Opinion
Case No. EDCV 14-01679-VAP (SPx)
07-07-2015
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. DIVINA ALBASETE GEORGE AKA DIVINA A. GEORGE, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT SETTING ASIDE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND ISSUANCE OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION (Doc. No. 13)
[Motion filed on March, 4 2015]
On March 4, 2015, Plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") filed a Motion for Default Judgment Setting Aside Fraudulent Conveyances and Issuance of Permanent Injunction ("Motion" or "Mot.") against Defendant Divina Albasete George ("George"). (Doc. No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) GRANTS Fannie Mae's request for cancellation of the recorded documents, to wit, the Grant Deed, Revocation of Power of Attorney, and Revocation of Deed; (2) QUIETS TITLE to the property located at 1918 S. Bonita Ave., Ontario, CA 91762 ("Bonita Property"); and (3) ENJOINS George from recording any further documents against the title of the Bonita Property and from any further unauthorized use of Fannie Mae's name.
I. BACKGROUND
Along with this Motion, Fannie Mae filed a Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"). (Doc. No. 14.) The Court takes judicial notice of Exh. 1-11 to the RJN as Fannie Mae has provided a reference number for each document, showing that they were in fact recorded in the Official Records of San Bernardino County; this demonstrates that the documents are public records. Exh. 12 to the RJN is an order of this Court, which is always subject to judicial notice.
In November 2003, the Bonita Property was owned by Mario R. George and Divina A. George. (Exh. A to RJN.) In 2005, Mario and Divina George refinanced the Bonita Property with a loan from GMAC Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"), which was secured by a deed of trust ("GMAC DOT") recorded on February 22, 2005. (Exh. B to RJN.) Executive Trustee Services ("ETS") was named trustee of the GMAC DOT. (Id.)
In July 2010, Mario and Divina George defaulted on their loan from GMAC and were served with a Notice of Default and Election to Sell. (Complaint (Doc. No. 1) ¶ 9; Compl. Exh. A.) On August 8, 2011, the Bonita Property was sold at a foreclosure sale to GMAC. (Id.) On August 10, 2011, GMAC took title to the Bonita Property, by way of a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale, which GMAC promptly recorded. (Id.)
On August 25, 2011, GMAC conveyed the Bonita Property to Fannie Mae by way of a Corporation Grant Deed. (Comp1. ¶ 10; Compl. Exh. B.) On October 13, 2011, Fannie Mae recorded the Corporation Grant Deed. (Id.)
On June 15, 2010, before the foreclosure sale, George recorded a document titled "Revocation of Power of Attorney" that purported to remove ETS as trustee of the GMAC DOT. (Comp1. ¶ 11; Compl. Exh. C.) At the same time, George recorded a document titled "Revocation of Deed" purporting to revoke the GMAC DOT. (Comp1. ¶ 12; Compl. Exh. D.) George did not have authority to record either document. (Comp1. ¶¶ 14-15.)
On August 30, 2011, after Fannie Mae acquired title to the Bonita Property, George and David Alan Boucher ("Boucher") recorded a deed ("Grant Deed") purportedly transferring the Bonita Property from GMAC to George. (Comp1. ¶ 14; Compl. Exh. E.) The Grant Deed was signed by Boucher as an "authorized representative" of GMAC; however, Boucher was not an employee, officer, or authorized signatory of GMAC and had no authority to execute or record the Grant Deed. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
B. Procedural Background
On May 1, 2013, in Federal National Mortgage Association v. Divina Abselete George et.al., No. EDCV12-0477-VAP, this Court entered an order granting Fannie Mae's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Setting Aside Fraudulent Conveyances and Issuance of Permanent Injunction ("Order") (Doc. No. 95.) The Order quieted title to six Fannie Mae properties (including the Bonita Property), canceled instruments recorded by Boucher for fraudulently executing grant deeds, awarded damages with respect to costs for clearing title, and enjoined Boucher from recording any further documents against the title of the six properties and from any further unauthorized use of Fannie Mae's name. (Order at 2.)
