Opinion
No. 98 C 1889.
February 25, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff George Ferguson ("Ferguson") brings this action against his former employer, Defendant Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company ("Wrigley") and its group health insurer, Aetna Life Insurance Company ("Aetna"), under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Plaintiff seeks payment of disability benefits for a period from when he left Wrigley's employment in 1984 to the present. Both Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff's suit is time-barred under the terms of Wrigley's long term disability plan which requires that claims for benefits be filed within three years. Plaintiff argues that the time limitation should be equitably tolled as he was too mentally incapacitated to bring a claim until he actually filed a complaint sometime in 1997. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment and dismisses Plaintiff's claim with prejudice.
Under the terms of Wrigley's long term disability plan, an eligible employee may continue to claim disability benefits until the date he or she is no longer totally disabled, the date the employee commences work at a reasonable occupation, or the date an employee fails to furnish proof of the continuance of total disability. (Group Insurance Policy p. 6; Exhibit B to Aetna's Rule 12(M) Statement.)
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Ferguson worked for Defendant Wrigley from 1980 until May 24, 1984. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Although his precise job responsibilities are not entirely clear, Plaintiff testified that he worked with flavor-making chemicals. (Ferguson Dep., at 28.) On May 24, 1984, Plaintiff resigned from Wrigley without notice. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff does not provide an explicit reason for his decision to quit, but explains generally in his complaint and other documents that he was "fixated" on a female co-worker and "paranoid" about the company. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not advise anyone at Wrigley about his reasons for resigning beyond identifying them as "personal reasons." (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff resigned during a telephone conversation with Manny Patel, an assistant to Plaintiff's supervisor Vosek Kures. Patel suggested that Plaintiff might instead want to give two weeks notice, but Plaintiff declined. (Ferguson Dep., at 30-31.)
In its brief, Wrigley identifies Plaintiff's last day at work as May 20, 1984. Because the May 24, 1984 date is used in the Complaint and the only date used in the correspondence between Plaintiff and Wrigley, this court adopts the May 24, 1984 date.
Plaintiff's complaint does not elaborate as to the nature of his paranoia at the time he left Wrigley. Under seal of court, Plaintiff submits various exhibits — mostly letters and art work — created after he left Wrigley which evidence some of the details of his paranoia. Although fears about Wrigley appear to have played a role, Plaintiff's paranoia was not limited to work-related issues.
Almost immediately after he left Wrigley, a headhunter contacted Plaintiff, and he compiled a resume and flew to California for an apparently unsuccessful interview with the Keebler Company. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶¶ 9-10.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff met with his former supervisor at Wrigley's chemistry laboratory, Dr. Phil Schnell, and with Bill Pearson of Wrigley's personnel department, to return a parking lot key and to discuss Plaintiff's decision to leave Wrigley. (Compl. ¶ 5; Plaintiff's Response to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 8.) For reasons he does not explain, Plaintiff asked for his job back at this time, but Dr. Schnell told him that he had already been replaced. (Plaintiff's Response to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 8.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he continued to interview for various positions with other companies during the summer of 1984. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶¶ 9-10.)
Wrigley's 12(M) Statement is taken entirely from its deposition of Mr. Ferguson, Exhibit A to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement. The parties filed statements of material fact in accordance with the Northern District of Illinois' Local Rules. The court's local rules have been amended, effective September 1, 1999, replacing Local Rule 12(M) and 12(N) with Local Rule 56.1. Because the parties' statements were filed before the amendment to the Local Rules, the court will use the old nomenclature for the sake of clarity.
On June 27, 1984, Plaintiff was voluntarily admitted to Highland Park Hospital's psychiatric ward for a period of two weeks, where he was diagnosed with paranoid disorder. (Compl. ¶ 11; Ferguson Aff. ¶ J.) Plaintiff was voluntarily readmitted on July 30, 1984 for a one-month stay. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ P.) A third voluntary re-admittance of twelve days occurred on January 1, 1985. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ R.) Plaintiff then admitted himself to "I.S.P.I" — which Plaintiff describes as a research hospital that does not charge patients — from February 11, 1985 to April 18, 1985. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ T.)
