Opinion
1585 EDA 2023 J-S47011-23
07-22-2024
FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC. v. COSTUME GALLERY, INC. APPEAL OF: COSTUME GALLERY ASSOCIATES, LLC AND RADG HOLDINGS, LLC
Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2022-02761
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
OPINION
STABILE, J.
The parties in interest in this case, Costume Gallery Holdings, LLC and RADG Holdings, LLC (Appellants), contend that the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) abused its discretion in denying their petition to set aside a writ of execution, levy, and sheriff's sale. According to Appellants, the writ and related levy are defective under Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d) because service of the writ and the levy were made over 90 days after the writ's issuance. Finding partial merit in Appellants' claims, we reverse the trial court's order denying their petition.
FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., the plaintiff in the underlying action and Appellee in this appeal (plaintiff/Appellee), commenced an action on June 17, 2022, against Costume Gallery, Inc. (defendant/judgment debtor). Plaintiff/Appellee did so by transferring a judgment in the amount of $544,508.75 from a federal court to the trial court.
On August 10, 2022, plaintiff/Appellee filed a "Praecipe for Writ of Execution" and a "Praecipe for Writ of Attachment Execution" with the Prothonotary of Bucks County. The two praecipes were included within one document. The first praecipe requested the issuance of a writ of execution to the Sheriff of Bucks County, directing the Sherriff to levy upon the personal property of defendant/judgment debtor. The second praecipe requested the issuance of a writ of attachment to the Sheriff, directing the attachment of all property of defendant/judgment debtor that was within the possession, custody, or control of Truist Bank, a named garnishee in the action.
The next day, on August 11, 2022, both Truist Bank and defendant/judgment debtor were served with the writs of execution and attachment, along with interrogatories. Truist Bank immediately served its answers to those interrogatories, indicating that it possessed no property belonging to defendant/judgment debtor, and on August 29, 2022, plaintiff/Appellee filed a praecipe to dissolve the attachment as to Truist Bank.
Plaintiff/Appellee later identified personal property it believed to be owned by defendant/judgment debtor located in an office suite of the 7th floor of a building at 925 Canal Street in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Accordingly, on November 29, 2022, the Sheriff levied upon various items of personal property at that address and scheduled a sale of the property to be held on December 28, 2022.
On December 14, 2022, Appellants filed a petition to set aside the writ of execution, the levy, and the sheriff's sale. As non-parties to the litigation at hand, Appellants based their standing on Pa.R.C.P. 3132, which permits "any party in interest" to petition the trial court to set aside a sheriff's sale of personal property "upon proper cause shown"; additionally, Appellants cited Pa.R.C.P. 3121(b), which permits a court to stay execution of a judgment where "any party in interest" shows "a defect in the writ, levy or service[.]" Similarly, "any party in interest" may seek to set aside a writ, service or levy due to a defect therein. Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d)(1).
Several exhibits purporting to establish Appellants' ownership of the personal property located at 925 Canal Street, Bristol Pennsylvania, were attached to the Brief in Support of Appellants' petition. These exhibits included a bill of sale, a leasing agreement, and financial statements establishing their ownership interests in the property. Plaintiff/Appellee denied Appellants' ownership, but none of their evidence was rebutted.
"The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary." Trigg v. Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020).
The defects identified by Appellants related to the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d), which states that a writ cannot be served, and a levy or attachment cannot be made, on a date more than 90 days after the writ was issued. It followed from their interpretation of the rule that since the writ of execution here was issued on August 10, 2022, and it was served pursuant to the levy over 90 days later, on November 29, 2022, the writ and levy were defective. See Petition to Set Aside Writ of Execution, Levy, and Sheriff's Sale With Request for Stay of Proceedings, 12/14/2022, at ¶¶ 10-14.