George was a defendant in this prior action, but was dismissed, without prejudice, because Fannie Mae did not serve her within the time frame provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Order at 4.)
On August 14, 2014, Fannie Mae filed the instant Complaint against George. The Complaint alleged four claims: (1) cancellation of instruments; (2) quiet title; (3) damages for slander of title; and (4) injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-34.)
On February 12, 2015, Fannie Mae requested the Clerk of Court enter default against George for failing to respond to the Complaint. (Doc. No. 11.) On February 19, 2015, the Clerk entered default; Fannie Mae submitted this Motion on March 4, 2015. (Doc. No. 12.)
C. Request for Judicial Notice
Fannie Mae filed a Request for Judicial Notice along with its Motion, requesting judicial notice of the following twelve documents:
(1) A Grant Deed recorded on November 5, 2003 as Instrument No. 2003-0834487 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County;
(2) A Deed of Trust recorded on February 22, 2005 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2005-012287;
(3) An Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded on July 19, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County as document number 2010-0287335;
(4) A Substitution of Trustee recorded on July 19, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2010-0287336;
(5) A Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust recorded on July 19, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2010-0287337;
(6) A Revocation of Power of Attorney recorded on June 15, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2010-0236728;
(7) A Revocation of Deed recorded on June 15, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2010-0236729;
(8) A Notice of Trustee's Sale recorded on October 28, 2010 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2010-0448216;
(9) A Trustee's Deed Upon Sale recorded on August 10, 2011 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, as document number 2011-0336912;
(10) A Grant Deed recorded on August 30, 2011, as Instrument No. 2011-0365288, in the Official Records of San Bernardino County;
(11) A Corporation Grant Deed recorded on October 13, 2011, as Instrument No. 2011-0428440, in the Official Records of San Bernardino County; and
(12) A Judgment Canceling Instruments and Quieting Title entered on May 1, 2013 in the United States District Court Central District of California Court Case Number EDCV 12-00477 VAP, which was then recorded as Instrument No. 2013-0279727 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County.
A court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)). Fannie Mae has provided a reference number for Exhibits 1-11, showing that they were in fact recorded; this demonstrates that the documents are public records. See Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Velazquez v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057-58 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Exhibit 12 is a court filing, which is subject to judicial notice. Accordingly, the Court grants judicial notice of these documents.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Requirements of Local Rule 55-1
Local Rule 55-1 provides that an application for default judgment must be accompanied by a declaration in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) setting forth: (1) when and against what party the default was entered; (2) the identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented by a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other representative; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply; and (5) that notice has been served on the defaulting party if required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2).
Fannie Mae has satisfied the requirements of Local Rule 55-1. (See Declaration of Brian P. Stewart ("Stewart Decl.") at ¶¶ 2-8 (Doc. No. 13-1).)
B. Default Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 authorizes the Court to enter a default judgment against a party that "fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend" a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (a)-(b)(2). "Even if entry of default has been made by the court clerk, granting a default judgment is not automatic; rather it is left to the sound discretion of the court." PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)); Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Demas Constr., Inc., 1997 WL 227976, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 1997) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Ioane v. Alter, 1997 WL 767526, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1997) (citing Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988)).
In exercising its discretion to grant or deny an application for default judgment, the Court considers the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits (collectively, "Eitel factors"). Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim and the sufficiency of the complaint are often treated by courts as the most important Eitel factors. Mnatsakanyan v. Goldsmith & Hull APC, 2013 WL 10155707, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Default Judgment
The general rule is that, upon default, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (1987); see also DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). Pursuant to Rule 8(b)(6), the Court accepts as true the allegations in the unanswered Complaint.
In applying the Eitel factors, the Court finds Fannie Mae entitled to entry of default judgment.
1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff
This "Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered." PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, Fannie Mae would be prejudiced if default judgment is not entered because it could not litigate on the merits since George did not respond. Without default, Fannie Mae would likely be without other recourse for recovery and the Grant Deed, Revocation of Power of Attorney, and Revocation of Deed would remain in the chain of title to the Bonita Property. George could continue to transfer improperly and further encumber the Bonita Property. Thus, this factor favors entry of default judgment.
