Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:99-CV-1537-P
November 19, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court for its consideration are:
(1) Defendant Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control — Dallas' ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment), filed May 31, 2000;
(2) Plaintiff John C. Ferguson's ("Plaintiff) Memorandum Brief in Support of Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment"), filed June 2, 2000;
(3) Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Proffered Evidence and Exhibits Offered as Part of Plaintiff's Memorandum Brief in Support of Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike ("Defendant's First Motion to Strike"), filed July 5, 2000;
(4) Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Proffered Evidence and Exhibits Offered as Part of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike ("Defendant's Second Motion to Strike"), filed July 31, 2000.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed June 30, 2000. Defendant's Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment was filed July 20, 2000.
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum Brief in Support of Summary Judgment was filed July 5, 2000. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed July 25, 2000.
Plaintiff did not file a response brief to Defendant's First Motion to Strike.
Plaintiff filed his Reply to Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Proffered Evidence and Exhibits on August 4, 2000.
After careful consideration of the Parties' briefing and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES as MOOT Defendant's First Motion to Strike and DENIES as MOOT Defendant's Second Motion to Strike.
I. FACTS
A. Plaintiff's Employment and Benefits History with Defendant.
Plaintiff began his employment at LTV Electrosystems, a subsidiary of Ling-Temco-Vought, in July 1965. (Def's. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C6 at 1; Ferguson Dep. at 19 1.24-201.1,) On April 26, 1972, LTV Electrosystems changed its name to E-Systems, Inc. (Id.) On May 5, 1972, the name of Ling-Temco-Vought was changed to LTV Corporation ("LTV"). (Def's. Mot. For Summ. J. at 3 ¶ 3.) On September 1, 1972, E-Systems was "spun-off" from LTV and E-Systems became an independent corporate entity wholly unaffiliated with LTV as of that date. (Ferguson Dep. at 20 1. 22 — 21 1.2.) Plaintiff continued his employment with the spun-off entity, E-Systems, until he was laid-off on November 12, 1972. (Id. at 24 1. 25 — 25 1. 5.)
Neither of the Parties have complied with Local Rule 7.1(i), which describes in detail the appendix requirements for briefs filed in the Northern District of Texas.
During his employment with LTV Electrosystems (later named E-Systems), Ferguson was a participant of its Retirement Plan for the Salaried Employees of the LTV Corporation (the "LTV Plan"). (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C6 at. 1.) His participation in the LTV Plan ceased on August 31, 1972 due to the corporate spin-off. (Id. Ex. C6 at 2.) Pursuant to the terms of the LTV Plan, all accrued and vesting service credits and benefits accrued through September 1, 1972 belonging to former LTV Electrosystems employees who became employees of E-Systems as a result of the spin-off, were transferred from the LTV Plan to the qualified retirement plan of E-Systems (the "E-Systems Plan"). (Id.) Plaintiff was one of those employees. (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff's seven-plus years of service (from July 7, 1965 to August 31, 1972) were transferred to the E-Systems Plan, of which he became a participant on September 1, 1972. (Id.)
According to the E-Systems Plan, no plan benefit would be paid unless a plan participant had ten (10) years of vesting service. (Id.) Plaintiff was terminated from E-Systems on November 12, 1972. (Id.) His total credited vesting service under the E-Systems Plan was less than eight (8) years. (Id.) Therefore, according to Defendant, Plaintiff was not vested under the E-Systems Plan and was ineligible to receive benefits under the E-Systems Plan. (Id.)
On December 11, 1972, Plaintiff was hired by LTV Corporation — Vought Systems Division. (Id.: Ferguson Dep. at 24 1.25 — 25 1.5.) According to Defendant, because Plaintiff's past service with LTV Electrosystems and E-Systems was fully transferred and recognized by the E-Systems Plan, and was no longer credited by the LTV Plan, Plaintiff was treated as a new employee by the LTV Plan as of December 11, 1972. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C6 at 2.) Plaintiff worked for LTV until his retirement in August 1993. (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) Consequently, Plaintiff's retirement benefits under the LTV Plan were calculated by Defendant without regard to his service with LTV Electrosystems/E-Systems from July 5, 1965 through November 12, 1972. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A ¶ 23.) Plaintiff currently receives retirement benefits for his service with LTV dating from December 11, 1972 through August 1993, his date of retirement. (Ferguson Dep. at 29 11.18-21.)
