Burch, 289 Ill. App.3d at 87; quoting Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App.3d 795, 799 (1993). "`[I]f an order does not resolve every right, liability or matter raised, it must contain an express finding that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal. Otherwise, the order is not appealable.'" F.H. Prince Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App.3d 977, 983 (1994), quoting Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill.2d 458, 465 (1990). A request for attorney fees is a claim within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill.2d R. 304(a)). Prince, 266 Ill. App.3d at 983.
Plaintiff contends that defendants should not have filed a motion to vacate because a review of the applicable law would have demonstrated that the basis of their motion was frivolous. Plaintiff finds that the January 16, 2019, order and case law destroy any legitimate basis to vacate because the trial court retained jurisdiction, citing F.H. Prince & Co. v. Towers Financial Corp. , 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 203 Ill.Dec. 940, 640 N.E.2d 1313 (1994), as support. Lastly, the trial court's January 3, 2019, order's omission of Rule 304(a) language ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)) further demonstrates that the motion to vacate would have been unfounded.
Plaintiff contends that defendants should not have filed a motion to vacate because a review of the applicable law would have demonstrated that the basis of their motion was frivolous. Plaintiff finds that the January 16, 2019, order and case law destroy any legitimate basis to vacate because the trial court retained jurisdiction, citing F.H. Prince & Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill.App.3d 977 (1994), as support. Lastly, the trial court's January 3, 2019, order's omission of Rule 304(a) language (Ill.
In fact, it is well established that a motion for attorney's fees is not a "posttrial motion directed against the judgment" within the meaning of Rule 303, and does not, therefore, toll the time period in which a party may appeal from a final judgment. See Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1990); c.f. F.H. Prince & Co., Inc. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 992 (1994) (noting that a petition for fees filed pursuant to Rule 137 would make a notice of appeal from the judgment premature). ¶ 17 Moreover, while this court has considered motions for attorney's fees "claims" within the meaning of Rule 304(a) (see F.H. Prince & Co., Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 983), it has long recognized a distinction between claims that are brought as part of the principal action and claims that are brought after the principal action has been decided (Servio, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 759). In the latter scenario, a Rule 304(a) is not required.
LaGrange Bank argues that its motion for attorney fees was timely filed because the motion is not a posttrial motion pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code, and thus, the 30-day limitation does not apply. See Brown Kerr, Inc. v. American Stores Properties, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1999); F.H Prince Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 983 (1994) ("a claim for attorney fees is not a posttrial motion within sections 2-1202 and 2-1203 of the Code * * * nor, even if viewed as a motion to modify the judgment, is it a post-trial motion `directed against the judgment' within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 303(a)"). Plaintiffs agree that a motion for reimbursement is not a posttrial motion, but argue that LaGrange Bank is still subject to a 30-day limitation to file its motion.
Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill.2d R. 301), and the filing of a notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court to hear the appeal of such orders. See, e.g., F.H. Prince Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App.3d 977, 640 N.E.2d 1313 (1994); In re Application of the County Treasurer Ex-Officio County Collector of Cook County for Judgment Order of Sale Against Real Estate Returned Delinquent for the Nonpayment of General Taxes for 1984, 208 Ill. App.3d 561, 567 N.E.2d 486 (1990). The time for filing the notice of appeal is governed by Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1)). That rule provides in relevant part as follows:
For purposes of Supreme Court Rule 303, an order or judgment is final if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause or disposes of the rights of the parties either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite part thereof. E.g., F.H. Prince Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App.3d 977, 640 N.E.2d 1313 (1994); Mars v. Priester, 205 Ill. App.3d 1060, 563 N.E.2d 977 (1990). If the judgment or order does not dispose of all matters, an appeal may not be taken unless the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.
This appeal follows our dismissals of appellant's two prior appeals which had been taken from nonfinal judgments. ( F.H. Prince Co. v. Towers Financial Corp. (1994), 266 Ill. App.3d 977, 640 N.E.2d 1313.) Appellant subsequently obtained certification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) ( 155 Ill. 2 d R. 304(a)); and this court now has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the arguments presented. The underlying action brought by F.H. Prince Co. (Prince) alleged a breach of contract by Towers Financial Corporation (Towers) due to Towers' failure to fulfill the terms of a settlement agreement, promissory note and guaranty.
Tressler, LLP v. Schwartz, 2019 IL App (1st) 172367, ¶¶ 18-19; Brown & Kerr, Inc. v. American Stores Properties, Inc., 306 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1028 (1999); F.H. Prince & Co., Inc. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill.App.3d 977, 983 (1994). Furthermore, "[i]n determining whether an order that does not resolve a claim for fees constitutes a final, appealable order, 'courts have made a distinction between a claim for fees brought as part of the principal action and a claim made after the principal action has been decided.'" Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶ 22 (quoting In re Estate of Kunsch, 342 Ill.App.3d 552, 556 (2003)).
A Rule 304(a) finding vests jurisdiction in this court over the appeal, while allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction over remaining claims. See F.H. Prince Co., Inc. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 989 (1994). "The filing of a Rule 304(a) appeal serves only to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to modify the judgment appealed from or rule on matters of substance which are the subject of the appeal."