Ferris v. State

281 Citing cases

  1. State v. Green

    375 Md. 595 (Md. 2003)   Cited 73 times
    Stating that "when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a driver has broken a traffic law, the officer may detain the driver temporarily ‘to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with intent to issue a citation or warning’ " (quoting Ferris v. State , 355 Md. 356, 372, 735 A.2d 491 (1999) )

    In reviewing a Circuit Court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the trial record. Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-08, 790 A.2d 660, 663-64 (2002) (citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Where, as here, the motion to suppress was denied, we view the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the State, the prevailing party on the motion.

  2. Kendrick Orlando Charity v. State

    132 Md. App. 598 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)   Cited 90 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that in Ferris, the initial traffic stop ended "[a]t the moment when Trooper Smith returned Ferris's driver's license and registration card to him and handed Ferris a copy of the speeding citation"

    Instead of appreciating that with the " Whren stop" the law enforcement prerogative may already be stretched to its outermost limit, police officers fall into the habit of accepting the " Whren stop" as an unremarkable norm and then try to stretch yet further what may already be right at the breaking point. The secondary lesson is that if this case is not squarely controlled by a linear application of the holding of the Court of Appeals in Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), it is nonetheless a variation on a theme by Ferris. The appellant, Kendrick Orlando Charity, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of the possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.

  3. Com. v. Freeman

    563 Pa. 82 (Pa. 2000)   Cited 80 times
    Noting that a request that an individual move in some manner has been regarded as persuasive evidence that a seizure has occurred (citing Ferris v. State, 735 A.2d 491, 505 (Md. 1999))

    Such directive constituted a greater show of authority than had previously been made (other than the physical stop of Freeman's vehicle itself). See Strickler, 563 Pa. at 68, 757 A.2d at 896 (citing Ferris v. State, 735 A.2d 491, 505 (Md. 1999) (stating that "a request that an individual move in some manner has been consistently regarded by this Court as persuasive evidence that a fourth amendment seizure has occurred" (citation omitted))). Moreover, given everything that had come before, although these events occurred after express conferral of advice that Freeman was free to depart, they would have suggested to a reasonable person that such advice was no longer operative.

  4. Green v. State

    145 Md. App. 360 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)   Cited 4 times

    " The prosecutor also sought to distinguish Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), arguing: . . . Ferris talked about a number of factors.

  5. Nathan v. State

    370 Md. 648 (Md. 2002)   Cited 95 times
    Concluding that, where there was probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband, police could dismantle the hidden compartment in the ceiling

    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention.See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, ___, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Generally, seizures of persons require probable cause to arrest, and investigative detentions violate the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause.

  6. Graham v. State

    146 Md. App. 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that the officer's retention of appellant's car keys "had the same restraining effect on the appellant's freedom to leave the scene" as would the retention of appellant's driver's license

    Id. See also Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491 (1999). In this case, the motion to suppress was denied, and the prevailing party is the State.

  7. Seldon v. State

    151 Md. App. 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that mechanic could not consent to a search of portions of vehicle over which he had authority to access for repairs after repairs had been completed

    The Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention should only last as long as it [sic] necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491 (1999) ( quotingFlorida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.E.d2d 229 (1983)). As previously discussed, the stop, of Defendant implemented the Fourth Amendment but was a valid seizure based on probable cause-the Defendant was speeding.

  8. Cartnail v. State

    359 Md. 272 (Md. 2000)   Cited 156 times
    Holding that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to pull over the Petitioner when he had not committed a traffic violation, and when the only evidence the officer had was a report from unidentified sources claiming they witnessed three black males rob a hotel and flee in a car similar to the car Petitioner was driving

    Our review of a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment ordinarily is limited to information contained in the record of the suppression hearing. See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 488, 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997); Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 312, 568 A.2d 22, 22 (1990); Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670, 521 A.2d 749, 755 (1990). We do not look at the trial record for additional information, nor do we engage in de novo fact-finding.

  9. Reynolds v. State

    129 Md. App. 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that defendant was seized when officers approached defendant, questioned him, and, upon receiving defendant's name and date of birth, ran a warrant check that took five minutes

    Reduced to its simplest terms, the issues in this case require us to answer two questions: 1) Was the initial encounter between Troy William Reynolds and the two law enforcement officers, Detective Thomas Coleman and Officer McNamara, a consensual accosting or a stop unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion? 2) During the five minute detention of appellant, do the circumstances, when subjected to an objective standard, indicate that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave and end the encounter? See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 367 (1999). As court decisions — particularly decisions emanating from the Supreme Court — have considered Fourth Amendment implications attendant to police-citizen confrontations in public places, the thread running throughout these decisions is that lawfulness of the encounter turns on the reasonableness of the actions of law enforcement officials, which must be evaluated according to the alternative which is minimally invasive of personal liberties, yet permits officers to carry out their sworn duties when the facts, which have come to their attention through legitimate means, demonstrate the commission of a criminal act or acts.

  10. Swift v. State

    393 Md. 139 (Md. 2006)   Cited 117 times
    Holding that defendant not in custody and was free to leave even though a police car "merely" blocked the defendant's

    Many courts have analyzed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in terms of three tiers of interaction between a citizen and the police. See, e.g., United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990); United Statesv. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 132-33 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1520, 75 L.Ed.2d 945 (1983); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 374 n. 5, 735 A.2d 491, 500 n. 5 (1999); State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507, 509 n. 1 (Utah 2005); Jefferson v. State, 349 Ark. 236, 76 S.W.3d 850, 854-55 (2002); Com. v. Sierra, 555 Pa. 170, 723 A.2d 644, 646 n. 3 (1999); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-20 (Wyo. 1994). The most intrusive encounter, an arrest, requires probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.