Actually, due to a series of corporate structural changes, Plaintiff's employer at the time of his retirement was known as Loral Vought Systems Corporation, predecessor to Defendant.
B. Plaintiff's Claims for Benefits.
On October 21, 1974, Plaintiff petitioned Defendant and requested that LTV "connect" or credit his LTV Electrosystems/E-Systems service to his service with LTV. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C14.) On February 14, 1975, LTV denied Plaintiff's petition. (Id. Ex. C15.)
In its denial, Defendant explained that, under the rules in place at that time, Plaintiff was required to — yet failed to — make his request to transfer his pension within sixty (60) days. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C15.)
In 1983, Plaintiff again tried to "connect" his E-Systems service to his LTV service for purposes of calculating his retirement benefits. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C Attachment 16.) Again, Plaintiff's request was denied. (Id. Ex. C17.)
In its petition, Plaintiff argued that Paragraph 2 of the "Vought Directive" stated that "Since 16 October 1965, a salaried employee who terminates because of lack of work and is rehired within three years retains the same seniority date applicable on the date of lay-off." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C16.) Plaintiff concluded that his hire date should have been July 7, 1965, his date of hire at LTV Electrosystems. (Id.)
In response, LTV explained that Amendment No. 6 to the LTV Plan states that the funds for retirement purposes for E-Systems employees were transferred on September 1, 1972 and therefore anyone terminating after that date would not be covered by any provisions of the LTV Plan. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C17.) Because Plaintiff was terminated on November 12, 1972 and because Plaintiff had not vested due to his seven-plus years with E-Systems, he was not qualified to connect his E-Systems employment with his LTV employment. (Id.)
On August 17, 1993, Plaintiff (through an attorney) asserted another claim for benefits — again requesting that his E-Systems service be calculated under the LTV Plan. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C3.) In the petition, Plaintiff's counsel relied on Article 10.2 of Amendment No. 6 to the LTV Plan. (Id.) Amendment No. 6 states: "in determining eligibility of such Employee for benefits under the Plan . . . Service shall include all Service credited for eligibility under any other retirement plans of the Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Prior to 9-01-72, for the purposes of this Article for Employees as of 09-01-72, such subsidiaries and affiliates shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the following organizations, namely; The LTV Corporation (formerly Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc.) . . . E-Systems, Inc. (formerly LTV Electrosystems, Inc.) . . ." (Id. Ex. C6 at 4.) Plaintiff's counsel also relies on Paragraph 2 of Article 13.1 which discusses connection of service for former participants who were terminated prior to and rehired prior to September 1, 1972. (Id. Ex. C3 at 1, Ex. C6 at 5.) Paragraph 2 of Article 13.1 states that if a Participant's employment with the Employers is terminated while entitled to a benefit under . . . [the] Plan . . . and such participant is subsequently re-employed on or after September 1, 1972 by the Employers, said Participants shall be entitled to receive credit for Service and Credited Service earned during his previous period of employment provided that his last termination was from one of employment from one of the Employers as defined in the Plan on or after September 1, 1972." (Id. Ex. C6 at 5.)
On November 15, 1993, LTV responded to Plaintiff's request with a lengthy and well-reasoned memorandum explaining LTV's reasoning for denying benefits to Plaintiff. (See id. Ex. C6.) Specifically, LTV explained that Amendment 6 to the LTV Plan provides that if LTV Plan participants were employees of LTV as of September 1, 1972, then eligibility of service with E-Systems, Inc. performed before September 1, 1972 would be recognized under the LTV Plan. (Id. Ex. C6 at 4.) However, if the person was not an employee of LTV on September 1, 1972 because of the spin-off, then prior service under the LTV Plan would not be recognized after the spin-off. (Id.) Article 10.2 of Amendment No. 6 states that "in determining eligibility of such Employee for benefits under the Plan . . . Service shall include all Service credited for eligibility under any other retirement plans of the Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Prior to 9-01-72, for the purposes of this Article for Employees as of 09-01-72, such subsidiaries and affiliates shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the following organizations, namely; The LTV Corporation (formerly Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc.) . . . E-Systems, Inc. (formerly LTV Electrosystems, Inc.) . . ." (Id.) However, it also provides that on and after September 1, 1972, for the purposes of this Article, E-Systems, Inc . . . shall be excluded from the above listed organizations." (Id.) LTV reasoned that according to this provision, Plaintiff was not an "employee" of LTV on September 1, 1972 due to the spin-off, and thus was ineligible for credit under the LTV Plan. (Id.)