On December 21, 2022, plaintiff/Appellee filed a response to the petition, denying that the writ was defective. As to the timeliness of service, plaintiff/Appellee emphasized that a bank attachment had been made under the writ, both of which were served on August 11, 2022, a date well-within the 90-day window afforded by Rule 3106(d). Plaintiff/Appellee noted that where a "levy or attachment has been made under the writ within the ninety-day period it shall remain valid . . . for the purpose of completing the pending execution proceeding under the levy or attachment." Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d).
On May 18, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying Appellants' petition to set aside the writ, levy, and sheriff's sale. Appellants timely appealed, and the trial court filed an opinion in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), giving the reasons why the order denying the petition should be affirmed. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 7/24/2023, at 3-5.
The trial court first found that the service of the writ of execution, and the levy upon personal property, were timely executed in accordance with Rule 3106. As an alternative ground for affirmance, the trial court stated that Appellants lacked standing to challenge the writ of execution because they had not complied with Pa.R.C.P. 3202, which requires that "a claim to tangible personal property levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution shall be in writing . . . and shall be filed with the sheriff prior to any execution sale of the property claimed." See id., at 5.
In their brief, Appellants now raise a single issue, asserting that their petition to set aside should have been granted as a matter of law because the service deadline was November 8, 2022 (90 days after the date on which the writ of execution was issued), and service did not take place until the levy was untimely made on November 29, 2022.
An order denying a petition to set aside or stay a writ of execution is an interlocutory order that is appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2); see also Foulke v. Lavelle, 454 A.2d 56, 58 (Pa. Super. 1982) (same). On review of such an order, we give great deference to the trial court's determinations and apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Anmuth v. Chagan, 485 A.2d 769, 771 (Pa. Super. 1984). But when the issue before us involves "the proper interpretation of the language of our rules of civil procedure," the question is a pure matter of law, and "our standard of review is de novo." Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 73 (Pa. 2014).
"The object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court." Pa.R.C.P. 108(a). "Every rule shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to its provisions. When the words of a rule are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Pa.R.C.P. 108(b).
The central dispute in this appeal concerns the parties' conflicting interpretations of Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d). This rule provides as follows:
A writ shall not be served nor shall a levy or attachment be made thereunder after the expiration of ninety days from the date of issuance or reissuance. After levy or attachment has been made under the writ within the ninety-day period it shall remain valid without further reissuance for the purpose of completing the pending execution proceedings under the levy or attachment.Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d).
Appellants focus on the first part of the rule, which prohibits (a) the service of a writ, and (b) a levy or attachment made thereunder, if made over 90 days from the date that the writ was issued. See id. Appellants assert that the writ "served on November 29, 2022 and the Levy upon it were defective by operation of law" because it had been over 90 days since the writ of execution was issued on August 10, 2022. Appellant's Brief, at 5.
Plaintiff/Appellee points out in response that the writ of execution was served on defendant/judgment debtor on August 11, 2022, just a day after its issuance. Further, plaintiff/Appellee highlights the second part Rule 3106(d), which dispenses with the 90-day period where a levy or attachment has been made under the writ within 90 days of the writ's issuance. Based on that provision, plaintiff/Appellee suggests that the service of the writ and the attachment on both defendant/judgment creditor and the garnishee, Truist Bank, qualified as a "levy or attachment . . . made under the writ within the ninety-day period," making it unnecessary for the writ of execution to be reissued until any and all subsequent execution proceedings had terminated.
We agree with plaintiff/Appellee that the writ of execution was timely served on defendant/judgment creditor on August 11, 2022. However, the levy as to personal property on November 29, 2022, was made on a date outside of the 90-day window afforded by Rule 3106(d). For that levy to be valid as of November 29, 2022, it had to have been made within 90 days of the writ's issuance date of August 10, 2022. It was not.
While a bank attachment under the writ of execution was made by plaintiff/Appellee on August 11, 2022, that particular proceeding concerned assets ostensibly held by the garnishee, Truist Bank, and not the personal property allegedly owned by Appellants. The second part of Rule 3106 only made the writ of execution valid beyond the 90-day period for the purpose of allowing plaintiff/Appellee to complete the pending execution proceedings under the bank attachment.
