Put simply, “at the motion-to-dismiss stage and without the benefit of discovery,” the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendants refused to hire Whitfield “because of the disruption it could cause in the workplace, rather than because of the content of the speech.” Festa v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Health Network, 380 F.Supp.3d 308, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Squicciarini v. Vill. of Amityville, No. 17-CV-6768, 2019 WL 1232093, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019); Sugar v. Greenburgh Eleven Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 18-CV-67 (VB), 2018 WL 6830865, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2018) (“Pickering's balancing test demands a fact-sensitive inquiry generally unsuited for resolution on a motion to dismiss. Here, on this undeveloped record, the Court cannot readily discern every interest at play in this case, or how those interests weigh against one another.”

Chiaravallo v. Middletown Transit Dist., No. 18-CV-1360, 2019 WL 4278937, at *9 (D. Conn. Sept. 10, 2019) (“Although the [c]ity's [c]harter may limit [the mayor's] authority. . . [the plaintiff] plausibly alleges that [the mayor's] actions circumvented any limitation on his power . . . and therefore constituted a ‘policy' under Section 1983.”); Festa v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Health Network, 380 F.Supp.3d 308, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[The p]laintiff alleges that she was told [the executive officer] made the decision to terminate [the p]laintiff's employment, suggesting he has final authority over hiring and firing decisions....

WCHCC is a suable entity, Quinones v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-985 (GBD) (DCF), 2017 WL 1322205, at *11 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (citation omitted), adopted by 2017 WL 775851 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017); see also N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3305(1) (noting that WCHCC shall have the power “to sue and be sued”), and WCHCC and its employees are state actors for purposes of Section 1983 liability. See Festa v. Westchester Medical Center Health Network, 380 F.Supp.3d 308, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Mejia v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 16-CV-9706 (LJL), 2018 WL 3442977, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)). B. Health care fraud or Medicaid fraud

The government bears the "burden to establish that its interest in [disciplining the plaintiff] outweighed [the plaintiff's] expressive interests[.]" Festa v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Health Network , 380 F. Supp. 3d 308, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). And while the government "need not show the existence of actual disruption" caused by the employee's speech, it must at least show "that disruption is likely to occur because of the speech."

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court's review is limited to the facts as-pleaded by the plaintiff, documents appended to or referred to in the complaint, and "to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Festa v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Health Network , 380 F.Supp.3d 308, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Judicial notice may be taken of documents that are "integral to the complaint," such that the complaint "relies heavily upon [the documents’] terms and effect."

The Court can infer from Reilly's title and her assertion of authority to hire someone other than Plaintiff that her decision was not subject to review by a superior official within DSNY as a matter of practice. See Westchester Medical Center Health Network, No. 18-CIV-1335 (KMK), 2019 WL 1430014, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (denying a motion to dismiss where "Plaintiff alleges that she was told [the defendant] made the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment, suggesting he has final authority over hiring and firing decisions."); Tekula v. Bayport-Blue Point School Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying a motion to dismiss where Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was the school district superintendent and that he personally signed the letter terminating Plaintiff's employment). Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Reilly possessed final authority to not hire him, the Amended Complaint supports the requisite inference that Reilly was a final policy-maker whose decision could establish a governmental policy and thereby subject the municipality to liability under Monell.