Opinion
CV174008824
05-21-2019
Bruce M. Felder #103273 v. Commissioner of Correction
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh) Newson, John M., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RESPONDENT’S REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO GENERAL STATUTES § 52-470 (#106.00)
Hon. John M. Newson, Judge
I. Procedural History
The petitioner was convicted by jury of Larceny First Degree and Larceny Second Degree, and on June 16, 2004, was sentenced to a total effective term of thirty years to serve. According to the information in the file, he has filed two prior State habeas corpus petitions, which were tried together in the Tolland Judicial District and denied on April 1, 2010. Felder v. Warden, CV07-4001645 and Felder v. Warden, CV06-4001113 (Nazarro, J.). The petitioner took an appeal from the decision, however, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, and his subsequent petition for certification to the Supreme Court was denied. Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, 133 Conn.App. 906, 36 A.3d 309 (2012), cert. denied, 204 Conn. 931, 43 A.3d 661 (2012). Notice of the Supreme Court’s denial of certification was released on May 12, 2012. The present petition was filed on May 17, 2018. The respondent filed a Request for Order to Show Cause on December 20, 2018, and the petitioner filed a timely objection. The parties were before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on March 8, 2019.
II. Law and Discussion
General Statutes § 52-470(d)(1) and (e) apply to the present claims, which provide, in pertinent part:
(d) In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review ; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. For the purposes of this section, the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same conviction shall not constitute a judgment. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction ...
(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner’s counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition . For the purposes of this subsection, good cause includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which materially affects the merits of the case and which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of this section.
Therefore, the petitioner had until May 29, 2014, to file a subsequent petition, which was two years from when the twenty-day period to appeal from the Supreme Court decision would have expired.
The petitioner argues that the two-year period in § 52-470(d) should be calculated from June 1, 2015, when a Federal habeas corpus petition he was litigating on this same conviction was disposed of, which would mean the applicable deadline did not run until June 1, 2017, fourteen days after this petition was filed. This argument, however, is explicitly contradicted by the statutory language in § 52-470(d), which states, in pertinent part: "The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction ..." "When we construe a statute, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us to ascertain its meaning from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ... [O]ur case law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219, 225-26, 177 A.3d 1113 (2018). The term "any other petition" is not limited in any way within subsection (d), or elsewhere in § 52-470. To read an exception into that language tolling the two-year time period while a petitioner was engaged in Federal habeas litigation would be contradictory to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and apparent intent of the legislature. Id.
The petitioner also offered during his testimony that he was unaware that § 52-470 existed until his present attorney came to discuss this motion with him. However, "everyone is presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the law excuses no one ..." State v. Surette, 90 Conn.App. 177, 182, 876 A.2d 582, 585 (2005). On the meaning of "good cause," our Appellate Court has held that "good cause is defined as a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law." Langston v. Commissioner of Correction, 185 Conn.App. 528, 532, 197 A.3d 1034 (2018). The petitioner has failed to present any "good cause" in the present case for filing this petition nearly three years beyond the May 29, 2014, deadline.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED .