Opinion
No. CIV. 08-0972 FCD KJM.
September 29, 2008
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants Big 5 Corp. and Patrick J. Kirrane's (collectively, "defendants") motion to dismiss plaintiff Lary Feezor's ("plaintiff") state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff opposes the motion, and, in the alternative, requests a stay of the proceedings pending the California Supreme Court's decision in response toMunson v. Del Taco, 522 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2008). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims is DENIED, and plaintiff's request for a stay is GRANTED.
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).
BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2008, plaintiff initiated this action arising out of defendants' alleged "discrimination at the building, structure, facility, complex, property, land, development, and/or surrounding business complex." (Compl., filed May 2, 2008, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he is physically disabled, as defined by all applicable California and United States laws, and that he encountered barriers on defendants' premises that "interfered with — if not outright denied — his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the facility." (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff brought suit for injunctive relief under the American with Disabilities Act and for injunctive and monetary relief under the California Disabled Persons Act and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (the "Unruh Act"). (Id. ¶¶ 16-47.)
STANDARD
A district court has the discretionary power to control the disposition of the cases on its docket "in a manner which will promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for the litigants." CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962); see Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). How these objectives can be achieved "calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55; see Lockyer v. Miran Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Where it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed."). Such competing interests include "the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay."CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268.
"A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case." Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Levya v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979); see Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (rejecting as "too mechanical and narrow" the view that there is no power to stay a proceeding upon the outcome of a controversy to which the litigant is a stranger). These separate proceedings may be judicial, administrative, or arbitral in nature, and proper imposition of a stay does not require that the issues in such separate proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court. Id. (quoting Levya, 593 F.2d at 863-64). However, "[a] stay should not be granted unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable time in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the court."Id. (quoting Levya, 593 F.2d at 864).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that the court has jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Section 1367 provides, in relevant part
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are to related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy. . . .28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West 2008). State claims are part of the same case or controversy if they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Defendant contends that plaintiff claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act presents novel or complex issues of state law because the Ninth Circuit recently certified to the California Supreme Court questions of law regarding interpretation of the statute.Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 522 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit held that certification was required because of a conflict between state and federal law. Id. at 1000-03. Specifically, after the California legislature amended the Unruh Act in 1992, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff was not required to demonstrate intentional discrimination in cases involving violations of the ADA. Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal held that Lentini was wrongly decided and that a showing of intentional discrimination is required to obtain relief under the Unruh Act.Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal. App. 4th 223, 255-56 (2006). In Munson, the Ninth Circuit noted that in the absence of a decision by the highest court of the state, it was required to follow the decision of the intermediate appellate courts, "unless there is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide differently." Munson, 522 F.3d at 1002 (quotations and citations omitted). However, the court reasoned that the analysis by the court in Gunther left it "in doubt as to whether the California Supreme Court would hold in conformity with it." Id. As such, the Ninth Circuit requested certiorari to determine (1) whether "a plaintiff who seeks damages under [the Unruh Act], claiming denial of full and equal treatment on the basis of disability" must prove intentional discrimination; and (2) if so, "what does `intentional discrimination' mean in this context?"Id. The California Supreme Court granted review, and petitioner's opening brief was scheduled to be filed by August 15, 2008. (Ex. B to Defs.' Req. for Judicial Notice in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, filed July 31, 2008.)
While the court finds that the resolution of these issues by the California Supreme Court is highly relevant to plaintiff's Unruh Act claim, the pending proceedings do not justify dismissal of the state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c). Defendant cites to numerous recent federal district court decisions that have dismissed state law claims in similar actions. However, none of these cited cases were decided after certification of the pertinent questions to the California Supreme Court. But see,Oliver v. KFC Corp, 2008 WL 2756605 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2008) (noting that the court could stay the case and await the California Supreme Court's decision, but declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the court dismissed the ADA claim that gave rise to federal jurisdiction). The conflict between the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lentini and the California Court of Appeal's decision in Gunther will be resolved by the Supreme Court's resolution of the certified questions set forth in Munson. Once this decision is rendered, the court will not be presented with novel or complex issues of state law with respect to plaintiff's claim under the Unruh Act.
In their reply, defendants also argue that plaintiff's state law claims for damages substantially predominate over the federal claim for injunctive relief. However, defendants rely solely on cases that found dismissal of state law claims was appropriate because of the predominance money damages in addition to an unresolved conflict in state law. Because the California Supreme Court's decision will resolve this conflict, these cases are distinguishable.
Therefore, the important policies of comity and federalism implicated by § 1367(c) will be served by staying this action pending the California Supreme Court's resolution of the certified questions. Further, judicial economy and convenience will be served by hearing both the state and federal claims that arise out of the common nucleus of operative fact in one action. Moreover, in light of the pending briefing schedule before the California Supreme Court and the early stages of litigation in this action, it does not appear that either party will be prejudiced by a stay in this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims is DENIED, and plaintiff's request for a stay is GRANTED. As such, this action is STAYED pending the California Supreme Court's decision in response to Munson v. Del Taco, 522 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2008).IT IS SO ORDERED