Opinion
Civ. No. 96-1329 (DRD)
September 15, 1999.
Elvira Fernandez, o/b/o Sasha Fernandez, Newark, New Jersey, Plaintiffpro se.
Peter G. O'Malley, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, Newark, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Elvira Fernandez, on behalf of her minor child Sasha Fernandez, appeals from a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her Application for Supplemental Security Income benefits ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner's determination is not supported by substantial evidence, but has not submitted a brief as required by L. Civ.R. 9.1. In light of her pro se status, however, the Court will review the administrative record without the benefit of briefs from either party. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's determination is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 9, 1992, plaintiff filed an Application for Supplemental Security Income on behalf of her daughter, alleging disability due to asthma. (Tr. 29-32). Her application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 33-41). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), but failed to appear for her hearing on August 12, 1994. (Tr. 27-28, 111). After appointment of a legal representative, plaintiff was represented by counsel at a rescheduled hearing conducted before ALJ Robert T. Woodruff on March 3, 1995. (Tr. 16-19, 122-144). ALJ Woodruff, in a decision dated April 22, 1995, determined that plaintiff was not disabled because she did not suffer an impairment comparable in severity to one which would disable an adult and was therefore not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act. (Tr. 11-14). The ALJ's decision became final when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on November 8, 1995. (Tr. 3-4). Plaintiff now seeks review of this determination.
Evidence Before the ALJ
ALJ Woodruff had several items of documentary evidence before him, including plaintiff's medical records and functional assessments from the plaintiff's mother, brother, and a physician, Dr. Gonzaga. (Tr. 63-104). Dr. Gonzaga's report lists plaintiff's condition as chronic asthma, but found no limitations on plaintiff's physical or mental development as a result of her condition. (Tr. 80-81). A Description of Child's Activities form completed by plaintiff's mother on March 28, 1993 likewise shows no evidence of any developmental problems. (Tr. 82-85).
At the March 3, 1995 hearing, plaintiff's mother testified as to her daughter's condition. While the plaintiff's testimony offers an account of the child's asthmatic condition, there is nothing to indicate that the child is precluded from engaging in normal activities for her age. To the contrary, plaintiff admitted that her daughter was doing well in school and that she plays with her brother and cousin as well as other children. (Tr. 126, 136, 140).
The ALJ also heard testimony from a medical expert, Dr. Martin A. Fechner. (Tr. 140-144). Dr. Fechner's opinion, based upon a review of plaintiff's medical records, was that plaintiff suffers from "moderately severe" asthma. (Tr. 141). He found plaintiff's development and functional capacity to be normal in all areas based open the medical evidence, but suggested that "[w]e would need to have, if possible, more information from the [child's] actual teachers because they would know how she's doing there." (Tr. 143).
Following the hearing, the ALJ received two additional items into evidence. The first is a Medical Evaluation Form dated March 6, 1995 and signed by plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Marc Roberts. The Medical Evaluation lists plaintiff's medical condition as asthma and describes her medication and treatment. (Tr. 113-14). Notably, the report includes Dr. Robert's medical opinion that the plaintiff is able to engage in substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 114).
The second item is an Individualized Functional Assessment and Case Summary, dated March 9, 1995 and signed by two teachers and a registered nurse from the plaintiff's school. This report finds no evidence of limitations on the plaintiff's physical or mental development or functional capacity, and concludes with the evaluation that "to date, there is no evidence that this child has any significant problem which is affecting her health or education." (Tr. 115-121).
Administrative Findings
On April 22, 1995, ALJ Woodruff made the following findings:
1. The claimant has never engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has asthma, but that she does not have an impairment or combinations of impairments listed in or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P of the Regulations No. 4.
3. The claimant's allegations of frequent asthma attacks and impaired breathing are not documented in the record.
4. Although the claimant's motor development is moderately limited by her pulmonary problems, there is no evidence to suggest that her cognitive development, social development or personal/behavior development is limited or that her ability to concentrate is limited.
5. The claimant does not have an impairment which is comparable in severity to an impairment which would disable an adult.
6. The claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision.
(Tr. 13-14).
DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY AND BURDENS OF PROOF
Under Social Security guidelines, disability is defined as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
At the time when the ALJ issued his decision, a child under the age of 18 was considered disabled and eligible for benefits "if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparable severity." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1382c in 1996. An "impairment of comparable severity" was defined as a physical or mental impairment that so limited a child's ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner that the child's impairment, and the limitations resulting thereof, were comparable to those which would disable an adult. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (a) (amended 1996).
Under the law in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision, the Commissioner had promulgated a four-step analysis for evaluating a child-claimant's disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. The Commissioner first determined whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity for his age group. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). If not, the ALJ then proceeds to determine whether the claimant has a "severe impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). A claimant who does not have a "severe impairment" is not disabled. Id. Third, if the impairment is found to be severe, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If so, the claimant is presumed to be disabled, and the evaluation ends there. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). If the impairment is not a listed impairment or its equivalent, the ALJ then proceeds to the fourth step.
In this final step, the Commissioner performs an Individual Functional Assessment ("IFA"), which is considered along with all other relevant evidence to determine whether the claimant's impairment would impair an adult from engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d (amended 1996). As part of this step, six "domains" of the claimant's functioning were considered: 1) motor functioning; 2) communicative functioning; 3) social functioning; 4) cognitive functioning; 5) personal/behavioral functioning, and; 6) concentration, persistence, and pace functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d(b) (amended 1996). If the IFA indicated that the claimant was impaired to a marked degree in one of the domains and to a moderate degree in at least one other, then he is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(C)(i) (amended 1996). In addition, if the IFA showed the claimant was impaired to a moderate degree in at least three domains, he is disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(C)(ii) (amended 1996).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court must accept the Commissioner's findings of fact as conclusive if they are supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981). Substantial evidence has been defined as "[s]uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 704. Whether evidence is substantial has been described by the Third Circuit as a qualitative, not quantitative, exercise, see Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983), requiring an elaboration of the ALJ's analysis "so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision . . . not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected." Cotter v. Harris, supra at 705 (quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974)).
DISCUSSION
Applying this standard, the Commissioner's determination is supported by more than substantial evidence. ALJ Woodruff's decision clearly sets forth the four-step analysis for determining a child-claimant's disability, at each step detailing specific items in the record which support his factual determinations. (Tr. 12-13). In particular, the ALJ relies on the plaintiff's medical records, as well as the reports provided by her treating physician, her teachers, and her school nurse; taken together, these items indicate that, while the plaintiff suffers from asthma, her condition has caused no substantial impairment of her ability to function in any of the six domains at a level normal for her age group. Id. This conclusion is adequately supported in the record by the reports of at least three physicians, the child's teachers and school nurse, as well as the testimony of the plaintiff's mother. Moreover, the record is devoid of any countervailing evidence which the ALJ could have overlooked or discounted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the final determination of the Commissioner is affirmed. An appropriate order shall be entered.