It is undisputed that the attachment as to the garnishee, Truist Bank, was dissolved on August 29, 2022, and the execution proceedings for the bank attachment were terminated on that date. As of November 8, 2022, the final day of the 90-day window beginning on August 10, 2022, there were no longer any pending proceedings concerning the writ of execution.
It was not until November 29, 2022, that the levy on personal property was made. Since this did not occur within 90 days of the issuance of the writ of execution, the levy was invalid. The fact that plaintiff/Appellee began (ultimately fruitless) attachment proceedings within the 90-day window did not authorize the continuous prosecution of the writ by separate means, with respect to different property, and for an indefinite period of time thereafter. Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Appellants' petition to set aside because, as to the levy on personal property, the writ of execution was no longer valid at the time those proceedings began.
The logical consequence of plaintiff/Appellee's position is that once the writ of execution and the bank attachment were served on August 11, 2022, plaintiff/Appellee then had an open-ended amount of time to execute the judgment by any other means. Such an interpretation of Rule 3106(d) would be at odds with its plain language, which prohibits "a levy or attachment [to] be made [under a writ of execution] after the expiration of ninety days from (Footnote Continued Next Page) the date of issuance or reissuance." Again, the bank attachment on the named garnishee was distinct from the subsequent levy on personal property, which was not made until after 90 days from the date of the writ's issuance had elapsed. See generally Pa.R.C.P. 108(a), (b). This made the levy untimely.
We now turn to the issue of Appellants' standing to request the setting aside of the writ and the sheriff's sale. The trial court adopted the position of plaintiff/Appellees that Appellants had failed to follow the proper procedures for asserting a claim to the personal property subject to the levy. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 7/24/2023, at 5. More specifically, Appellants did not file a property claim with the sheriff pursuant to the Rules of Sheriff Interpleader. See Pa.R.C.P. 3201-3216.
As stated in Pa.R.C.P. 3201, this set of rules governs the procedure "when tangible personal property levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution is claimed to be the property of a person other than the defendant in the execution." And under Pa.R.C.P. 3202, "[a] claim to tangible personal property levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution shall be in writing" and filed with the sheriff prior to the sale.
In our reading of the applicable procedural rules, Appellants had standing to obtain the form of relief they sought (setting aside the writ, levy, and the sheriff's sale), and it was not necessary for them to utilize the procedures for making a property claim with the sheriff. Appellants certainly insisted that the personal property subject to the levy belonged to them, but they were primarily seeking to set aside the writ based on procedural defects and then preclude the sheriff's sale on those grounds. They were not asking the sheriff to determine a claimant's title to that property or otherwise resolve a dispute over ownership.
Conversely, it would not have been proper for the sheriff to adjudicate the issue of whether there were defects in the writ of execution and the levy, as this was a pure matter of law for the trial court to resolve.
With respect to the remedies of setting aside the writ and the sheriff's sale, Appellants had recourse through Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d), which enables "any party in interest" to petition the trial court to "set aside the writ, service or levy" based on "a defect therein" or "upon any other legal or equitable ground therefor." See also Pa.R.C.P. 3132 (allowing "any party in interest" to have a sheriff's sale set aside "upon proper cause shown.").
"A party has standing if he is aggrieved, i.e., he can show a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation." Merrill Lynch Mortg. Cap. v. Steele, 859 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. 2004). A party's standing to set aside a sheriff's sale has been equated with the requirement of Pa.R.C.P. 3132 that the individual seeking that remedy be a "party in interest." Id. Appellants in this case have submitted uncontroverted evidence that they have an interest in the property subject to the levy and the sheriff's sale. As such, they are entitled to avail themselves of that rule. See id.