Plaintiff reports that during this time period he consistently felt "broke, paranoid, depressed, terrified and overwhelmed." (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 151.) He was terrified of being in a motor vehicle accident, though he did continue to drive and managed to renew his driver's license. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 88.) He repeatedly took walks lasting several days, causing lacerations to his feet. (Ferguson Aff. ¶¶ 139-140.) From approximately September 1985 to February 1986, Plaintiff attempted to starve himself to death. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ U.) His symptoms seem to vary. He reports receiving secret messages from songs on the radio and television commercials. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 16.) When he went on job interviews, he concluded that everyone was part of a conspiracy to "give [him] a hard time." (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 34.) He believed the police wanted him to patronize prostitutes, to avoid fast food establishments, and to drive his car without purpose. (Ferguson Aff. ¶¶ 29, 54 102.) At places in the record too numerous to cite, Plaintiff reports paralyzing fear of being beaten by the police. Plaintiff also submits a twenty-four page letter, written in May 1989, chronicling his desire to sue his mother, his sister, and a female co-worker for their participation in a conspiracy to enter his brain through radio waves and cause him physical and mental discomfort. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Z.)
In June or July of 1984, Plaintiff, through his mother, authorized a family friend and insurance broker, Jerome Mancuso to contact Wrigley about making a claim for long-term disability benefits. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 11.) In August of 1984, Dr. Field, Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist at Highland Park Hospital, sent Mancuso a letter expressing his opinion that Plaintiff's "mental symptoms began prior to the time Plaintiff terminated his employment with Wrigley and played a major role in his decision to terminate his employment." (Letter from Dr. Field to Mancuso of 8/7/84, Ex. B1 to Compl.) Mancuso contacted Philip Johnson, identified only as a representative of Wrigley's Personnel Department, about making a long term disability claim for Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 12.) In September 1984, Dr. Field also wrote to Johnson informing him of Plaintiff's diagnosis and expressing his "firm belief that Mr. Ferguson's mental illness played a major role in his impulsive decision to terminate his employment." (Letter from Dr. Field to Johnson of 9/6/84, Ex. B2 to Compl.)
It appears from the correspondence (described below) that Mancuso personally called Johnson on the telephone, but the record does not reflect the details or the date of that conversation.
In October 1984, Johnson sent Mancuso a letter in which he said:
First . . . [Wrigley] considers George Ferguson to have voluntarily resigned his position on May 24, 1984. Accordingly, Mr. Ferguson has no rights and benefits for the period of time following his resignation.
Second, Mr. Ferguson was not covered by any formal disability plan as defined by ERISA. Mr. Ferguson . . . was eligible to be considered for salary continuation if, in the opinion of the management of the Company, he was totally disabled and unable to work. There are no formal procedures to apply for this benefit, since it is fully discretionary.
Johnson's letter raises a variety of questions: First, do the plan terms disqualify persons who resign voluntarily? Or does the employee still qualify if he can show that the disability began during his employment at Wrigley? (Dr. Field's letters appear to be an effort to establish that Ferguson's disability influenced his decision to resign.) Second, was Plaintiff in fact "not covered by a formal disability plan as defined by ERISA"? (Defendants' current argument that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred suggests he was in fact covered by a plan that contains a time limit on filing claims.) Finally, what kind of "fully discretionary" policy was Johnson referring to at the end of the letter? Was Johnson claiming that Wrigley's disability plan was fully discretionary? Unfortunately, none of the questions raised by this letter are answered in the record, but the court concludes they are not material to this motion.
(Letter from Johnson to Mancuso of 10/22/84, Exhibit C1 to Compl.) Notably, Johnson's letter makes no mention of the terms of Wrigley's group insurance plan which required that legal action concerning the plan take place within three years from the date of any alleged violation. (Aetna Insurance Co. Policy at 11, Tab B to Aetna's 12(M) Statement (hereinafter the "Group Policy").) Although otherwise relying on the same facts as Wrigley, Aetna additionally notes that the Group Policy requires claimants to furnish proof of loss directly to Aetna before any claim would be made. ( Id.)
