Walker v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 339, 127 P. 895. The jury found the defendant "guilty of maiming as charged in the information herein," and under 22 O. S. 1941 § 927, the court had the authority to assess the punishment of the defendant, even though the jury had not attempted to do so. Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251. Before a defendant can take advantage of uncertainty in a verdict, he must first object to the verdict in the trial court, and ask the court to require the jury to amend it.
We know that at the time of the trial of the instant case, November 20, 1946, there was much controversy with respect to actions of unions and union leaders, and that the actions of the union involved in the "Quick Charge" case were of a controversial character and calculated to incite prejudice in the minds of certain persons against that union. See Huss v. Heydt Bakery Co., 210 Mo. 44, 108 S.W. 63, 67, 68; State v. Blackwood, 103 Wn. 529, 175 P. 168, 169; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251, 252; People v. Cowan, 1 Cal.App. 411, 82 P. 339, 341; Note, 74 A.L.R. 1157. State v. Malmberg, 14 N.D. 523, 105 N.W. 614, 615.
In construing this statute, this court has held that where a verdict of conviction has been returned by the jury but the punishment to be assessed is not set forth in the verdict, it is the duty of the court to assess and declare the punishment. Blair v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 359, 111 P. 1003; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; Bayless v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 27, 130 P. 520. If counsel for the accused had thought that the verdict was irregular or not in proper form, he should have objected to its sufficiency at the time it was returned into court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to have the verdict corrected before the jury was discharged.
In construing this statute it has been held that on cross-examination of a witness, he may be asked as to any matter which tends to disclose his friendship or bias in favor of either party to the litigation for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; Pryor v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 102, 257 P. 335; Durant v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 288, 240 P. 1088; Stanfield v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 82, 235 P. 256. In Pryor v. State, supra, it is held:
"When a witness, though on cross-examination, gives adverse testimony to the person cross-examining, showing his interest or bias in the case, or lack of it, such person is not bound to accept the statements of such witness as conclusive, but is entitled to offer proof contradicting such witness and tending to establish the existence of facts to the contrary." In the following cases this court has held that impeachment to show bias and interest of the witness is proper: Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; Beason v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 388, 195 P. 792; Stanfield v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 82, 235 P. 256. The evidence complained of was proper for impeachment as tending to show bias and prejudice of the witness as a result of the prosecution.
In the instant case the court properly pronounced the judgment and sentence, and after a careful review of all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record we feel that the judgment, although the maximum, is no more than should have been imposed." Bland v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 514, 196 P. 732; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; Whitfield v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 37, 256 P. 68. The court having properly instructed the jury upon fixing the punishment, and the jury having failed to declare the punishment in the verdict, it was within the discretion of the court to receive such verdict, and having received the verdict, the court was authorized to enter judgment and fix the punishment thereon.
"When the defendant presents himself as a witness, and voluntarily takes the witness stand in his own behalf, he waives all privileges to which he is entitled by remaining silent, and subjects himself to the same rules of cross-examination and impeachment as any other witness." See Groves v. State, 29 Okla. Cr. 128, 233 P. 243; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; McClendon v. State, 19 Okla. Cr. 382, 200 P. 464; Stephens v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. 351, 217 P. 1063. The defendant having offered himself as a witness and other evidence of the state having developed the fact that the difficulty probably arose over the handling of liquor between the defendant and deceased, it was proper on cross-examination of the defendant to inquire into these matters for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness and to show his malice or unfriendly attitude toward the deceased and for the purpose of establishing motive for the commission of the crime.
There are two verdicts, one as to each defendant, finding such defendant guilty, fixing the punishment at imprisonment in the county jail "for a term of _____ and a fine of _____," followed by the words "leaving penalty to the court." The court's attention should be called to the form of the verdict at the time it is returned, so that, if informal, it may be corrected. Pruitt v. State, 17 Okla. Cr. 434, 190 P. 894; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 314, 194 P. 251; Kennedy v. State, 25 Okla. Cr. 306, 220 P. 61; Fowler v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 170, 223 P. 206; Turner v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. 274, 226 P. 1064. No objection was made, nor was the attention of the trial court called to the form of the verdict at the time they were returned. It would have been better form if the verdict had stated that the jury were unable to agree upon the punishment, but that is its clear import.
Where the defendant had taken the stand in his own behalf, the courts have been very liberal with the party cross-examining, and we do not find that the court in this instance erred in permitting the defendant to be fully examined. The court may in its discretion permit either the defendant or the state to reopen the case for further testimony and unless a clear abuse of such discretion appears no question is presented for review on appeal. Winfield v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 258, 191 P. 609; Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251; Ivey v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 182, 206 P. 257. It is next contended that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a continuance.
This was discretionary with the trial court, and no abuse of discretion is shown. Felice v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 313, 194 P. 251. Other assignments of error are made, but they are not tenable and require no special consideration here.