These provisions granted Appellants standing to challenge the sale of the property subject to levy under the writ of execution; were we to find otherwise, it would run counter to the plain language of our Supreme Court's procedural rules. See e.g., Merrill Lynch Mortg. Cap. v. Steele, 859 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that Appellant, a party in interest, had standing to challenge sheriff's sale because the "express language" of Rule 3132 permitted it where "the record establishes that Appellant had a real, substantial, and direct interest in ensuring that her property was not deeded by the sheriff to a third party.").
Finally, we note that our disposition is not impeded by the manner in which Appellants challenged the trial court's denial of their petition to set aside the writ of execution, levy, and sheriff's sale. Contrary to the dissent's concerns, Appellants adequately preserved the issue of standing for review. They asserted in their 1925(b) statement that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying their petition to set aside because Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d) afforded them the right to that relief as undisputed "parties in interest." In the first sentence of the argument section of their brief, Appellants also stated that their "standing" to file the petition was governed by Rule 3121(d). See Appellants' Brief, at 5. This was consistent with their claims before the trial court.
We found merit in Appellant's interpretation of Rule 3121, agreeing that its plain language allows any party in interest to petition for the setting aside of a writ of execution based on defects therein. The fact that Appellants omitted reference to a potentially relevant authority cited by plaintiff/Appellee and the trial court (Rule 3202 (sheriff interpleader)) does not mean that Appellants completely waived the issue of standing for lack of preservation. Again, they argued that they had properly availed themselves of the remedies outlined in Rule 3121(d).
Under Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), a "[1925(b)] statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein . . . or fairly suggested thereby." In line with Rule 2116(a), appellate courts have the "authority to sua sponte address arguments which are clearly implicated in the cases before us." Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 5 A.3d 212, 216 (Pa. 2010).
Whether Appellants had standing to seek relief exclusively under Rule 3202 was clearly a subsidiary question to the one that Appellants directly posed in this case. Since the issue of standing was before us, this Court was free to clarify why Rule 3202 was not applicable upon determining that Appellants had correctly proceeded under Rule 3121. Thus, because Appellants had standing to seek the type of relief they sought, and their grounds were meritorious, the trial court's order denying their petition cannot be upheld.
The dissent presumes that Appellants are foreclosed from prevailing in this case because they did not specifically challenge the trial court's determination regarding Rule 3202, making that portion of the order on review binding. But this does not logically follow. We held that the trial court erred in denying Appellants' petition to set aside the writ of execution under Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d) because they are parties in interest and the writ was defective. It is implicit in that holding that Appellants were not required to proceed under any other rule. Even assuming that Appellants waived a challenge to the subsidiary issue of standing under rule 3202, our disposition as to Rule 3121 would still control. Our holding therefore moots the trial court's alternative basis for affirmance - not the other way around, as the dissent contends.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Stevens joins the opinion.
Judge Kunselman files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING OPINION
KUNSELMAN, J.
I respectfully dissent. Two companies, Costume Gallery Associates, LLC and RADG Holdings, LLC, are Third Parties to this case. They appeal from an order denying their petition to set aside FedEx Corporate Services, Inc.'s Writ of Execution, Levy, and Sheriff's Sale against named-Defendant, Costume Gallery, Inc. The Majority sua sponte raises the issue of the Third Parties' standing and reverses the trial court's ruling that the Third Parties' failure "to follow the proper procedures for asserting a claim to the personal property subject to the levy" deprived them of standing. Majority Opinion at 8 (citing Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/23, at 5). However, the Third Parties did not raise or argue that issue on appeal. As such, I would affirm the trial court's order.
On April 6, 2022, FedEx secured a default judgment against Costume Gallery in federal court. A few months later, it transferred that judgment to the trial court and, on August 10, 2022, praeciped the Prothonotary of Bucks County to issue a writ of execution and attachment. The praecipe was two paragraphs long. The first paragraph, "Praecipe for Writ of Execution," sought a levy on Costume Gallery's cash on hand, accounts receivable, and personalty; the second paragraph, "Praecipe for Writ of Attachment Execution," directed to Truist Bank, as garnishee, sought any of Costume Gallery's property that the bank held.