2. The Merits of Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint
In evaluating a motion for default judgment, a court deems the complaint's factual allegations, other than those relating to the amount of damages, to be true. Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Allstate Beauty Prods., Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing see Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008)). The district court is not required to make detailed findings of fact. Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
a. Cancellation of the Recorded Documents
California Civil Code § 3412 authorizes the cancellation of written instruments if "there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding . . . serious injury [may occur] to a person against whom it is void or voidable." The plaintiff must show "facts constituting the invalidity of the instrument if the instrument is for any other reason void or voidable, then the facts showing it to be such, whatever be their nature, should be shown, and in such case, if the facts be well pleaded, a case is stated." Hironymous v. Hiatt, 52 Cal. App. 727, 731 (1921).
(i) Grant Deed
In California, a "grant [deed] takes effect, so as to vest the interest intended to be transferred, only upon its delivery by the grantor." Cal. Civ. Code § 1054; see Bank of Healdsburg v. Bailhache, 65 Cal. 327, 328-32 (1884). In other words, a deed is void if it is not legally delivered to the grantee. (Id.) Moreover, "delivery" refers to the grantor's intent to transfer title of the property described in the grant. Luna v. Brownell, 185 Cal. App. 4th 668, 673 (2010) (citing Osborn v. Osborn, 42 Cal. 2d 358, 363 (1954)).
Here, Boucher and George recorded the Grant Deed attempting to transfer the Bonita Property from GMAC to George without Fannie Mae's knowledge or authorization. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Therefore, Fannie Mae did not intend to transfer the Bonita Property to George. As a result, the Grant Deed could not be legally delivered and is void.
"[A]n instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase." Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 656 (1934). As discussed above, the Grant Deed recorded by Boucher and George is void. Thus, there is substantive merit to Fannie Mae's claim for cancellation of the Grant Deed purporting to transfer title from GMAC back to George.
(ii) Revocation of Power of Attorney
George's attempt to remove the Bonita Property trustee by recording the Revocation of Power of Attorney is void. Paragraph 24 of the GMAC DOT articulates the only mechanism by which a trustee can be changed, and it does not include a unilateral removal by the borrower. (Mot. at 7.) George, as the borrower, cannot remove the trustee to the Bonita Property. Thus, there is substantive merit to Fannie Mae's claim for cancellation of the Revocation of Power of Attorney.
Paragraph 24 of the GMAC DOT states as follows: "Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the office of the Recorder of the county in which the Property is located. The instrument shall contain the name of the original Lender, Trustee and Borrower, the book and page where this Security instrument is recorded and the name and address of the successor trustee. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, powers and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by Applicable Law. This procedure for substitution shall govern to the exclusion of all other provisions for substitution."
(iii) Revocation of Deed
George attempted to revoke the GMAC DOT from the Bonita Property chain of title by recording the Revocation of Deed. Similar to changing a trustee, however, Paragraph 23 of the GMAC DOT articulates the only mechanism by which the deed of trust can be reconveyed. (Mot. at 8.) According to this provision the GMAC DOT can only be reconveyed by the lender. George, as the borrower, cannot reconvey the GMAC DOT. Thus, there is substantive merit to Fannie Mae's claim for cancellation of the Revocation of Deed.
Paragraph 23 of the GMAC DOT states as follows: "Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it. Lender may charge such person or persons a reasonable fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) for services rendered and the charging of the fee is permitted under Applicable Law If the fee charged does not exceed the fee set by Applicable Law, the fee is conclusively presumed to be reasonable."
b. Quiet Title
An action for quiet title is brought "to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 760.020(a). Courts must follow specific procedural requirements to adjudicate a quiet title cause of action. (Id.) To state a claim, "the complaint shall be verified" and must include all of the following: (1) a legal description of the property and its street address or common designation; (2) the title of the plaintiff and the basis of the title; (3) the adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims. (Id. § 761.020.)
