The defendant notes that the trial court ordered the videotaped deposition of Dr. Glick expressly "for use at trial," characterizing the plaintiff's request for deposition as "not a request for discovery." See Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 706, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (1986). The trial court has broad discretion in the management of discovery and the admissibility of evidence.

Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is no longer implicated. Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (1986). This Court has previously ruled that one party's expert, whom it is not calling as a witness, may not be compelled to testify.

Court trials in a free nation, however, exist for precisely the opposite reason: to bring it all out in the open, to get the whole truth. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1181, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 302-03 (1990); Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 706, 506 A.2d 319, 321, 66 A.L.R.4th 203, 208 (1986). Indeed, justice itself depends on the judge and jury hearing all the facts in a lawful trial.

[12, 13] The law is well established that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 705, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (1986); Brown v. Cathay Island, Inc., 125 N.H. at 115-16, 480 A.2d at 44; N.H. R. Ev. 104(a). While evidence of a defendant's flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, see State v. Glidden, 123 N.H. 126, 134, 459 A.2d 1136, 1141 (1983), the evidence in this case reveals that Mr. Lynch did not flee from the scene of the accident.

In granting the defendants' motion to quash the subpoena, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could subpoena Dr. Drukteinis for trial, but that the plaintiff had not carried his burden of showing that "exceptional circumstances" were present to justify a court-ordered, pretrial deposition under Superior Court Rule 35.b(3)(b). In its ruling, the court relied on Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319 (1986), which establishes the premise that, as a general rule, parties may "assert the right to testimonial compulsion." Id. at 707, 506 A.2d at 322.

"[W]e think the rule favoring testimonial compulsion should be applied to all experts, including doctors, appraisers, and others." Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 707, 506 A.2d 319 (1986). After cross-examining the plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert, the defendant's counsel chose to rely on the testimony of five eyewitnesses and not to call Shanok to testify.

In a case almost identical to the facts herein, plaintiffs argued that the trial court order preventing a doctor, initially consulted by one of the defendants, from testifying on their behalf denied them "their constitutional rights to a fair jury trial." Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319 (1986). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was unfair and prejudicial for the trial court in mid-trial to exclude the witness.

On the contrary, a fact finder must judge the weight and credibility of expert testimony, In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 173 F.3d 145, 157 (3d Cir. 1999), which naturally should include an understanding of the influences brought to bear on the expert. See Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 323 (N.H. 1986) (trial court's order forbidding plaintiff from eliciting testimony that a doctor was originally hired by the defense "was erroneous because [his] status as a consultant pertains to the weight and credibility of his testimony"); cf. ONTI, Inc., 1998 WL 671263, at *2 (noting "that experts are more often than not hired hands, brought in by a party in order to propose the truth as that party sees it, or authorized by that party to represent the experts' own opinions as they conform to the party's position"). I will therefore permit the plaintiffs to place before the jury evidence that advises the jury that Dr. Fortuin was hired by the defendants.

" ‘ The rule does not address itself to the admissibility at trial of the testimony of such an expert which is elicited by the opponent.’ " Steele, 1986 WL 30765, at *3 (quoting Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1982)); see alsoFenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (1986) (holding that state rule, modeled after Rule 26(b)(4)(B), does not control admissibility of opponent's consultative expert's testimony at trial). Second, Defendant neither abused the discovery process nor obtained the Deutsch Report through happenstance.

But the majority of state high courts declined to adopt a privilege for expert witnesses and instead allowed trial courts to compel witnesses to disclose their previously formed opinions. SeeFenlon v. Thayer , 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319, 322 (1986) (holding "[a]s a general rule" that "a party may assert the right of testamentary compulsion of experts" but noting that the right is "subject to the traditional limitations excluding prejudicial, misleading, or cumulative evidence"); State , Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Stumpf , 458 So. 2d 448, 454 (La. 1984) (allowing a party to depose experts retained but not called by the other party "on their opinions" and to "subpoena the experts to appear as their own witnesses at trial"); Cornfeldt v. Tongen , 262 N.W.2d 684, 696 (Minn. 1977) ("[N]o cogent reason appears sustaining the restriction of the testimony of a defendant who has sufficient expertise to render an opinion against a codefendant."); Urban Renewal & Cmty. Dev. Agency of Louisville v. Fledderman , 419 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ky. 1967) (allowing a party to subpoena as an expert witness "the other party's paid expert"); Cooper v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. , 197 Va. 653, 90 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1956) (allowing plaintiff in condemn