Defendant also reasoned that Article 13.1 was inapplicable to Plaintiff because that article discusses connection of service for former participants who were terminated prior to and rehired prior to September 1, 1972 — when E-Systems was affiliated with LTV Corporation. (Id. Ex. C6 at 5.) LTV reasoned that these provisions are not applicable because Plaintiff was employed by E-Systems, not an LTV company, when he was terminated on November 11, 1972. (Id. Ex. C6 at 4.) Article 13.1 provides that "if a Participant's employment was terminated prior to September 1, 1972 and such Participant is subsequently re-employed prior to September 1, 1972 by any of the Employers, as defined in the Plan on such day of re-employment, said Participant shall be entitled to receive credit for Service and Credited Service earned during his previous period of employment." (Id. Ex. C6 at 5 (emphasis added).) Finally, Article 13.1 provides that "Participants who terminated their employment with the Employers while not entitled to a benefit . . . shall be treated in the same manner as a person who was not previously in the Employer's employ." (Id. Ex. C6 at 4.)
Plaintiff's counsel appealed the claim denial, stating that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by refusing to apply Plaintiff's E-Systems service to his LTV retirement while permitting others to connect their service. (Id. Ex. C7.) Plaintiff's appeal was denied because Plaintiff failed to provide any legal basis for overturning the original claim denial. (Id. Ex. C8.) Further, LTV rejected Plaintiff's discrimination argument as being legally and factually unfounded. (Id.)
On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff moved Defendant to reconsider its denial of Plaintiff's appeal. (Id. Ex. C9.) In Plaintiff's correspondence, Plaintiff provided the names of two employees who Plaintiff believed were similarly situated to Plaintiff yet were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. (Id.) LTV's response to Plaintiff's request for reconsideration was basically a reiteration of the bases for its denial of the request. (Id. Ex. C10.)
Plaintiff's counsel sent a second letter to Defendant on November 21, 1994, again asking Defendant to reconsider its denial of benefits. (PL's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6.) Accompanying this letter was a memorandum from Defendant that Plaintiff argues constitutes evidence of discrimination against Plaintiff. (Id. Ex. 5.) Defendant denied this final appeal for the same reasons it had denied all previous claims and appeals. (Id. Ex. 7.)
The memorandum issued by Defendants to certain employees concerned connecting prior service of those employees who had breaks in service. The memorandum states in pertinent part, "[W]e have reexamined the question of non-connected pension service for employees who have breaks in company service prior to January 1, 1976 . . . Loral Vought Systems has elected to amend the salaried employee's pension plan and will reinstate years of credited service under the retirement plan for your future pension benefit . . . This amendment . . . connects only service that would have been connected had the . . . [ERISA] Rule of Parity been effective before January 1, 1976. (PL's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard.Summary Judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.United States v. Diebold. Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The party defending against the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless he provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986).
Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50;Abbot v. Equity Group. Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n. 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to is case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted.Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues.Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees. 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992), The Court need only rely on the portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs the Court. Id. B. Do the Treasury Regulations Create Substantive Rights Upon Which Plaintiff Can Sue?
