Opinion
2:21-cv-00451-MCE-JDP
12-13-2021
MARIA FIATARONE, Plaintiff, v. SQUAW VALLEY RESORT, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Maria Fiatarone (“Plaintiff”) seeks to recover from her former employer, Defendant Squaw Valley Resort, LLC (“Defendant”), for, very generally, harassment and retaliation she suffered during her tenure with the company. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay the Case. ECF No. 3.
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).
“The [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)] was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). Under the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the FAA “reflect[s] . . . a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.'” Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). At the same time, however, § 2 reflects “the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.'” Id. (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)). “[Section] 3 requires courts to stay litigation of arbitral claims pending arbitration of those claims, ‘in accordance with the terms of the agreement'; and § 4 requires courts to compel arbitration ‘in accordance with the terms of the agreement' upon the motion of either party to the agreement . . . .” Id. at 1748. In determining whether to compel arbitration, the court may not review the merits of the dispute. Instead, the court must limit its inquiry to three steps: (1) whether the contract containing the arbitration agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce; (2) whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate; and (3) whether the dispute(s) fall within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 476-78 (9th Cir. 1991).
The parties agree that when Plaintiff was first employed by Defendant in 2014, she signed a written arbitration agreement (“Agreement”) that covered disputes regarding her employment. That employment was seasonal, however, and ended in the spring of 2015. She then re-applied for future seasonal positions in 2016 and was offered positions in each of the following years until her current claims arose in the 2019/2020 season. She did not sign new arbitration agreements when she was re-hired. Nor did the offer letters presented to her reference arbitration, despite purportedly laying out the terms and conditions of her employment. Moreover, Plaintiff was presented with documents expressly contemplating that either she or Defendant could pursue claims in a judicial tribunal. Accordingly, arbitration is only mandated if the Agreement covered disputes for future terms of employment. It does not.
That Agreement “survives the termination of Employee's employment with the Company, ” but then specifies that it “also applies, without limitation, to disputes regardless of the date of accrual arising out of or related to the current or any past employment relationship with the Company.” Decl. of Jennifer Scharp, ECF No. 5, ¶ 5, Ex. 3. Nowhere in the Agreement does it indicate that the parties agreed to arbitrate claims regarding future terms of employment. Since Plaintiffs claims do not arise out of her first tenure with Defendant, the Agreement is thus inapplicable. Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay the Case (ECF No. 3) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.