In Abbot v. Town of Salem, No. 05-cv-127-SM, 2006 WL 276704, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 2, 2006), the district court concluded that mall “security service” was not a “place of public accommodation.” See also Fernandez v. Frank, No. 10-00573, 2012 Wl 1004322, at *6 (D. Haw. Mar. 23, 2012) (dismissing ADA claim against security guard where there was no evidence that the guard owned, leased, or operated a place of public accommodation).
The Court therefore has no basis to construe Rickmyer's complaint as alleging that ABM leases or operates the A-Ramp, and this is fatal to his § 12182(a) claim. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Frank, No. 10-00573, 2012 WL 1004322, at *6 (D. Haw. Mar. 23, 2012) (finding that a plaintiff's § 12182(a) claim was not viable because it was based on "alleged misconduct by a security guard" and there was no evidence that the security guard owned, leased, or operated a place of public accommodation), aff'd, 548 F. App'x 504 (9th Cir. 2013); Abbott v. Town of Salem, No. 05-127, 2006 WL 276704, at *5 (D.N.H. Feb. 2, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff's § 12182(a) claim was not viable because the defendant "operates a security service; it does not operate a place of public accommodation"). Rickmyer also objects to the Magistrate Judge's statement that "[t]here is no indication from the amended complaint that the security guard who asked Rickmyer to continue walking had any indication that Rickmyer is disabled."