Feldmeier v. Watson

21 Citing cases

  1. Harris v. City of Bisbee

    219 Ariz. 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that “excluding all signatures on a signature sheet is appropriate only when an affidavit is defective and the presumptive validity of the affected signatures has not been restored or when ... the affidavit is false”

    In 1991, after Devcor was decided, the legislature amended § 19-112, redesignating former subsections (B) and (C) as current subsections (C) and (D), amending subsection (D) to include the language the supreme court in Devcor concluded it had lacked, and adding a new subsection (B). 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 8. Harris contends the supreme court "overrule[d]" Devcor in Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 123 P.3d 180 (2005). But Feldmeier neither overruled Devcor nor questioned its reasoning.

  2. Wilhelm v. Brewer

    219 Ariz. 45 (Ariz. 2008)   Cited 11 times
    Finding petition contained title in compliance with Arizona law even though title was not centered nor did it precede the text

    ¶ 2 When considering challenges to the form of initiative petitions, Arizona courts follow a rule of "substantial compliance." Feldmeier v. Watson (Citizens for Responsible Growth), 211 Ariz. 444, 447-48, ¶¶ 14-15, 123 P.3d 180, 183-84 (2005). The rule recognizes that before errors in petition formalities will be found to bar a measure from the ballot, a court must determine whether the petition, considered "as a whole," "fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements, despite a lack of strict or technical compliance."

  3. Chances v. Hobbs

    249 Ariz. 396 (Ariz. 2020)   Cited 23 times
    Setting forth the requirements for a special action

    Nevertheless, because it involves an issue of statewide importance, we address it. ¶37 Substantial compliance applies to petitions that, despite minor, technical errors, still "fulfill[ ] the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements." Feldmeier v. Watson , 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005). Thus, a petition will be deemed valid if it "compl[ies] substantially, [but] not necessarily technically" with statutory and constitutional requirements.

  4. Pedersen v. Bennett

    230 Ariz. 556 (Ariz. 2012)   Cited 16 times
    Holding § 12–2030 did not require fee award when plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in action to compel Secretary of State to accept initiative petitions but legal duties were only clarified through litigation itself

    Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1), (2). Arizona has a strong policy supporting the people's exercise of this power. See, e.g., Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (citing W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 428, 814 P.2d 767, 769 (1991)). For that reason, courts liberally construe initiative requirements and do not interfere with the people's right to initiate laws “unless the Constitution expressly and explicitly makes any departure [from initiative filing requirements] fatal.”

  5. Arrett v. Bower

    237 Ariz. 74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that a petition serial number requirement was "critical" to ensuring the integrity of the referendum process

    and statutes. Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) ; W. Devcor, 168 Ariz. at 429, 814 P.2d at 770 ; Cottonwood Dev., 134 Ariz. at 49, 653 P.2d at 697. Applying supreme court precedent, this court has done so as well.

  6. In re Drummond

    543 P.3d 1022 (Ariz. 2024)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that motor homes do not qualify as mobile homes and therefore are ineligible for homestead exemptions under A.R.S § 33-1101

    [27, 28] ¶32 This Court has previously found that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance is appropriate when deciding whether statutory obligations have been met. See, e.g., In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519, 524 ¶ 11, 533 P.3d 951, 956 (2023) (explaining that substantial compliance "tolerates errors if the purpose of the relevant statutory requirements was nevertheless fulfilled"); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (allowing substantial compliance with initiative petition statutes if the petition "fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements"); Pima County v. Cyprus-Pima Mining Co., 119 Ariz. 111, 114, 579 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1978) (allowing substantial compliance with statute requiring payment of disputed taxes because "spirit of the law" was satisfied). This doctrine, however, is not applicable when interpreting the text of a statute to determine its meaning.

  7. Voice of Surprise v. Hall

    255 Ariz. 510 (Ariz. 2023)   Cited 5 times

    This conflicts with Whitman and a host of other cases. See, e.g. , Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 57–58, 811 P.2d 12, 18–19 (1991) ; Feldmeier v. Watson , 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005). It is debatable under separation-of-powers principles whether the legislature can direct how courts apply our constitution.

  8. LaChance v. Cnty. of Cochise

    553 P.3d 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    . See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 7, 123 P.3d 180 (2005) ("The initiative process reserves to the people the power to propose to the electorate laws and amendments to the constitution.").

  9. Encanterra Residents Against Annexation v. Queen Creek

    No. 2 CA-CV 2020-0002 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2020)

    In deciding whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements, courts may consider various factors, including the nature of the requirements, the extent of the deviation from the requirements, and the purpose of the requirements. See Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶¶ 1, 14 (2005) (discussing substantial compliance in context of petitions for ballot initiative). ¶36 Applying those principles in this case, we conclude the Town substantially complied with the "plan, policy or procedure" requirement of § 9-471(O).

  10. Parker v. City of Tucson

    233 Ariz. 422 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 32 times
    Finding no prejudice when amendment did nothing to change the theory of the case and the issue had been raised and addressed by the parties

    “The term ‘legal sufficiency,’ as used in § 19–122(C), requires substantial, not necessarily technical, compliance with the requirements of the law.” Id. at 58, 811 P.2d at 19 (citations omitted); see also Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005) (test for initiatives, unlike referenda, is whether petition substantially complies with requirements of constitution and statute). “Courts may remove a measure from the ballot only ‘when it appears affirmatively the constitutional and statutory rules in regard to the manner in which initiative ... petitions should be submitted have been so far violated that there has been no substantial compliance therewith....’ ” Kromko, 168 Ariz. at 58, 811 P.2d at 19,quoting Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 366, 404 P.2d 705, 710 (1965) (alterations in Kromko ).