The next day, the sheriff served the Writs of Execution and Attachment, along with a set of interrogatories, upon Truist Bank and Costume Gallery. On August 18, 2022, the bank replied that it possessed no money or property belonging to Costume Gallery. Thus, FedEx praeciped to "discontinue the above-captioned matter against Truist, Garnishee, ONLY, without prejudice" and served a copy of the discontinuance on Costume Gallery. Praecipe to Discontinue at 1 (emphasis in original).
Two months later, on November 29, 2022, the sheriff levied several pieces of personal property at 925 Canal Street, Building 3, Floor 7, in Bristol, Pennsylvania. FedEx believed the personalty belonged to Costume Gallery. The sheriff set a date of December 28, 2022 to sell the levied personalty. Before the sale occurred, the Third Parties filed a Petition to Set Aside the Writ of Execution, the Levy, and the Sheriff's Sale under Pa.R.C.P 3121(b).
The Third Parties offered two grounds for setting aside the Writ. First, they claimed the sheriff untimely levied the personalty, because the levying occurred more than 90 days after issuance of the Writ of Execution. Second, the Third Parties contended that they, rather than the Defendant, Costume Gallery, owned the levied personalty. Thus, they claimed to be the real parties in interest and the levied personalty was therefore exempt from execution.
FedEx filed a response opposing the petition on two grounds. FedEx claimed the sheriff properly levied the personalty, because his attachment at the bank and initial service of the Writs of Execution upon Costume Gallery occurred within the 90 days required under Pa.R.C.P. 3106(d). In FedEx's view, service of the Writs upon the bank and Costume Gallery tolled the clock for the sheriff to levy the personalty at 925 Canal Street any time thereafter.
FedEx also explicitly challenged the Third Parties' standing. See FedEx's Response to Petition at 1. FedEx contended the "proper mechanism for a third party to make an ownership claim to property that [the sheriff has] levied upon is by filing a property claim, as set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 3202 and not by filing a petition as a non-party to the action." Id. at 2. FedEx asserted the question of whether the Third Parties owned the levied personalty must originally "be determined by the sheriff and then potentially appealed by either party in an interpleader," where the party claiming ownership would have the burden of proof. Id. at 3.
The trial court stayed the sheriff's sale, pending its disposition of the petition. The Third Parties filed a brief reiterating their claims in the petition. Notably absent from the brief was any response to FedEx's claim that the Third Parties lacked standing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3202.
Three weeks later, FedEx filed a responsive brief and argued that the Third Parties lacked standing, because they failed to raise the question of who owned the levied property under Pa.R.C.P. 3202. According to FedEx's trial-court brief:
[The Third Parties] claim that the Writ should be set aside under Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d)(2), because the property is exempt or immune, must also fail. The appropriate avenue for the [Third Parties] to bring the argument that they are asserting here is by filing a property claim under Pa.R.C.P. 3202. There is a substantial distinction between property that is exempt and/or immune from execution and property of a third party. [The Third Parties are] relying on a rule relating to exemption and immunity, when they truly are seeking to have a sheriff determine that [Costume Gallery] is not the owner of the property that is levied upon. As such, their misplaced reliance must result in the petition being denied.
A property claim is the exclusive avenue for a third party to enforce its rights to property that has been levied upon which is not owned by the defendant. "A claim to tangible property levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution SHALL be in writing and SHALL be filed with the sheriff prior to any execution sale of the property claimed." Pa.R.C.P. 3202 (emphasis added). "Within ten days after the claim is filed the sheriff shall, with or without formal hearing, determine whether the claimant is prima facie the owner of the property in whole or part." Pa.R.C.P. 3204. Either party is allowed to object to the sheriff's ruling which would result in an interpleader. "Upon the filing of the objection an interpleader shall be at issue in which the claimant shall be the plaintiff and all other parties in interest shall be defendants. The only pleading shall be the claim, all averments of which shall be denied." Pa.R.C.P. 3206. This is an important distinction. It puts the burden of proof on the claimants, who would be the [Third Parties] in this case. This action is entirely distinct from a claim for exemption or immunity.
