In janitorial service cases, the standard test applies for determining whether the subcontractor is an independent contractor. See, e.g., Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47 ( 476 SE2d 822) (1996). That test asks "whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract."

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (2011) (“In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered ... (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities [and] tools ... for the person doing the work”). FN8. Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga.App. 47, 48(1), 476 S.E.2d 822 (1996) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); see also Englehart v. OKI America, 209 Ga.App. 151, 152, 433 S.E.2d 331 (1993) (same), disapproved on other grounds by Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga.App. 749, 755(b) n. 6, 694 S.E.2d 673 (2010). FN9. Feggans, 223 Ga.App. at 48–49(1), 476 S.E.2d 822 (citation and punctuation omitted).

This is true because a question of material fact exists regarding whether Howard exercised ordinary care, pursuant to implementation of the abovementioned policy, in either disregarding or failing to notice the undisputed fact that no signs were posted warning customers of the potential danger posed by the wet floor. See Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47 (2) ( 476 S.E.2d 822) (1996). There also is clearly an issue of material fact in this case regarding whether plaintiff failed to use ordinary care for her own safety.

(Citation omitted.) Feggans v. Kroger Co. , 223 Ga. App. 47, 51 (2), 476 S.E.2d 822 (1996). Here, the evidence shows that neither Cody nor UPS owned or controlled AmericasMart, the security station, or the mat at issue.

Having reviewed the record, we also agree with the trial court that the City was entitled to summary judgment on Heard's claim that the City was liable under a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47 (1) ( 476 SE2d 822) (1996); Loudermilk Enterprises v. Hurtig, 214 Ga. App. 746 ( 449 SE2d 141) (1994) (no precedential value). The order granting summary judgment to defendants is accordingly affirmed.

While this Court has previously held that a landowner may be relieved of its duties to invitees where it surrenders "full possession and complete control" to another party, Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 351 SE2d 718) (1986), a material issue of fact exists as to whether Sun Valley had surrendered full possession and control of the breezeway where Carpenter fell. As a result, that issue must be decided by a jury. See Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47, 51 (1) ( 476 SE2d 822) (1996) (jury issue remained as to whether business surrendered full possession and control of area where plaintiff fell where business remained open and did not exclude its customers from such area). Here, Carpenter, as a guest of a Sun Valley tenant, was an invitee of Sun Valley. Winchester v. Sun Valley-Atlanta Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 140, 141 (2) ( 424 SE2d 85) (1992) ("guest of a tenant is an invitee upon the premises of the landlord where he is invited by the tenant and visits him in such premises.

Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to grant a directed verdict on this basis. 223 Ga. App. 47( 476 S.E.2d 822)(1996). Id. at 50 (1).

Thus, Pulte was vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of America's Best, Inc. in hosing down the drive way in freezing weather without sanding and salting to prevent the formation of ice and for failing to warn of the presence of ice, which it knew or should have known would form, and for failure to warn of the dangerous condition. See generally Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47, 50-51(1) ( 476 S.E.2d 822) (1996); Towles v. Cox, supra at 196. The knowledge of acts and omissions of America's Best, Inc., which was active negligence, are imputed to Pulte as its knowledge as principle.

(a) Under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 (4), the employer of an independent contractor is liable for the acts and omissions of such independent contractor when the duty is imposed by statute; in this case, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 imposes a personal and nondelegable duty upon the landlord to keep the premises and approaches safe when he retains possession and control. Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47 ( 476 S.E.2d 822) (1996); Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 702-703 ( 458 S.E.2d 883) (1995); Moon v. Homeowners Assn. of Sibley Forest, 202 Ga. App. 821, 824 (4) ( 415 S.E.2d 654) (1992); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 196-197 (1) ( 351 S.E.2d 718) (1986). Further, a personal and nondelegable duty imposed by statute cannot be avoided by a management company employing the security company to protect only the owner's property; the owner is liable for the torts of an independent contractor in protecting its premises.

Little v. Liberty Savings Bank, 191 Ga. App. 732 ( 382 S.E.2d 734) (1989); Towles v. Cox, [supra]." Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47, 50 (1) ( 476 S.E.2d 822) (1996). Under the facts of this case, there is no evidence that Goodman Decorating had full and complete control of the premises where painting was being done, even on a temporary basis.