After carefully reviewing the Parties' briefing and the documents filed in support thereof, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is seeking to assert a claim against Defendant based on Defendant's refusal to apply Plaintiff's service with LTV Electrosystems and E-Systems to his service under the LTV Plan. (See e.g., PL's Compl.; Ferguson Dep. at 39 11.7-11.) Plaintiff attempts to accomplish this by relying on 26 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, which sets forth requirements a pension plan must meet in order to maintain its tax-qualified status. (See Compl.; Ferguson Dep. at 32 1.22 — 33 1.22; 26 U.S.C. § 410(a).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's lawsuit must be dismissed in its entirety because Plaintiff is not entitled to a substantive right to sue Defendant under the Internal Revenue Code. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 10.) In its motion, Defendant cites to several cases that hold that certain Treasury Regulations of the Internal Revenue Code do not create substantive rights that would enable a plan participant or beneficiary to pursue an ERISA claim based on their alleged violation. (Id. at 10-11.) Interestingly, however, none of those cases hold that plan participants are not entitled to substantive rights under ERISA through section 410(a) — the section relied on by Plaintiff. In fact, several of the cases cited by Plaintiff expressly acknowledge that Section 410(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is applicable to ERISA. See e.g. Reklau v. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 808 F.2d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We are convinced that had Congress intended § 401 of the I.R.C. be applicable to ERISA, it would have so stated in clear and unambiguous language as it did . . . with § 410(a) . . . of the I.R.C." (emphasis added)); Stamper v. Total Petroleum, Inc. Retirement Plan. 188 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); see also Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir. 1996) ("ERISA does incorporate portions of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations, in some instances, but on those occasions it does so explicitly . . . [for example] 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) expressly incorporates] Treasury regulations promulgated under 26 U.S.C. § 410(a) . . ."). Courts have repeatedly held that the Internal Revenue Code "clearly states that § 410(a) . . . [is] applicable to ERISA." See e.g., Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1131. However, while the Fifth Circuit (and others) has held that 29 U.S.C. § 1202 explicitly incorporates § 410(a) into ERISA, it has not provided any guidelines to explain exactly what is meant by the "incorporation of § 410 into ERISA." See e.g., Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1131.
Defendant's cases do nothing to bolster Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has no substantive right to sue under § 410(a). In fact, the cases hold to the contrary. Defendant's cases tend to suggest, but do not unequivocally establish, that Plaintiff may have a substantive right to sue pursuant to § 410(a). See Reklau, 808 F.2d at 631; Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1131; Stamper, 188 F.3d at 1238.
In his Complaint and in the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant failed to credit him with service from July 5, 1965 through September 30, 1972. (See Compl.; Ferguson Dep. at 40 1.22 — 41 1.4.) Plaintiff cites 29 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5) as the basis for his Complaint, a section that may or may not provide Plaintiff with a right to sue. However, in the spirit of construing pro se litigants' pleadings liberally, the Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint asserting an ERISA claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 [ERISA § 502], the "typical approach for pursuing an ERISA claim," rather than under § 410(a).See Johnson v. Atkins. 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding pro se complaints are to be liberally construed);Hooks v. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 944 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (same); Gregory A. Padgett, Litigants Trying to Implicitly Incorporate Treas. Regs. Into ERISA May Have Little Luck In Court, 7 J. Tax'n Employee Benefits 202, 207 (2000). C. What Type of Claim Is Plaintiff Asserting?
The Court does note that Plaintiff received a law degree from Southern Methodist University. (See Ferguson Dep. at 17 11.12-20); Bradford v. Supreme Court of La., NO. CIV. A. 88-4389, 1988 WL 125456, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov 21, 1988) ("it is precisely because pro se applicants are not trained as lawyers that the courts go to such lengths to give them the benefit of the doubt and liberally construe their pleadings, which are often time consuming and most difficult to decipher.")
ERISA became effective on its date of enactment, September 2, 1974. Morgan v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund, 433 F. Supp. 518, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on February 14, 1975, the date Plaintiff's original request was denied. See Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1981) (An ERISA cause of action does not accrue until an application for benefits is denied). Because Plaintiff's cause of action accrued after ERISA's effective date, Plaintiff's claim is governed by ERISA.
Although it is far from clear, it appears as though Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims for (1) common-law fraud; (2) discrimination under ERISA; and (3) recovery of benefits. (See PL's Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, 4; PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 1, 3-4.) After carefully reviewing the Parties' briefing and the summary judgment evidence, the Court concludes that this is simply an action for the recovery of benefits under an ERISA plan — and nothing more.See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Ferguson Dep. at 39 11.7-11, 40 1.23 — 411. 4. The Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint as a claim for benefits or enforcement of Plaintiff's rights under the terms of the pension plan and therefore, this lawsuit is governed by the civil enforcement provisions of § 502.
