Similarly, the term "hit-and-run" aptly includes characterization of an accident which is caused without physical contact by one who leaves the accident scene without identifying him- or herself. See, e.g., Ferega v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Ill. App.3d 246, 248, 303 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1973); Hayne v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 115 Wis.2d 68, 73, 339 N.W.2d 588, 590 (1983).Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabr. 1961).
Upon stipulated evidence the trial court denied recovery on the ground that there had been no physical contact with the hit-and-run motor vehicle as required by the policy. The appellate court affirmed, one judge dissenting ( 15 Ill. App.3d 246), and we allowed leave to appeal. The plaintiff points out that it was his position, both in the trial court and in the appellate court, "that he had complied with the `physical contact' requirement of the policy by virtue of the fact that there was `constructive' physical contact between his vehicle and the uninsured vehicle, due to the fact that the insured vehicle driven by plaintiff struck a concrete culvert rather than strike the oncoming uninsured vehicle."
On the other hand it is said in the annotation at 25 ALR 3rd 1299 at page 1306 that courts have generally held the physical contact requirements to be valid. This same result was likewise reached by divided courts in Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Ill. App. 3rd 246, 303 N.E.2d 459 (1973) and Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Cooperman, 33 Ohio App.2d 152, 293 N.E.2d 293 (1972). The majority relies in part on Lord v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 22 Mich. 669, 177 N.W.2d 653 (1970), and certainly the language quoted from that case makes much sense.
The court further held that there is no conflict between the statutory term "hit-and-run motor vehicle" and the policy requirement of "physical contact of such automobile." We note that the rules enunciated in Prosk were followed in the recent case of Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 15 Ill. App.3d 246, 303 N.E.2d 459. For the reasons set forth the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County should be affirmed.