Exemptions and immunity from execution are discussed separately in Pa.R.C.P. 3123 and 3123.1. These rules set forth specific property and types of property that are exempt and/or immune from execution. They are listed as exemptions under
Pennsylvania Law and exemptions under Federal Law as the note to Pa.R.C.P. 3123.1 [enumerates]. There is no mention in the list or in the Pennsylvania or Federal statutes that it references to property that is held by parties who are not the defendant.
The reason for this, as stated above, is that the exclusive remedy for those third parties is to file a property claim. The rules of statutory construction tell us that when you have one rule or statute that is specific to a situation, we should not create a conflict with another rule that is not specific to apply. The [Third Parties'] attempt to add a third-party property claim to a rule that clearly states exemptions or immunity, which are defined in other rules, is improper and directly conflicts with the rules of statutory construction. Since this property claim doesn't fall under Pa.R.C.P, 3121 (d)(2), the Petition to Set Aside the Writ should be denied.FedEx's Memorandum of Law at 3-5 (emphasis added by FedEx, some punctuation and capitalization omitted).
Because neither party requested oral argument, the trial court decided the petition based on the filings and briefs of record. On May 18, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying the petition. This timely appeal followed, and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.
In that opinion, the trial court explained that it denied the Third Parties' petition, because it adopted both of FedEx's legal theories. First, the court opined the sheriff's levy was timely, because "the attachment accompanying the writ of execution allowed for the levy to be served beyond 90 days." Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/23, at 3. Second, and importantly to this appeal, the trial court also agreed with FedEx that, in order to acquire standing, the Third Parties needed to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 3202.
Regarding Rule 3202, the trial court opined that:
[the Third Parties] failed to follow the appropriate procedures to raise their claims in this cause of action as it is currently captioned. The proper mechanism for [the Third Parties] to have challenged the Writ/Service/Levy was pursuant to Pennsylvania Civil Procedure Rule 3202, which provides: "a claim to tangible personal property levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution shall be in writing and shall be filed with the sheriff prior to any execution sale of the property claimed." Pa.R.C.P. 3121(a). Pursuant to this Rule, the appropriate course of action would have been for [the Third Parties] to raise a claim for the Personal Property pursuant to Rule 3202, which they did not do. As such, even in the event the Superior Court determines that this Court erred in denying the Petition to Set Aside the Writ based on a procedural defect [in the Writ], the error is harmless in that [the Third Parties] failed to properly assert their rights as Parties-In-Interest in this matter.Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/23, at 5 (some punctuation omitted).
In other words, the trial court ruled that the Third Parties filed the wrong type of petition. In the trial court's view, they needed to assert their alleged ownership of the personalty with the sheriff in a different form. Instead, the Third Parties challenged the sheriff's levy under Pa.R.C.P. 3123.1, claiming that the property was exempt or immune. According to the trial court, that Rule gives named defendants grounds to challenge the levy of their property, but third parties do not have standing to claim exemption or immunity from levy. Rather, the Third Parties were challenging the ownership of the levied property and needed to comply with Rule 3202.
On appeal, the Third Parties do not raise the trial court's ruling that they lacked standing under Pa.R.C.P. 3202 as grounds for reversible error. Indeed, as the Majority acknowledges, the Third Parties "raise a single issue, asserting that their petition to set aside should have been granted as a matter of law because the service deadline was November 8, 2022 (90 days after the date on which the writ of execution was issued), and service did not take place until the levy was untimely made on November 29, 2022." Majority Opinion at 4-5; see also Third Parties' Brief at 2. Thus, whether the trial court was correct in its analysis of Pa.R.C.P. 3202 is not before us in this appeal. In fact, Rule 3202 - one of two independent bases for the trial court's denial of the petition - does not even appear in the Third Parties' appellate brief. See Third Parties' Brief, Table of Citations, at ii. Nevertheless, my learned colleagues in the Majority raise the issue of the Third Parties' standing under Pa.R.C.P. 3202 sua sponte and reverse the trial court's alternative basis for denying the petition.