1. Plaintiff's Discrimination Allegation is a Claim for Benefits.
The only mention of an ERISA discrimination allegation in this lawsuit is found in Plaintiff's summary judgment briefing. (See PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (". . . Defendant is unlawfully discriminating against Plaintiff . . .") There is no allegation or claim of discrimination in the Complaint, (See Compl.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) ("A pleading . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" (emphasis added).) Second, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant "bridged" "service for other employees in completely analogous situations" to Plaintiff. (See PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) Third, Plaintiff's purported claim for discrimination is based on allegations that Defendant refused to "connect" Plaintiff's service, while agreeing to connect service for other employees. (See PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) This claim is no different from Plaintiff's claim for recovery of benefits. Therefore, Plaintiff's "discrimination" claim is analyzed as a claim for benefits pursuant to ERISA § 502.
2. Plaintiff's Fraud Allegation is a Claim for Benefits.
With respect to any supposed common-law fraud claim against Defendant, such a claim is pre-empted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144. There can be no dispute that Plaintiff's efforts to collect his retirement benefits "relate to an employee benefit plan" and thus come within the scope of ERISA's express preemption provision § 514(a), which declares that ERISA "supersede[s] any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). Defendant is essentially accused of misrepresenting the extent of coverage to which Plaintiff is entitled under the LTV Plan. Again, this boils down to a claim for benefits under ERISA § 502. D. Plaintiff's Claim for Benefits Is Barred by the Applicable Statute of Limitations.
To the extent Plaintiff's fraud allegation is intended to be part of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, Plaintiff's only reference to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is in Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, where Plaintiff cited a case that applied the six-year statute of limitations to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. First, Plaintiff has not alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in his Complaint. (See Compl.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) ("A pleading . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." (emphasis added).) Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege or present any evidence of any breach of fiduciary duty, fraud-based or not. The only wrongdoing of which Defendant is accused is failing to credit Plaintiff with his years of service with LTV Electrosystems. Again, this boils down to a claim for benefits under ERISA § 502.
ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim to enforce plan rights. See Hogan v. Kraft Foods. 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, courts apply the state statute of limitations most analogous to the cause of action raised. Id. Because Plaintiff's claim involves alleged violations of the terms of the pension plan under which Plaintiff was covered, Plaintiff's claim is measured against the four year Texas limitations statute governing suits sounding in contract. See id.; St. Julian v. Trustees of Agreement of Trust for Maritime Ass'n-I.L.A. Pension Plan, 5 F. Supp.2d 469, 472 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004 (West 2001).
The Fifth Circuit has held that a cause of action does not accrue until an application for benefits is denied. See Hogan, 969 F.2d at 145; Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf. Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1981). According to the summary judgment evidence before the Court, Plaintiff's request for continuation of his LTV Electrosystems service with LTV was denied on February 14, 1975, nearly twenty-five years before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C 15.) Plaintiff's request for continuation of service was again denied on January 6, 1984 — nearly fifteen years before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. At the very latest, Plaintiff's application for benefits was denied by November 28, 1994 — the date on which the administrative committee for the Loral Vought Systems Retirement Plan denied Plaintiff's second appeal of Plaintiff's third claim for connection of Plaintiff s E-System's service. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C 12.) Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on July 6, 1999 — more than four years after the administrative committee's final denial of Plaintiff s application(s) for benefits. Consequently, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
In his response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff erroneously contends that ERISA's six-year limitations period applies to this action. The limitations period prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1113 applies only to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, not for claims for the recovery of benefits. See Myers v. King's Daughters Clinic, 912 F. Supp. 233, 236-37 (W.D. Tex, 1996) ("Section 1113 applies only to causes of action based on violations of the provisions contained in Part 4 of Title 29, entitled Fiduciary Responsibility. A cause of action that does not allege a violation of a fiduciary duty, e.g., a cause of action not brought pursuant to Part 4, is not governed by the limitations period contained in section 1113.") As statedsupra, Plaintiff has not alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary duty — but rather has alleged a claim for benefits.
