This Court "already properly considered [Appellant's] claims when we reviewed and rejected [its] discretionary application to appeal. That being so, [it] has no right to file a direct appeal and obtain a second review of those same claims." Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 256(1) ( 564 S.E.2d 715) (2002). See also Lewis v. Robinson, 176 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 336 S.E.2d 280) (1985).

Enacted in 1979, OCGA § 5–6–35 (a) (1) was meant to “reduce the massive caseload of Georgia's appellate courts.” Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners , 275 Ga. 255, 256, 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002). See also Rayle , 246 Ga. at 729–730, 273 S.E.2d 139.

Additionally, since Trend, the Georgia Supreme Court has clarified that OCGA § 5–6–35 (a) (1) applies not only to cases where a party appeals directly to the superior court from the local government's zoning decision, but also in cases where a party collaterally attacks the local government's zoning decision by filing an action in superior court for mandamus, declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief. See Hamryka , 291 Ga. at 125(2), 728 S.E.2d 197 ; Ladzinske v. Allen , 280 Ga. 264, 265, 626 S.E.2d 83 (2006) ; Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners , 275 Ga. 255, 258, 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002). As the Supreme Court noted in Hamryka , 291 Ga. at 125(2), 728 S.E.2d 197, OCGA § 5–6–35 (a) (1) “is not limited to ‘appeals' to the superior court but instead applies to appeals from the superior court's ‘review[ ]’ of an administrative agency decision, however that judicial review is sought.”

(Footnote omitted.) Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 256 (1) ( 564 SE2d 715) (2002). When an appealed judgment or order is of a type listed in OCGA § 5-6-34, but concerns subject matter listed in OCGA § 5-6-35, both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated.

Instead, the case turned on whether the State has a right to appeal in criminal cases. Likewise, no question was raised in Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 275 Ga. 255 ( 564 S.E.2d 715) (2002), or in Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467 ( 448 S.E.2d 192) (1994), regarding this Court's jurisdiction over mandamus cases; the appeals were dismissed because no applications for discretionary appeal had been filed. Finally, the cases cited by the dissent cannot be relied upon for the propositions for which they were cited.

In contrast, this appeal involves a request, not to a county administrative agency, but directly to the County's Board of Commissioners under OCGA § 12-8-24 (g). 275 Ga. 255, 256-257 ( 564 S.E.2d 715) (2002). See also King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428 ( 531 S.E.2d 350) (2000) (where zoning case does not involve superior court review of an administrative decision, trial court's order is not within discretionary appeal statute).

The following year, the Court overruled Sprayberry in part, explaining that “to the extent Sprayberry holds that a litigant is not seeking ‘review’ of an administrative decision by filing a mandamus action in superior court to attack or defend that decision, Sprayberry is hereby overruled.” Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 275 Ga. 255 , 258 (2) (564 SE2d 715 ) (2002). The Ferguson decision also included a special concurrence arguing that Sprayberry should not be overruled at all, and another concurrence arguing that Spray-berry should be overruled in its entirety.

The County timely filed an application for discretionary review. Citing Sprayberry v. Dougherty County, 273 Ga. 503 ( 543 S.E.2d 29) (2001), overruled inFerguson v. Composite State Bd. c., 275 Ga. 255, 258 ( 564 S.E.2d 715) (2002), this Court issued an order in which we determined that the County had the right to directly appeal the trial court's issuance of the writ of mandamus compelling the county to issue a special use permit, and granted the application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35(j). At the hearing on the petition, the Congregation verbally amended its pleading to include within it an appeal from the decision of the local governing body.

Id. (citing OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (7), which provides that "[a]ppeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from the following judgments and rulings of the superior courts, the constitutional city courts, and such other courts or tribunals from which appeals are authorized by the Constitution and laws of this state: ... All judgments or orders granting or refusing to grant mandamus or any other extraordinary remedy, except with respect to temporary restraining orders").Id. ; see Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners , 275 Ga. 255, 255, 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002) ("[T]he underlying subject matter listed in the discretionary appeal statute prevails over the procedural judgment listed in the direct appeal statute.").Selke , 295 Ga. at 629, 759 S.E.2d 853.

Nothing about Grogan’s appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss qualifies as an appeal from a decision of a superior court "reviewing decisions of the ... state and local administrative agencies." Compare Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 257-258 (2), 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002) (requiring discretionary application from appeal of denial of mandamus petition that seeks to attack or defend the validity of an administrative ruling). As a result, Grogan was not required to file a discretionary application to pursue his appeal to this Court.