Opinion
No. 04-05-00930-CV
Delivered and Filed: March 1, 2006.
Appeal from the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-CI-06749, Honorable Michael Peden, Judge Presiding.
Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction.
Sitting: Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In her original petition, Sheryl Fey sued Guido Lumber Co., Inc. for violating chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Guido Lumber Co. then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Fey was barred from bringing a claim under chapter 21. Before the summary judgment hearing, Fey filed an amended petition, dropping her chapter 21 claim but adding other claims. She also added Brazo Guido as a defendant. On September 28, 2005, the trial court denied Guido Lumber Co.'s motion for summary judgment as moot, but ordered Fey and her attorney, Charles Bomba, to pay Guido Lumber Co.'s attorney's fees in the amount of $6,137.00. Fey and Bomba filed a notice of appeal, stating that they intend to appeal the trial court's order of September 28, 2005, awarding attorney's fees.
A judgment or order is final for purposes of appeal if it actually disposes of all pending parties and claims before the court. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Here, the trial court's order of September 28, 2005, is interlocutory because it does not dispose of all parties and causes of action. As such, it is not a final and appealable order. Interlocutory orders may be appealed if a specific statute authorizes such an interlocutory appeal. For example, section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code lists circumstances under which a person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014. We cannot, however, find any statutory authority that allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory order awarding attorney's fees.
Therefore, in an order dated January 31, 2006, we ordered appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the same order, we suspended all appellate deadlines pending further order of this court. In response, appellants filed a motion for extension of time to file their brief. However, as appellate deadlines have been suspended pursuant to our order of January 31, 2006, their brief is not due to be filed. We, therefore, deny their motion for extension of time as moot. More importantly, in their response, appellants do not cite to any legal authority in support of us having jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.