Even if Plaintiff had pled a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, it would be barred by § 1113's statute of limitations. Section 1113 states that" no action may be commenced . . . after the earlier of (1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission, the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or (2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation." 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (emphasis added). Plaintiff contends that he obtained actual knowledge of Defendant's alleged wrongful conduct when he received a copy of Defendant's memorandum to employees with breaks in service concerning connection of their prior service on or about July 16, 1993. (See supra note 10; Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) Using the July 16, 1993 notice date as a springboard, Plaintiff concludes that he filed his lawsuit within the six-year limitations period by filing this action on July 6, 1999. (PL's Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) Plaintiff's argument is flawed because the six-year limitations period would be inapplicable to this case. According to § 1113, the limitations period is either (1) three years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation (July 16, 1993) or (2) six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation (November 28, 1994 — the date on which the administrative committee denied Plaintiff's final appeal) — whichever is earlier. 29 U.S.C. § 1113. Plaintiff admits he had actual knowledge of the alleged breach or violation as early as July 16, 1993. (PL's Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) Therefore, the limitations period expired July 16, 1996, three years from July 16, 1993 — which is the earlier limitations period, as required by statute.
E. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Receive Credit for His Years of Service at LTV Electrosystems.
Even if Plaintiff's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff is not entitled to receive credit for his years of service at LTV Electrosystems pursuant to the terms set forth in Amendment 6 of the Plan. The undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record before the Court is that LTV Electrosystems changed its name to E-Systems on April 26, 1972. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. A1 at 1, A4 at 1; Ferguson Dep. at 20 11.17-18.) E-Systems was spun off from LTV in September 1972, at which time it became an independent company. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. A1 at 2, A4 at 2; Ferguson Dep. at 20 1.22 — 21 1.3; 22 11.13-17.) According to Amendment No. 6 of the Plan, when E-Systems was spun-off from LTV, all accrued and vesting service credit and benefits through September 1, 1972 were transferred from the LTV Plan to the qualified retirement plan of E-Systems. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. Al at 2, A4 at 2; Ferguson Dep. at 21 11.15-19.) Consequently, at the time of the spin-off (September 1, 1972), Plaintiff's seven-plus years of service credit and benefits with LTV Electrosystems (renamed E-Systems) (from July 7, 1965 through August 31, 1972) were transferred to E-Systems' retirement plan. (Id.; Ferguson Dep. at 22 11.18-23.) Plaintiff was no longer a participant of the LTV Plan, no longer had any service credited to the LTV Plan, and had no benefits accrued under the LTV Plan. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A4 at 2.)
When Plaintiff was terminated from E-Systems on November 11, 1972, Plaintiff's total credited vesting service (all of which had been transferred to the E-Systems Plan) was seven-plus years. (Id.) Because the E-Systems Plan provided that no plan benefit would be paid unless plan participants had 10 years of vesting service, Plaintiff was ineligible to receive benefits under the E-Systems Plan. (Id.)
After being laid-off by E-Systems, Plaintiff was hired by LTV Corporation on December 11, 1972. (Id.) However, under the clear and unambiguous terms of Amendment 6 to the LTV Plan, Plaintiff was not entitled upon his re-employment with LTV Corporation to receive credit for his years at LTV Electrosystems and E-Systems because that service was fully transferred and recognized by the E-Systems Plan. (Id.)
Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's April 1993 memorandum concerning ERISA's bridging rules does not rescue Plaintiff's lawsuit from dismissal. Defendant's April 1993 memorandum applies ERISA's bridging rules to employees with breaks in service prior to January 1, 1976. (See PL's Resp. To Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1.) Because ERISA requires that "all years of service with the employer . . . maintaining the plan be taken into account in computing the period of service," Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to credit for all his years of service with LTV Electrosystems. 29 U.S.C. § 1052(b)(1) (emphasis added). However, Plaintiff's years of service with LTV Electrosystems no longer belong to LTV — they belong to E-Systems. Thus, Plaintiff's "employer" from July 1965 through August 31, 1972 is E-Systems, not LTV, for purposes of maintaining Plaintiff's pension plan. Because E-Systems, not LTV, maintains Plaintiff's pension benefits from July 1965 through August 31, 1972, LTV cannot transfer or distribute those retirement benefits to Plaintiff.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
D. Objections to and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence.
Because Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted supra, the Court need not consider Defendant's First Motion to Strike or Defendant's Second Motion to Strike and hereby DENIES both motions as MOOT.
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED, Defendant's First Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED as MOOT and Defendant's Second Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED as MOOT.
SO ORDERED.