Judge Landau wrote a concurring opinion in one of those cases. He agreed with the majority that Court of Appeals precedent compelled affirmance of the agency orders, but he questioned whether those precedents — which rejected petitioner's Article I, section 8, challenge to the OMIA's distinction between off-premises signs and on-premises signs — were valid in light of this court's opinion in Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or 1, 969 P2d 376 (1998). Outdoor Media Dimensions, 184 Or App at 496-98 (Landau, J., concurring).

'" Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 141 Or. App. 495, 501-02, 920 P.2d 154 (1996), rev'd, 328 Or. 1, 969 P.2d 376 (1998) (quoting City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or. 480, 488, 871 P.2d 454 (1994)). And the Supreme Court said that we were wrong.

However, we do not examine legislative history under PGE unless we are unable to determine the meaning of the statutes through examination of their text and context. Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or. 1, 9, 969 P.2d 376 (1998). Moreover, even assuming that the legislature made such a mistake, the courts are not free to expunge it in the guise of statutory interpretation.

Plaintiffs contend that this court previously has declared that lobbying is political speech protected under Article I, section 8. See Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or 1, 8, 969 P2d 376 (1998) (discussing principle). Plaintiffs argue that, in this context, giving gifts constitutes lobbying because the gifts are "clearly designed to attempt to influence legislative action or, at a minimum, to attempt to `obtain the good will' of a legislative official."

The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. SeeFidanque v.Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or. 1, 3 n 2, 969 P.2d 376 (1998) (so noting). Claimant also asserts that the church has not preserved its constitutional arguments.

See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting that one of three central concerns of First Amendment jurisprudence is "regulation of political speech"); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("While the term `lobbyist' has become encrusted with invidious connotations, every person or group engaged . . . in trying to persuade Congressional action is exercising the First Amendment right to petition."); Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D.Conn. 1973) (it is "beyond dispute that lobbyists and their employers . . . have First Amendment rights); Fidanque v. Oregon Gov't Standards and Practices, 969 P.2d 376, 379 (Or. 1998) ("Lobbying is political speech, and being a lobbyist is the act of being a communicator to the legislature on political subjects."). "Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.

We did not discuss it. See State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 507, 85 P3d 864 (2004) (declaring a statute overbroad because it could interfere with, for example, assembly intended to alarm, annoy, or inconvenience government leaders); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 524, 547-48, 931 P2d 770 (1997) (regulation of elections; campaign finance limitations); Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 317 Or 445, 459-60, 857 P2d 101 (1993) (punitive damages imposed against political protesters); Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 54, 535 P2d 541 (1975) (regulation of elections; campaign expenditure limitations); State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 462, 204 P 958 (1922) (section 26 would not prohibit "assemblages from counseling the commission of a crime"); Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or 167, 189, 66 P 714 (1901) (regulation of elections; political parties); Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 141 Or App 495, 506, 920 P2d 154 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 328 Or 1, 969 P2d 376 (1998) (regulation of political action; lobbyist registration fees). The text of section 26, on the other hand, provides useful interpretive material.

It is unconstitutional.' Fidanque [ v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices ], 328 Or [1,] 9, [ 969 P.2d 376 (1998)]." Id.