Therefore, affidavits and affirmations must be made by persons with personal knowledge of the facts alleged in those affidavits and affirmations. Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 A.D.2d 368, 369 [2nd Dept 2001]).

Although defendant demonstrated that it had timely requested verification of the claim ( see Insurance Department Regulations [ 11 NYCRR] § 65-3.5 [b]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group ofIns. , 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2007]), defendant failed to establish that plaintiff did not provide the requested verification. Defendant's litigation examiner did not even allege that the requested verification was outstanding, and defendant's attorney failed to demonstrate that she had personal knowledge to support her assertion of defendant's non-receipt of such documents (see Warrington vRyder Truck Rental, Inc. , 35 AD3d 455, 456; Feratovic v Lun Wah, Inc., 284 AD2d 368, 368; V.S. Med. Servs., P.C. v New York Cent.Mut. Ins. , 20 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51473[U] [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2008]).

Moreover, the petition was not supported by any other testimonial or documentary evidence establishing that the District obtained notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days of the accident or a reasonable time thereafter, and counsel's uncorroborated assertions are no substitute for evidence ( see e.g. Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563). The "bare affirmation of [an] attorney . . . [is] without evidentiary value" ( Feratovic v Lun Wah, Inc., 284 AD2d 368, 368). While we acknowledge that "[n] either the presence nor the absence of any one factor is determinative" ( Catterson v Suffolk County Dept. of Health Servs., 49 AD3d 792, 794) in determining a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, there is no proof here that, within the 90 day postaccident period or within a reasonable time thereafter, the District received any notice that the infant petitioner had been injured ( see Matter of Kumar v City of New York, 52 AD3d 517; cf. Matter of McLean v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. 30, 48 AD3d 571), much less that it had received notice of the "facts that underlie THE legal theory . . . on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim" ( Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 148).

In this action by a health care provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff's counsel and various documents annexed thereto. However, facts set forth in an attorney's affirmation are of no probative value absent the attorney's assertion of a basis for his or her personal knowledge of the facts ( Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557; Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 AD2d 368; Melbourne Med., P.C. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Plaintiff's counsel did not lay a sufficient foundation to establish that what counsel represented to be plaintiff's claim forms were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule ( see CPLR 4518; see also People v. Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569; Trotti v. Estate of Buchanan, 272 AD2d 660; Dayanim v. Unis, 171 AD2d 579).

"The plaintiff met its initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the equipment lease and proof of nonpayment" ( Advanta Leasing Servs. v. Laurel Way Spur Petroleum Corp., 11 AD3d 571, 571; Preferred Capital v. PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168; see also Canon Fin. Servs. v. Medico Stationery Serv., 300 AD2d 66). In opposition, defendant submitted an affirmation by its counsel which was of no probative value ( see Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 AD2d 368). In any event, the affirmation failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact ( see Preferred Capital, 309 AD2d at 1168-1169; Canon Fin. Servs., 300 AD2d at 66-67).

Shareen failed to submit sufficient evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of any triable issues of fact concerning the nature and location of the alleged sidewalk defect ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320; Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557). Moreover, to meet its prima facie burden, Shareen could not rely on the evidence submitted for the first time in its reply papers ( see Adler v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 306 A.D.2d 229; Constantine v. Premier Cab Corp., 295 A.D.2d 303; Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 A.D.2d 368; Voytek Technology v. Rapid Access Consulting, 279 A.D.2d 470). In any event, granting Shareen's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint would have been premature since discovery was outstanding at the time the motion was made ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Lantigua v. Mallick, 263 A.D.2d 467; Brown v. County of Nassau, 226 A.D.2d 492; Yu v. Forero, 184 A.D.2d 506).

The defendants did not submit the plaintiff's medical records, nor did they submit any medical expert evidence of their own. Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Feratovic v. Lun Wah, 284 A.D.2d 368; Akujo v. USA Truck, 227 A.D.2d 360). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

It is well settled that [a] plaintiff moving to restore an action to the trial calendar more than one year after it was stricken from the calendar, after it has been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, must establish: (1) a meritorious cause of action, (2) a reasonable excuse for the delay in prosecution of the action, (3) a lack of intent to abandon the action, and (4) a lack of prejudice to the defendant * * *" ( Buckley v. Astoria Fed. Say. Loan Assn., 297 AD2d 696, 697 [citations omitted]; see also Neidereger v. Hidden Park Apts., 306 AD2d 392; Bassetti v. Nour, 287 AD2d 126). Plaintiff's motion papers failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay in prosecuting the action ( see Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 AD2d 368). In addition, although plaintiff claims she did not intend to abandon the action, her lengthy failure to communicate with her counsel after she moved from the state demonstrates otherwise ( see Zaldua v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 97 AD2d 84).

Certain documents submitted by the defendant in support of its position are not properly before this court, since they were either submitted for the first time with its reply papers (see Klimis v. Lopez, 290 A.D.2d 538; Wright v. Cetek Tech., Inc., 289 A.D.2d 569; Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 A.D.2d 368; Voytek Technology v. Rapid Access Consulting, 279 A.D.2d 470), or, as the defendant concedes, were never submitted to the Supreme Court (see CPLR 5526; cf. Boyar v. Goodman, 202 A.D.2d 541). Since the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of factual issues, its motion for summary judgment should have been denied (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851).

Since the defendant failed to make out a prima facie case that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers (see Mariaca-Olmos v. Mizrhy, 226 A.D.2d 437, 438). Furthermore, we decline to consider the affirmation of the defendant's examining orthopedist, which was improperly submitted for the first time in the defendant's reply papers (see CPLR 2214; Scott v. Albord, 292 A.D.2d 367; Klimis v. Lopez, 290 A.D.2d 538; Feratovic v. Lun Wah, Inc., 284 A.D.2d 368). SANTUCCI, J.P., SMITH, KRAUSMAN, H. MILLER and ADAMS, JJ., concur.