One of Mancuso's employees wrote Plaintiff's mother informing her of Wrigley's response. Presumably referring to the earlier telephone conversation, she noted that "Johnson has changed his original statements which he had made to [Mancuso], and at this point is stating that George simply has no rights to any benefits. . . ." (Letter from Warn to Dorothy Ferguson of 10/26/84, Ex. C2 to Compl.) The letter recommended that Plaintiff retain an attorney, a recommendation that Plaintiff ignored. ( Id.) At deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that he reviewed the correspondence in 1984 and understood Mancuso's efforts were directed toward asserting his right to obtain disability benefits from Wrigley. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 11.) Plaintiff avers only that he was too "paranoid" of Mr. Wrigley and the Chicago Police Department (which Plaintiff believed was under the control of Mr. Wrigley) to pursue the matter. (Plaintiff's Response, at 2.) As described by Dr. Field, during the period 1984-1986, while Plaintiff
The precise nature of Johnson's "original statements" is unexplained.
did at times show good insight into the irrational nature of [his] thoughts and behavior, [his] ability seemed tenuous. It seems clear to me that [his] mental state during periods of hospitalization was such that [he] would have been unable to exercise good judgment about whether or not to apply for benefits.
(Letter from Dr. Field to Ferguson of 11/21/96; Ex. B3 to Compl.) No legal guardian was sought or obtained for Plaintiff. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 21.)
The record does not reflect the context of Dr. Field's letter except that it was written in response to Plaintiff's request for information about his diagnosis.
Plaintiff never returned to full-time employment. To raise money, he sold his car through the Chicago Tribune in 1985. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 12.) At deposition, he stated that he determined an asking price by comparing the price of similar cars advertised in the Tribune and drafted and placed the advertisement by himself. ( Id.) In 1986, Plaintiff interviewed with a temporary employment agency and was placed at Dart Kraft, where he performed clerical and filing work. (Wrigley's 12(M) at 15.) Although Dart Kraft was apparently satisfied with his performance, Plaintiff resigned after only eight weeks because of "paranoia, depression and stomach problems." (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 203.) During this time period, Plaintiff applied to renew his Firearms Identification Card. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 20.) The application was denied, and Plaintiff appealed the denial by traveling to and appearing at an administrative hearing in Joliet, Illinois for which Dr. Field and two friends submitted letters in his support. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 20; Ferguson Dep., at 136-7.) Plaintiff lost the appeal, but claims the administrative hearing officer told him to "just wait five years" and his Firearms card would then be renewed. (Ferguson Dep., at 139.)
The record does not reflect when the Firearms Identification Card was first issued. Plaintiff reports that he has owned guns all his life and had no accidents with them for over thirty years. (Ferguson Aff. ¶ 140.) He reports that he owned two firearms prior to 1984 and had previously renewed his Firearms card by mail. (Plaintiff's Response to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 41.)
In fact, Plaintiff successfully reapplied for his Firearms card in 1997. (Ferguson Dep., at 140.)
Since he left Wrigley, Plaintiff continuously maintained a savings and checking account and maintained credit cards all in his own name. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶¶ 14, 16.) It appears from the record that while Plaintiff was unable to pay off the monthly balances on his credit cards, he nevertheless made regular payments. During the periods he was hospitalized, Plaintiff's mother brought his check book and bills to the hospital for Plaintiff to sign. (Ferguson Response to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement, ¶ 33.) In 1989, Plaintiff wrote creditors to inform them he would be unable to pay his bills. He responded to subsequent collection inquiries with correspondence stating his inability to pay. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 17.) The same year, Plaintiff's mother called the Law Offices of Peter Francis Geraci, listened to the attorney's bankruptcy tapes, and told Plaintiff that filing for bankruptcy would cost him approximately $600. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 18.) Plaintiff subsequently contacted other lawyers regarding bankruptcy. ( Id.) Plaintiff reports that he delayed filing for bankruptcy until 1995 because he did not want to pay the $600. ( Id.) Plaintiff also applied for Public Aid benefits in 1995 without legal assistance. ( Id.) Plaintiff also contacted lawyers about Social Security benefits in 1989 but for unknown reasons did not actually file for such benefits until encouraged to do so by Public Aid in 1995. (Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 19.) Although an initial application to the Social Security Administration was denied for unknown reasons, Plaintiff was eventually found disabled by that agency from May 24, 1984 to the present. The record does not reflect whether Plaintiff also considered or took action regarding any claims for disability benefits he might have against Wrigley before actually filing suit. (Plaintiff's Response to Affirmative Defenses ¶ 12.)
