Family Court was also within its power to resettle its initial order. Resettlement, which "rest[s] on the inherent power of courts to cure mistakes, defects and irregularities that do not affect substantial rights of the parties" ( Matter of Torpey v. Town of Colonie, N.Y. , 107 A.D.3d 1124, 1126, 968 N.Y.S.2d 615 [3d Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Joan HH. v. Maria II., 174 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 107 N.Y.S.3d 168 [3d Dept. 2019] ), is an appropriate, and preferred, remedy when a party alleges that an order does not accurately incorporate the terms of a stipulation (seeFerrigan v. Ferrigan, 211 A.D.3d 820, 821, 179 N.Y.S.3d 748 [2d Dept. 2022] ; Town of Warwick v. Black Bear Campgrounds, 95 A.D.3d 1002, 1002, 943 N.Y.S.2d 608 [2d Dept. 2012] ; Charos v. Charos, 3 A.D.3d 467, 467, 769 N.Y.S.2d 906 [2d Dept. 2004] ). An examination of the oral stipulation shows that paragraphs 20, 21, 26 and 28 of Family Court's initial order were terms not agreed to by the parties on the record, and those paragraphs were therefore properly stricken and/or amended (seeEidman v. Eidman, 143 A.D.2d 803, 804, 533 N.Y.S.2d 340 [2d Dept. 1988] ; compareRenaud v. Renaud, 197 A.D.3d 515, 516–517, 148 N.Y.S.3d 901 [2d Dept. 2021] ).