The Majority cites no authority for the proposition that this Court may address a trial court's ruling on standing sua sponte. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has repeatedly held that "the matter of standing is not available to be raised by a court sua sponte." Rendell v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm'n, 983 A.2d 708, 717 (Pa. 2009). "Therefore, the issue of standing cannot be raised sua sponte and is waived if not properly raised." In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 501 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Generally, under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, appellants have the obligation to raise appellate issues, or they are waived.1 Even if issues are raised, appellants also have the obligation to develop a cogent and complete argument on each, specific issue for this Court to grant them appellate relief. Such procedural obligations preserve the adversarial system of justice and restrain appellate courts to the adjudicator role.
When drafting an appellate brief, the appellant must identify all waivable appellate issues in the statement of questions involved. "The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved . . . No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby." Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). Hence, this Court "will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief's statement of questions involved . . . ." Krebs v. United Ref. Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006). In such instances, we dismiss any unraised issue as waived. See id.
Moreover, even where an issue appears in the statement of questions involved, the argument portion of the appellant's brief must develop a full analysis of that issue in order to permit appellate review. "The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall . . . [include] such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent." Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). "When an appellant's argument is underdeveloped, we may not supply it with a better one. In such situations, we shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will deem the issue to be waived." Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019) (some punctuation omitted).
Here, with respect to the trial court's ruling that the Third Parties lacked standing because they failed to petition the sheriff under Pa.R.C.P. 3202, the Third Parties waived any claim of error regarding that ruling. They failed to raise such a claim in their statement of questions involved, and they made no argument that the trial court misapplied Pa.R.C.P. 3202 in dismissing their petition. Again, I observe that the Third Parties' Brief does not mention Rule 3202, much less provide an analysis concerning the trial court's interpretation of it. Thus, the Third Parties offer no authority to suggest that the trial court misapplied Rule 3202. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Despite these clear commissions of waiver, the Majority raises the issue of whether the trial court erroneously determined that the Third Parties lacked standing under Pa.R.C.P. 3202 sua sponte. In doing so, I believe the Majority mistakenly provides the Third Parties with a complete appellate argument on an issue they neither raised nor argued on appeal. Under our precedents, I respectfully suggest the Third Parties have waived the issue of whether they violated Rule 3202 when the court dismissed the petition on that alternative basis. See Krebs, supra; see also Pi Delta Psi, supra.
Additionally, because the Third Parties neglected to challenge the trial court's ruling that they lacked standing, I find that the sole issue they raised on appeal is moot.
"It is well established in this jurisdiction that [appellate courts] will not decide moot questions." In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. 1978). An issue becomes moot when, due to some change in the circumstances of the case or the law, it is "impossible to grant relief by deciding the issue . . . ." Id. at 120.
The trial court denied the Third Parties' petition on the grounds that they lacked standing to challenge the Writs and levy, because they did not file a petition with the sheriff under Pa.R.C.P. 3202. Because the Third Parties did not appeal that ruling and instead waived it, the trial court's lack-of-standing determination is, in my mind, final. Given that the Third Parties lack standing, this Court may not "grant [them] relief by deciding the issue" that they raise on appeal. Gross, 382 A.2d at 120. Hence, that issue is moot. See id.
Simply stated, a party without standing is not entitled to appellate relief.
In sum, the Majority erroneously addresses the issue of the Third Parties' standing sua sponte; the Third Parties neither raised nor briefed that issue. It is waived and may not serve as grounds for reversal. Further, the Third Parties' lack of standing moots the appellate issue that they raised and briefed. Because the Majority reverses the trial court's order based on waived and moot issues, I respectfully dissent.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.