In his reply, Plaintiff reports that he made an error when he stated in his deposition that he talked to "Social Security lawyers" before August 28, 1995. (Plaintiff's Response to Wrigley's 12(M) Statement ¶ 38.)
In 1997, Plaintiff filed an action against Wrigley and Aetna to secure benefits in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division and filed another action for personal injury, alleging that Wrigley's negligence in maintaining its chemical laboratory caused Plaintiff's mental illness. On April 7, 1997, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed those claims so that he could "restructure and refile" those cases. He refiled on March 27, 1998. On April 15, 1998, Defendants successfully removed the complaints to federal court and consolidated them under case 98 C 1889. On September 2, 1998, this court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's common law claims as pre-empted by ERISA and granted Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint and Wrigley and Aetna now both move for summary judgment based on the time limitation found in the Group Policy.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED R. CIV. P. 56(C); see also Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1999). The requirement that a disputed fact be material means that summary judgment will be denied only when there are disputes over facts that have the potential to change the outcome of a suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Id. Additionally, the allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff argues that the contractual limitations period should be tolled because his mental illness precluded him from making a claim within the three years specified in the Group Policy. In a lengthy discussion of the important social interests of certainty, accuracy and repose reflected in the statute of limitations, the Seventh Circuit held that common law doctrines of equitable tolling apply to all federal legislation. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452-3 (7th Cir. 1991). Equitable tolling allows a "plaintiff extra time if he needs it;" but if the plaintiff does not need it "there is no basis for depriving the defendant of the protection of the statute of limitations." Id. at 452. The Cada court, faced with an Age Discrimination in Employment claim, expressed particular concern about delay in the bringing of an employment-related suit because each day of delay results in one more day of backpay entitlements. Id. at 453. In Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1141 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit, citing Cada, found the equitable tolling doctrine applicable to an ERISA claim. Plaintiff there did not receive information vital for her to base a claim within the statutory period, but the court refused to find equitable tolling when four years and eleven months had passed between the time at which she received such information and her decision to pursue the claim.
Plaintiff also asks this court to estop Defendants from enforcing the time limits on grounds that the Policy unilaterally changes his rights under Illinois law (which contains a ten year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims). He further challenges the constitutionality of allowing the Defendants to unilaterally change his rights under Illinois law. Plaintiff seems to misunderstand that the ten year Illinois statute of limitations applied only to the state law claims dismissed by Judge Gettleman in his Minute Order of 9/12/98. The only issue here is whether the three year time limitation in the Group Policy is reasonable. The Seventh Circuit has already determined that a three year contractual limitations period is reasonable under ERISA and is enforceable regardless of longer state law limitations periods. Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1997). Notably, Plaintiff's complaint was filed well longer than ten years after his resignation from Wrigley.
Although the Seventh Circuit has apparently never considered whether a plaintiff's mental illness may be a basis for equitable tolling of an ERISA claim, it has suggested that mental illness may be a basis for the equitable tolling of other statutes. For example, in Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff brought suit against his former employer for wrongful discharge. Under a collective bargaining agreement entered into by plaintiff's union, plaintiff had fourteen days to bring his claim. Id. at 193. Plaintiff, however, did not bring his claim until three years later, arguing the time limit should be tolled because of his acute psychosis. Although it was undisputed that the plaintiff suffered from a mental illness during the three-year delay, the court found that plaintiff's ability to enroll in college and attend classes during the relevant statutory period conclusive of the issue of whether he could understand his legal rights against his former employer. Id. at 192. Adopting the rule used in all other circuits which had then decided the issue, our Court of Appeals observed that a limitation period will be tolled "only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them." Id. at 191.
