In 1991, after Devcor was decided, the legislature amended § 19-112, redesignating former subsections (B) and (C) as current subsections (C) and (D), amending subsection (D) to include the language the supreme court in Devcor concluded it had lacked, and adding a new subsection (B). 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 8. Harris contends the supreme court "overrule[d]" Devcor in Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 123 P.3d 180 (2005). But Feldmeier neither overruled Devcor nor questioned its reasoning.
¶ 2 When considering challenges to the form of initiative petitions, Arizona courts follow a rule of "substantial compliance." Feldmeier v. Watson (Citizens for Responsible Growth), 211 Ariz. 444, 447-48, ¶¶ 14-15, 123 P.3d 180, 183-84 (2005). The rule recognizes that before errors in petition formalities will be found to bar a measure from the ballot, a court must determine whether the petition, considered "as a whole," "fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements, despite a lack of strict or technical compliance."
Nevertheless, because it involves an issue of statewide importance, we address it. ¶37 Substantial compliance applies to petitions that, despite minor, technical errors, still "fulfill[ ] the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements." Feldmeier v. Watson , 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005). Thus, a petition will be deemed valid if it "compl[ies] substantially, [but] not necessarily technically" with statutory and constitutional requirements.
Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1), (2). Arizona has a strong policy supporting the people's exercise of this power. See, e.g., Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (citing W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 428, 814 P.2d 767, 769 (1991)). For that reason, courts liberally construe initiative requirements and do not interfere with the people's right to initiate laws “unless the Constitution expressly and explicitly makes any departure [from initiative filing requirements] fatal.”
and statutes. Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) ; W. Devcor, 168 Ariz. at 429, 814 P.2d at 770 ; Cottonwood Dev., 134 Ariz. at 49, 653 P.2d at 697. Applying supreme court precedent, this court has done so as well.
[27, 28] ¶32 This Court has previously found that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance is appropriate when deciding whether statutory obligations have been met. See, e.g., In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519, 524 ¶ 11, 533 P.3d 951, 956 (2023) (explaining that substantial compliance "tolerates errors if the purpose of the relevant statutory requirements was nevertheless fulfilled"); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (allowing substantial compliance with initiative petition statutes if the petition "fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements"); Pima County v. Cyprus-Pima Mining Co., 119 Ariz. 111, 114, 579 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1978) (allowing substantial compliance with statute requiring payment of disputed taxes because "spirit of the law" was satisfied). This doctrine, however, is not applicable when interpreting the text of a statute to determine its meaning.
This conflicts with Whitman and a host of other cases. See, e.g. , Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 57–58, 811 P.2d 12, 18–19 (1991) ; Feldmeier v. Watson , 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005). It is debatable under separation-of-powers principles whether the legislature can direct how courts apply our constitution.
. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 7, 123 P.3d 180 (2005) ("The initiative process reserves to the people the power to propose to the electorate laws and amendments to the constitution.").
In deciding whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements, courts may consider various factors, including the nature of the requirements, the extent of the deviation from the requirements, and the purpose of the requirements. See Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶¶ 1, 14 (2005) (discussing substantial compliance in context of petitions for ballot initiative). ¶36 Applying those principles in this case, we conclude the Town substantially complied with the "plan, policy or procedure" requirement of § 9-471(O).
“The term ‘legal sufficiency,’ as used in § 19–122(C), requires substantial, not necessarily technical, compliance with the requirements of the law.” Id. at 58, 811 P.2d at 19 (citations omitted); see also Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (test for initiatives, unlike referenda, is whether petition substantially complies with requirements of constitution and statute). “Courts may remove a measure from the ballot only ‘when it appears affirmatively the constitutional and statutory rules in regard to the manner in which initiative ... petitions should be submitted have been so far violated that there has been no substantial compliance therewith....’ ” Kromko, 168 Ariz. at 58, 811 P.2d at 19,quoting Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 366, 404 P.2d 705, 710 (1965) (alterations in Kromko ).