California prohibits the entry of default judgment in a quiet title action unless the Court conducts a thorough review of the evidence. See Harbour Vista, LLC v. HSBC Mortg. Servs. Inc., 201 Cal. App. 4th 1496 (2011). California courts conclude that "a quiet title judgment requires a hearing in open court. Although section 764.010 does not mandate oral argument — and we do not hold oral argument is necessary, though it may be helpful — the statute requires examining plaintiff's title and hearing defendant's evidence 'in all cases.'" Harbour Vista, LLC, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 1507 (2011).
Further, it is well established that "[u]nder the Erie doctrine [Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)], federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." In re Larry's Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). The Erie doctrine does not extend to matters of jurisdiction, or generally, to matters of procedure. Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1982). Harbour Vista's open court evidentiary hearing requirement, in quiet title claims, is procedural. Hence, the Court finds Fannie Mae's Complaint sufficient to make a claim for quiet title under section 761.020, without an evidentiary hearing, based on the judicially-noticed evidence supporting the claim.
Most evidentiary rules are procedural in nature, and the Federal Rules of Evidence ordinarily govern in diversity cases. Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995). Only state evidence rules that are "intimately bound up with the state's substantive decision making" must be given full effect by federal courts sitting in diversity. Id.
The first element of a quiet title claim is satisfied because the Complaint provides the legal description and address of the Bonita Property. (Compl. ¶ 8.)
The Complaint identifies Fannie Mae's title and the basis of the title. "A properly conducted non-judicial foreclosure sale constitutes a final adjudication of the rights of the borrower and lender." Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App. 4th 822, 831 (1994). Fannie Mae obtained title to the Bonita Property through a non-judicial foreclosure sale conducted on August 8, 2011, and a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale recorded August 10, 2011. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the second element.
The third element is satisfied because George's Grant Deed claim (Compl. ¶ 14; Exh. E) is adverse to Fannie Mae's Trustee's Deed Upon Sale claim to the Bonita Property title. (Compl. ¶ 10; Exh. B.)
The fourth element (date of determination) and fifth element (prayer for determination) are satisfied by Fannie Mae's request that the Court quiet title in its favor as of the date Fannie Mae recorded its Trustee's Deed Upon Sale. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
The Court finds that Fannie Mae has a valid claim to the Bonita Property title free and clear of George's recorded interests because "recording laws mandate that the first recorded deed of trust on real property is superior to subsequently recorded deeds." In re Sunset Bay Assocs., 944 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1214). Fannie Mae properly recorded the Trustee's Deed of Upon Sale on August 10, 2011, before Boucher and George recorded the void Grant Deed on August 30, 2011. George had proper record notice of Fannie Mae's title, and therefore is without right to any title to the Bonita Property. See In re Marriage of Cloney, 91 Cal. App. 4th 429, 442 (2001) ("[I]t is an equally well-established principle of law that any purchaser of real property acquires the property subject to prior interests of which he or she has actual or constructive notice.").
Since Fannie Mae has good and legal title to the Bonita Property, there is substantive merit to Fannie Mae's claim for quiet title to the Bonita Property.
3. The Sum of Money at Stake
This factor "takes into account the amount of money at stake and the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, which involves an assessment of whether the recovery sought is proportional to the harm which the defendant's conduct has caused." Trs. of Teamsters Local 631 Sec. Fund for S. Nevada v. Knox Installation-Dismantling & Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 4857897, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013).
Here, Fannie Mae is not seeking damages; rather, it is seeking to clear title to the Bonita Property, cancel the instruments filed by Boucher and George, and enjoin George from further unauthorized use of Fannie Mae's name. Since Fannie Mae is not seeking damages, and because the relief requested is proportional to the harm George caused, this factor favors entry of default judgment in support of the Motion.
4. Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts and Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect
Fannie Mae filed a Complaint that alleged the requisite elements for each claim and George did not file a response. Fannie Mae also provided supporting declarations and recorded documents that confirm Boucher and George acted without authorization and that Fannie Mae is the owner of the Bonita Property. Therefore, no genuine dispute of material facts exist. Elektra Entm't Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists.").