While there is not a large body of case law on the issue, Miller's reasoning is in accord with other courts. See, e.g., Speiser v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 670 F. Supp. 380, 384 (D.D.C. 1986) (plaintiff suffering from psychiatric disorder understood her legal rights and duties when she contacted an employment counselor about her claim), aff'd, 818 F.2d 95 (Table) (D.C. Cir. 1987); Merman v. Otis Elevator Co., 855 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.Fla. 1994) (plaintiff who managed personal bank account transactions and conferred with attorneys during limitations period understood legal obligations); Decrosta v. Runyon, No. 90 CV 1269, 90 CR 585, 1993 WL 117583 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1993) (plaintiff who pursued a worker's compensation claim, a personal injury action and a Social Security appeal not entitled to equitable tolling for failure to also file a Title VII claim against employer).
Here, despite uncontested evidence that Plaintiff suffered from a mental illness and showed signs of impaired judgment, the record shows that he was nevertheless able to understand his legal rights and duties and at times actually exercised them. Indeed, in his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged his ability to understand his legal rights to make a disability claim against Wrigley when he stated that he understood in 1984 that Mancuso was attempting to secure such benefits. While Dr. Field warrants that Plaintiff's failure to do so was the result of bad judgment, impaired judgment is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff was able to exercise his legal rights and duties in other contexts, including communicating with creditors, conducting banking transactions, maintaining a checking and savings account, renewing his driver's license, interviewing for employment positions, working as a temporary employee, and maintaining and using credit cards. Interestingly, Plaintiff, possibly his doctor, and at least some of his friends believed at least by 1992 that despite his paranoia he was nevertheless eligible to carry a firearm. Any one of these activities would be sufficient to suggest that Plaintiff was capable of understanding his rights and duties despite his psychological problems.
Plaintiff explains he failed to contact Aetna because he presumed that Wrigley had already contacted Aetna about his claim. (Plaintiff's Response to Aetna's Motion for a More Definite Statement ¶¶ 5, 6.) This response, however, does not address the question of whether Plaintiff could understand his legal obligation to provide Aetna with proof of loss as required by the disability policy.
While Plaintiff reports that he needed assistance and encouragement in exercising some of these legal obligations, the need for assistance does not preclude his ability to understand his legal rights. Even giving the facts the most liberal construction and assuming that Plaintiff was unable to exercise his legal rights when Mancuso contacted Wrigley in 1984, this court would necessarily find that his actions in 1989, particularly dealing with creditors and investigating bankruptcy and public aid claims, constitute conclusive evidence of his ability to understand his legal rights as of that time. Under this liberal construction, Plaintiff still waited another eight years before exercising his legal rights to benefits.
Given the difficulties Plaintiff obviously experienced following his termination, it is truly unfortunate that the one claim Plaintiff chose not to pursue at this time was his claim for disability benefits. For the reasons noted above, the court finds Wrigley's 1984 letter to Plaintiff somewhat troubling. If the statements in that letter were not accurate representations of his right to benefits, this court does not condone them. Nevertheless, no basis appears in the record for denying Defendants the benefit of the contractual limitations period.
Such limitations serve valid purposes. Memories fade; witnesses move from their jobs and homes; documents may be misplaced or destroyed. Claims for disability benefits present particularly compelling reasons for enforcing reasonable limitation periods. If Plaintiff had filed his claim within that three-year period, Defendants would have been entitled to determine at that time whether he was eligible for benefits; were the court to entertain Plaintiff's claim now, Defendants would need to determine from the vantage point of 15 years whether Plaintiff was eligible back in 1984. If Plaintiff had applied when he should have, Wrigley and Aetna would have been entitled to require that he continue to verify his eligibility. They may even have been in a position to ensure that he get appropriate treatment and medication. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the circumstances of his case justify setting aside these considerations.
CONCLUSION
The court sympathizes with Plaintiff's obvious distress, but his complaint was filed far outside the appropriate time limitations. Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Doc. No. 31-1, Doc. No. 35-1) are granted. This case is dismissed with prejudice.