That evidence included the medical examiner’s testi- mony that the fatal shot was fired approximately six-to-twelve inches from Herring’s face, and that she did not suffer a "contact wound" that would have occurred if the muzzle of the gun were in contact with the skin when it was discharged—that is, evidence the jury could have thought was "at odds with" Chambliss’s account at trial that the gun went off on impact with Herring’s face. See Ferguson v. State, 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015). And the evidence would also allow the jury to reject the theory Chambliss advanced during closing argument, that he could have dropped the gun after he struck Herring and it accidentally discharged when it fell, either because the jury disbelieved this story (which was not even supported by Chambliss’s own testimony) or because the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the bullet would have to travel well over twelve inches from the ground to Herring’s face.
And contrary to Locklear's contention, the State presented significant evidence contradicting his self-serving version of events, including evidence showing that Locklear used both a knife and a screwdriver to stab the 82-year-old Long 21 times and subsequently took extensive measures to conceal Long's body. See Martin v. State , 306 Ga. 538, 541 (1), 832 S.E.2d 402 (2019) (evidence that appellant "took extreme measures to destroy and conceal evidence" undermined his claim of self-defense); Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (jury was authorized to reject appellant's unrebutted testimony that he acted in self-defense, especially in light of "evidence that appear[ed] at odds with [appellant's] account, as, for example, the sheer number of stab wounds sustained by [the victim], which is indicative of an aggressive attack rather than defensive maneuverings"). Turning to the conviction for concealing a death, Locklear argues that, because he told police where to find Long's body, he did not hinder discovery of Long's murder.
Gude claimed that the shooting was an act of self-defense based on McClain's allegedly aggressive and unwelcome sexual advances toward him, but the jury was entitled to reject Gude's self-serving version of the events. See Gobert v. State , 311 Ga. 305, 309 (1) (a), 857 S.E.2d 647 (2021) (evidence was sufficient to support aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and jury was authorized to reject defendant's self-defense theory); Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (jury was authorized to disbelieve defendant's self-defense theory). In addition, Gude's own version of events in his trial testimony, specifically the efforts he claimed he and his father took to conceal the shooting and abandon McClain's body, were contradicted both by evidence that McClain's body was still in the trunk of his car (rather than in bushes at the abandoned complex) and testimony given by Damien and Washington about Gude's actions in the days following the shooting.
Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344-345 (3), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (counsel's failure to adduce a prior inconsistent statement did not prejudice the outcome because "even to the extent [the witness's] prior statement could have served to impeach his credibility, it was unlikely to have had any impact at all on the verdicts"). Judgment affirmed.
However, these were matters within the province of the jury to consider and decide, and the jury, "as the sole arbiter of witness credibility," was free to disbelieve Davenport and his theory of self-defense. Martin v. State , 306 Ga. 538, 541 (1), 832 S.E.2d 402 (2019) ; see also Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (jury was authorized to disbelieve defendant's self-defense theory). The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Davenport's convictions.
Gobert's arguments in this regard, like his arguments concerning the reliability of the police investigation and quality of the State's evidence, were matters within the province of the jury to consider and decide. See Lowery v. State , 310 Ga. 360, 362 (1) (a), 851 S.E.2d 538 (2020) ; see also Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (jury was authorized to disbelieve defendant's self-defense theory). Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Gobert guilty of aggravated assault and the felony murder of Montgomery predicated on that aggravated assault.
The jury, as the sole arbiter of witness credibility, was entitled to discredit Martin’s testimony that he shot McGhee in self-defense after McGhee choked him and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, predicated on aggravated assault. Ferguson v. State , 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015) (the jury was authorized to disbelieve the unrebutted testimony of the defendant that he stabbed two victims in self-defense); Sapp v. State , 273 Ga. 472, 473, 543 S.E.2d 27 (2001) (the jury was authorized to discredit the defendant’s testimony and find, based on his behavior before the shooting, an obscene comment he made about the victim, and his actions afterwards, that he possessed the requisite malice when he shot and killed the victim). Martin’s sufficiency argument as to felony murder fails, and the evidence was sufficient as to the other crimes of which he was convicted.
Although Brittian claimed that he acted in self-defense, the jury, as arbiter of facts and credibility, was entitled to reject Brittian's version of events. Ferguson v. State, 297 Ga. 342 (1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015). 2.
But the only evidence that any of the shots came from somewhere other than White's vehicle was his own statement about the first shot. And the jury was free not to believe that claim. See Amos v. State, 297 Ga. 892(1), 778 S.E.2d 203 (2015); Ferguson v. State, 297 Ga. 342, 344(1), 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015). White also asserts that, even if Sturgis did shoot first, White's conduct before and after the incident showed that he did not know that Sturgis was going to shoot and the State failed to present any evidence to the contrary.
After being hit several times, the victim walked to a nearby restaurant, where 911 was called.See Ferguson v. Slate, 297 Ga. 342, 343, 773 S.E.2d 749 (2015). Meanwhile, a woman who had been driving in the area approached a police officer and reported that she had just seen Grant — whom she knew — "beat up a [male] in the middle of the street[.]"