Fannie Mae made sufficient efforts to notify George of the Complaint and intent to seek default judgment by serving George properly. (Doc. No. 7.) Nonetheless, George has not responded nor attempted to defend this action. It is unlikely that default would be the result of excusable neglect.
Accordingly, these factors favor entry of default judgment.
5. The Strong Public Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits
Though "[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible," a defendant's failure to answer the plaintiff's complaint "makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible." Elektra, 226 F.R.D. at 393. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for termination of a case before a hearing on the merits where the defendant fails to defend an action. Here, George has failed to defend this action. Thus, this factor favors entry of default judgment.
Accordingly, as all the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment, the Court enters default judgment.
B. Permanent Injunction
1. Legal Standard
"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)("Winter test"); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) ("The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.").
Irreparable harm will be presumed where defendants engaged in acts prohibited by a statute that provides for injunctive relief. See Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2001).
12 U.S.C. § 1723a(e) (2012) prohibits any individual from the use of the words "'Federal National Mortgage Association,' 'Governmental National Mortgage Association,' or any other combination of such words." Violations of § 1723a(e) "may be enjoined by any court of general jurisdiction." (Id.)
2. Discussion
The first element of the Winter test is met because Fannie Mae succeeds on the merits of its claims to cancel Boucher and George's recorded documents, and gain quiet title to the Bonita Property.
The second element is met because George may attempt to convey or otherwise encumber the Bonita Property in the future, and because George used the name Federal National Mortgage Association and Government National Mortgage Association in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(e). (Compl. ¶ 15.) Therefore, under Silver, there is a presumption of irreparable harm to Fannie Mae.
The third element is met because a monetary judgment will not prevent George from further clouding title to the Bonita Property, making an injunction necessary to grant relief. Furthermore, George's Grant Deed is void and without legal title to Bonita Property. Thus, the balance of equities clearly favor Fannie Mae.
The fourth element is met because it is in the public interest that real property in the community is free and clear of void and improper encumbrances.
As all the elements of the Winter test are met, the Court GRANTS the request for a permanent injunction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court (1) GRANTS Fannie Mae's request for cancellation of the recorded documents; (2) QUIETS TITLE to the Bonita Property; and, (3) ENJOINS George from recording any further documents against the title of the Bonita Property and from any further unauthorized use of Fannie Mae's name. Thus, the Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED, and Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Fannie Mae and against Defendant Divina Albasete George as follows:
(1) The Court declares that Fannie Mae is the true and lawful owner of the real property commonly known as 1918 S. Bonita Ave., Ontario, CA 91762 (the "Bonita Property") and legally described as:
Lot 50, Tract 11306, as per plat Recorded in Book 153, Page(S) 55 to 61 Inclusive of Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessor's Parcel No. 1050-352-19;
(2) The Court declares that the Revocation of Power of Attorney recorded on June 15, 2010 as Instrument No. 2010-0236728 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, California is VOID, ab initio, and does not alter title as established by the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded as Instrument No. 2011-0336912 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County;
(3) The Court declares that the Revocation of Deed recorded on June 15, 2010 as Instrument No. 2010-0236729 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, California is VOID, ab initio, and does not alter title as established by the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded as Instrument No. 2011-0336912 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County;
(4) The Court declares that the Grant Deed recorded on August 30, 2011 as Instrument No. 2011-0365288 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County, California is VOID, ab initio, and does not alter title as established by the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded as Instrument No. 2011-0336912 in the Official Records of San Bernardino County;
(5) The Court declares that Fannie Mae shall have judgment in its favor for its claim of quiet title to the subject property located at 1918 S. Bonita Ave., Ontario, CA 91762, as against Divina Albasete George;
(6) The Court declares that Divina Albasete George is enjoined from recording any further documents against the title to the Bonita Property and from any further unauthorized use of Fannie Mae's name. Dated: July 7, 2015
/s/_________
VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
United States District Judge