argues here that his pleading on its face establishes a basis for a jury to conclude that the defendants "spoke with malice" (Liberman at 437). He cites in support cases (e.g. Ferrara v Esquire Bank et al., 153 A.D.3d 671, 673 [2d Dept 2017]) that state the pleading standard for establishing a cause of action to defeat a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) As the Second Department wrote in Ferrara," accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the amended complaint sufficiently alleges malice to overcome the privilege.

This "common-interest privilege," however, may be overcome by a showing of malice (Colantonio v. Mercy Med. Ctr. , supra at 903; seeKamchi v. Weissman , 125 AD3d 142, 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169 [2nd Dept.2014] ). "To establish the ‘malice’ necessary to defeat the privilege, the plaintiff may show either common-law malice, i.e. , ‘spite or ill will,’ or may show ‘actual malice,’ i.e. , knowledge of falsehood of the statement or reckless disregard for the truth" ( Diorio v. Ossining Union Free School Dist. , 96 AD3d 710, 712, 946 N.Y.S.2d 195 [2nd Dept.2012], quoting Liberman v. Gelstein , supra at 437-438[internal quotation marks omitted]; seeFerrara v. Esquire Bank , 153 AD3d 671, 672-73, 61 N.Y.S.3d 73, 75 [2nd Dept. 2017] ). Plaintiff alleges two possible sources of defamation.

Generally, a cause of action predicated on allegedly defamatory statements is subject to dismissal, inter alia, where the statements are protected by a qualified privilege (seeGottlieb v. Wynne, 159 A.D.3d 799, 800, 74 N.Y.S.3d 46 ). The qualified privilege defense extends to a communication made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest (seeStillman v. Ford, 22 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 238 N.E.2d 304 ; Ferrara v. Bank, 153 A.D.3d 671, 673, 61 N.Y.S.3d 73 ; Kamchi v. Weissman, 125 A.D.3d 142, 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). "This qualified privilege has been applied to communications carried out ‘in furtherance of a common interest of a religious organization’ " ( Kamchi v. Weissman, 125 A.D.3d at 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169, quoting Berger v. Temple Beth–El of Great Neck, 41 A.D.3d 626, 627, 839 N.Y.S.2d 504 ).

tements (i) charging plaintiff with a serious crime; (ii) that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business or profession; (iii) that plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or (iv) imputing unchastity to a woman" ( Spring v. County of Monroe , 151 A.D.3d 1694, 1696–1697, 57 N.Y.S.3d 799 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, we conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Laxen's statements constituted defamation per se inasmuch as they purportedly injured plaintiff in her "professional standing" ( id. at 1697, 57 N.Y.S.3d 799 ). Furthermore, despite the court's determination that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and Laxen was protected by the common interest qualified privilege, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Laxen acted with the requisite malice necessary to overcome those defenses (seeFerrara v. Bank , 153 A.D.3d 671, 673, 61 N.Y.S.3d 73 [2d Dept. 2017] ; Kondo–Dresser v. Buffalo Pub. Schools , 17 A.D.3d 1114, 1115, 794 N.Y.S.2d 768 [4th Dept. 2005] ; cf.Kipper v. NYP Holdings Co., Inc. , 47 A.D.3d 597, 597, 852 N.Y.S.2d 56 [1st Dept. 2008], affd 12 N.Y.3d 348, 884 N.Y.S.2d 194, 912 N.E.2d 26 [2009] ). We further agree with plaintiff that the court erred in concluding that the alleged defamatory comments were not actionable inasmuch as they were statements of opinion.

As a general rule, a cause of action predicated on alleged defamatory statements is subject to dismissal if the statements are insufficiently pleaded, constitute nonactionable opinion, or are subject to a qualified privilege defense (seeArvanitakis v. Lester, 145 A.D.3d 650, 652, 44 N.Y.S.3d 71 ). " 'A communication made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest is protected by a qualified privilege' " ( Ferrara v. Bank, 153 A.D.3d 671, 673, 61 N.Y.S.3d 73, quoting Stillman v. Ford, 22 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 238 N.E.2d 304 ). This "common interest" privilege, however, may be overcome by a showing of common law malice, such as spite or ill will, or by a showing of actual malice, such as knowledge of the falsehood of a statement or reckless disregard for the truth (seeLiberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437–438, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 605 N.E.2d 344 ).

(Gottlieb v Wynne, 159 AD3d 799, 800 [2d Dept 2018]). While conclusory allegations of malice are insufficient (L.Y.E. Diamonds, Ltd. v Gemological Inst. of Am., Inc., 169 AD3d 589, 591 [1st Dept 2019]), a plaintiff need not support his allegation of malice with evidentiary facts on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (Ferrara v Esquire Bank, 153 AD3d 671, 673 [2d Dept 2017]). That a statement is defamatory per se does not obviate the need to allege malice.

Were dismissal and summary judgment not warranted, the issue of whether defendant was entitled to rely on the common interest qualified privilege would be left for trial (see Ferrara v Bank, 153 A.D.3d 671, 673 [2d Dept 2017]), since a qualified privilege "may be overcome by a showing of common law malice, such as spite or ill will, or by a showing of actual malice, such as knowledge of the falsehood of a statement or reckless disregard for the truth" (Gottlieb v Wynne, 159 A.D.3d 799, 800 [2d Dept 2018]).

In order to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published a false statement, without privilege or authorization, to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se. Ferrara v. Esquire Bank, 153 AD3d 671, 672-73 [2d Dept. 2017], quoting Rodriguez v Daily News, L.P., 142 AD3d 1062 [2d Dept 2016]. In determining the sufficiency of a defamation pleading, a court must consider "whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation [citation omitted]."