Feldman v. Harari

14 Citing cases

  1. J.S.S. v. H.S.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 50447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    Dismissal on this ground is proper "where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" (Jadron v 10 Leonard St., LLC, 124 A.D.3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2015]; see Aurora Loan Services, LLC v Reid, 132 A.D.3d 788, 788-789 [2d Dept 2015]). However, dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(4) is not mandatory, and the court has broad discretion in determining whether dismissal should ensue on this ground (Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 629 [2d Dept 2020]).

  2. Longfellow v. Barney

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 34263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

    Rather, dismissal may be warranted where there is a substantial identity of parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same. (Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 630-631 [2d Dept 2020].) "The critical element is whether both suits arise out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs."

  3. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Props. Corp.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 3508 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    "[A] court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Luxama, 172 A.D.3d 1341, 1341 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "It is not necessary that the precise legal theories presented in the first action also be presented in the second action [so] long as the relief... is the same or substantially the same" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 631).

  4. Hirsch v. Beda

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 2053 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), "a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Luxama, 172 A.D.3d 1341, 1341 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Akter v Zara Realty Holding Corp., 203 A.D.3d 791, 792). "It is not necessary that the precise legal theories presented in the first action also be presented in the second action so long as the relief... is the same or substantially the same" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Luxama, 172 A.D.3d at 1341 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 631).

  5. Hirsch v. Beda

    226 A.D.3d 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    [1, 2] Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), "a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently simi- lar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Luxama, 172 A.D.3d 1341, 1341, 102 N.Y.S.3d 238 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Akter v. Zara Realty Holding Corp., 203 A.D.3d 791, 792, 160 N.Y.S.3d 887). "It is not necessary that the precise legal theories presented in the first action also be presented in the second action so long as the relief … is the same or substantially the same" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A v. Luxama, 172 A.D.3d at 1341, 102 N.Y.S.3d 238 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Feldman v. Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 631, 122 N.Y.S.3d 664). [3] Here, while there was a substantial identity of the parties and this proceeding and the action pending in New Jersey arose from the same alleged series of wrongs, the relief sought was not the same or substantially the same (see Matter of Spicer v. Spicer, 162 A.D.3d 886, 887, 80 N.Y.S.3d 328).

  6. Singe v. Bates Troy, Inc.

    206 A.D.3d 1528 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 10 times

    By contrast, the claims in this action arise from plaintiff's status as a putative minority shareholder, and he frames defendants’ alleged unlawful conduct and his wrongful termination as oppression for which he seeks dissolution of Bates Troy or a buyout of his shares (cf. Matter of Williamson v. Williamson, Picket, Gross, Inc., 259 A.D.2d 362, 362, 687 N.Y.S.2d 53 [1999] ). Although both actions proceed from the same general allegations of malfeasance by Kradjian, the amended complaint in this action, in effect, seeks "different damages" for "different wrongs" than sought in the first action ( Feldman v. Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 631, 122 N.Y.S.3d 664 [2020] ). Accordingly, as the claims in the amended complaint are not "the same cause of action," dismissal is unwarranted at this stage ( CPLR 3211[a][4] ; seeSprecher v. Thibodeau, 148 A.D.3d 654, 656, 53 N.Y.S.3d 13 [2017] ; Blank v. Schafrann, 167 A.D.2d 745, 746, 563 N.Y.S.2d 311 [1990] ).

  7. Alsaud v. Gomez

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 30299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

    The allegations in the two actions refer to and describe similar, albeit distinct, tortious conduct by several different defendants, resulting in separate incidents involving the plaintiff and her course of treatment, as well as distinct damages arising from each failure to diagnose and properly treat her infection. The plaintiff essentially seeks "different damages" for "different wrongs" (Singe v Bates Troy, Inc., 206 A.D.3d 1528, 1531 [3d Dept 2022]; Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 631 [2d Dept 2020]). Hence, "'[although] the causes of action in both suits arise out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs, there is good reason for the separate existence of the earlier cause of action . . . since the nature of the relief sought is not the same or substantially the same'" as that sought in the later-commenced action (Boyer v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 120 A.D.2d 363, 363 [1st Dept 1986], quoting Kent Dev. Co. v Liccione, 37 N.Y.2d 899, 901 [1975]).

  8. Skoglund v. N.Y. Police Dep't

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 32732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

    Rather, it is sufficient if the two actions are 'sufficiently similar' and that the relief sought is 'the same or substantially the same' [citation omitted]. 'The critical element is whether both suits arise out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs'" (Feldman v. Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629, 630-631 [2d Dept. 2020] [all internal citations omitted]).

  9. In re Gruber

    2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 31964 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2021)

    The critical element is whether both suits arise out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs" (Jadron v 10 Leonard St., LLC, 124 A.D.3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added]; see Pryce v Pryce, 160 A.D.3d 965, 966 [2d Dept 2018]). In short, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is appropriate "if the two actions are sufficiently similar . .. and that the relief sought is the same or substantially the same" (Feldman v Harari, 183 A.D.3d 629 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Importantly, "[c]ourts enjoy broad discretion when considering whether to dismiss a claim on the ground that another [action] is pending between the same parties dealing with a similar issue" (Mann v Malasky, 41 A.D.3d 1136, 1137 [3d Dept 2007]; accord Caudill v McGreevy, 299 A.D.2d 626, 627 [3d Dept 2002]).

  10. In re Application of Gruber

    72 Misc. 3d 1209 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2021)

    The critical element is whether both suits arise out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs " ( Jadron v 10 Leonard St., LLC , 124 AD3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added]; seePryce v Pryce , 160 AD3d 965, 966 [2d Dept 2018] ). In short, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is appropriate "if the two actions are sufficiently similar ... and that the relief sought is the same or substantially the same" ( Feldman v Harari , 183 AD3d 629 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Importantly, "[c]ourts enjoy broad discretion when considering whether to dismiss a claim on the ground that another [action] is pending between the same parties dealing with a similar issue" ( Mann v Malasky , 41 AD3d 1136, 1137 [3d Dept 2007] ; accordCaudill v McGreevy , 299 AD2d 626, 627 [3d Dept 2002] ).