Opinion
EP-06-CA-365-DB.
October 19, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Lawrence W. Few's ("Few") pro se "Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" ("Application") [Docket No. 1], filed on October 12, 2006, in conjunction with a Civil Rights Complaint ("Complaint") brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After carefully reviewing the Application, Complaint, and available public records, the Court determines that it will GRANT Few's Application, but will DISMISS his Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Few, a state prisoner, alleges in his Complaint that the Honorable Peter Peca ("Judge Peca"), a visiting judge in the 388th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, denied Few his civil rights to a jury trial, discovery, call witnesses, enter evidence, and proceed in forma pauperis during his state court divorce proceedings in cause number 2003CM4130. Few also claims Judge Peca denied his request for genetic testing. Few seeks a new trial and change of venue.
Few filed a similar lawsuit pursuant to section 1983 against Judge Peca in cause number EP-06-CA-050-PRM. In that case, Few challenged orders in his state court divorce proceedings in cause number 2003CM4130 on the grounds that Judge Peca violated his civil rights. He alleged that Judge Pica denied his attorney's request for funds, thereby precluding the lawyer from conducting discovery. Further, he claimed Judge Peca did not permit him to introduce evidence of adultery. Few sought a reversal of Judge Peca's orders and genetic testing for a child. The Court dismissed this lawsuit as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
Few filed still another civil rights complaint pursuant to section 1983 raising similar claims in cause number EP-05-CA-42-DB brought against the Honorable Patricia Macias ("Judge Macias"), the presiding judge of the 388th Judicial District Court. Few alleged Judge Macias violated his constitutional rights in his state court divorce proceedings in cause number 2003CM4130 by denying him access to his assets so that he could hire lawyers, investigators, and experts to defend himself. Few further alleged Judge Macias failed to order genetic testing despite the fact that his wife stated under oath that some of her children were not Few's. Few asked the Court to order the release of his assets. The Court dismissed this case with prejudice as frivolous.
II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Judicial Screening of In Forma Pauperis and Prisoner Complaints
Complaints of plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis are subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Complaints of prisoners seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity are also subject to preliminary screenings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Both of these sections provide for sua sponte dismissals of the complaints, or any portions thereof, if the Court finds they are frivolous or malicious, if they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted, or if they seek monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief.
Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. B. Judicial Immunity
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1007).
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Generally, judges acting in their judicial capacity enjoy absolute immunity from lawsuits. "[J]udicial immunity can be overcome in two sets of circumstances: (1) `a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e. actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity' and (2) `a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.'" Courts consider four factors in determining whether a judge's actions are judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of represents a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly from a visit to the judge in his official capacity. These factors are construed broadly in favor of immunity. "The fact that a party alleges "the judge committed grave procedural errors is not sufficient to avoid absolute judicial immunity." In addition, section 1983 provides for judicial immunity in actions for injunctive relief, unless the judge has violated a prior declaratory decree or declaratory relief is unavailable. C. Claim Preclusion
Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) ( citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)).
Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12).
Id. (quoting Malina v. Gonzalez, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
"[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2006).
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars re-litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit. The test for claim preclusion has four elements: (1) The parties are identical or in privity; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the judgment in the prior action; (3) the prior action reached a final judgment on the merits; and (4) both actions involved the same claim or cause of action. The critical issue in determining the fourth element is whether the two actions under consideration are based on "the same nucleus of operative facts." D. Abstention Doctrine
Super Van Inc. v. San Antonio, 92 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 1996); In Re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1999).
Matter of Swate v. Hartwell, 99 F.3d 1282, 1286 (5th Cir. 1996).
In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d 736, 743 (5th Cir. 1993) ( quoting In re Howe, 913 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The abstention doctrine requires a federal district court to refrain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings in deference to the principles of equity, comity, and federalism. The doctrine has been extended to civil proceedings, including divorce proceedings. Further, federal district courts are empowered to exercise original, not appellate, jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to reverse or modify final state-court judgments is lodged exclusively in the United States Supreme Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. III. ANALYSIS
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
Id. at 283-284 (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds suits in federal district courts are impermissible when they are "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.").
Few's Complaint lacks any information supporting a conclusion that he can overcome judicial immunity. The Complaint's language neither alleges that Judge Peca acted outside his judicial capacity nor claims that he acted in the absence of jurisdiction. In addition, it is clear that the complained-of actions by Judge Peca all fall within the parameters of judicial functions. Accordingly, Judge Peca is entitled to judicial immunity from suit for damages. Moreover, Few alleges no facts suggesting that Judge Peca violated a prior declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable. Consequently, Judge Peca is also immune from suit for injunctive relief. In sum, Few's claims against Judge Peca are frivolous because they are based on indisputably meritless legal theories. Further, Few fails to state a claim for federal civil rights relief because he can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief from Judge Peca.
The present case also satisfies all the requirements of claim preclusion. Few and Judge Peca are parties in both cause number EP-06-CA-050-PRM and the instant case. A court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final judgment on the merits in the earlier matter. Both cases are based on the same nucleus of operative facts; all of Few's claims were either litigated or should have been raised in the earlier suit.
Finally, the abstention doctrine requires the Court to refrain from interfering with Few's divorce proceedings. Few's remedies lie with state trial and appellate courts, not with this Court.
IV. CONCLUSIONS ORDERS
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Lawrence W. Few's pro se Civil Rights Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court enters the following ORDERS:
1. Plaintiff Lawrence W. Few's pro se "Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" [Docket No. 1] filed on October 12, 2006, is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Lawrence W. Few's pro se Civil Rights Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as FRIVOLOUS and for FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM upon which relief may be granted.
3. All pending motions in this case, if any, are DENIED as MOOT.
4. Since this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), it will be counted as a " STRIKE." Because Few already has strikes in cause numbers EP-05-CA-042-DB, EP-05-CA-043-DB, and EP-06-CA-050-PRM, Few will be denied in forma pauperis status, and required to pay the full filing fee to file a civil action or appeal, unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.")
SO ORDERED.