And we have held that the practice of kiting checks constituted obtaining money under "false pretenses" as that term was used in a bond.
His attempt to do so should not be a basis of error unless done in a biased manner. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 8 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 532, 539; Kramer v. United States, 8 Cir., 1969, 408 F.2d 837, 841; Ray v. United States, 8 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 258, 261, cert. denied, 1967, 386 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 863, 17 L.Ed.2d 785; Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 8 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 160, 170. No such bias has been demonstrated in the instant case. It is appellant's final contention that the Assistant United States Attorney committed prejudicial error in his final argument to the jury.
He has the authority to interrogate witnesses, and to express his opinion upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 170 (8th Cir. 1935). We see no reason why such power need be restricted to the actual trial.
The words "fraudulent or dishonest" are to be given a broad meaning in the context here. Irvin Jacobs Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 202 F.2d 794 (C.A.7, 1953). Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (C.A.8, 1935). Although it is not necessary that the employee benefit personally, here the proof traced some funds directly to Mr. Leach, and monies of GFC were diverted again and again to unauthorized purposes in disregard of the interest of the corporation and palpably subjecting it to a likelihood of loss.
It was correct under this view of Montana law for the district court to submit the question to the jury since timeliness of notice and excuse for delay are traditionally questions of fact. See American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 552, 42 L.Ed. 977 (1898); Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1935). Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the jury's determination was without support in the record.
Thus, if the issues are obscured or the testimony misunderstood, he is entitled to and should interrogate witnesses to help render understandable such matters. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1941); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1932); United States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 600 (3 Cir. 1948); Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6 Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 131, 1 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1956); United States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1951); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941); Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 170 (8 Cir. 1935); United States v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522, 529 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659, 60 S.Ct. 513, 84 L.Ed. 1008 (1939); Kettenback v. United States, 202 F. 377, 385 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613, 33 S.Ct. 772, 57 L.Ed. 1352 (1913). There are instances where the bounds of judicial propriety have been overstepped, e.g., United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (2 Cir. 1961); United States v. Quercia, supra; Knapp v. Kinsey, supra, however, in each question on review the paramount consideration is whether the judge has seen to it that all admissible evidence helpful to an intelligent understanding of the issues is before the jury to aid it in its deliberations.
A long established and quite strictly enforced rule in federal courts has been that cross-examination of a witness is limited to the scope of direct examination. Wills v. Russell, 1879, 100 U.S. 621, 25 L.Ed. 607; Smith v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 260, 263; Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 8 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 160, 168; Union Electric Light Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 8 Cir., 1933, 65 F.2d 297, 302; Rose v. United States, 8 Cir., 1930, 45 F.2d 459, 465; Hill v. Wabash R. Co., 8 Cir., 1924, 1 F.2d 626, 630; Minnesota Ontario Paper Co. v. Swenson Evaporator Co., 8 Cir., 1922, 281 F. 622. The trial court properly limited the cross-examination of Treece and Hudnall to the scope of their direct examination, and if the testimony sought by appellants was deemed important, the witnesses could have been called subsequently as their own, Kincade v. Mikles, 8 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 784, 787, or the trial judge could have upon request, in his discretion, allowed appellants to make the witnesses their own during cross-examination and by so doing go into other matters. In such case, however, the appellants would be bound by the witnesses' answers.